Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

033.4211/4–2453

No. 967
Memorandum by the Chargé in Canada (Bliss) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

secret

Ottawa, April 24, 1953.

• Subject: Development of Canadian Defense.

This paper is directed primarily to consideration of topics which might be discussed between the President and the Prime Minister on May 7. The point of departure is the latter part of Memorandum of Conversation dated April 23¹ which summarizes views put forward by senior officials in the Department of External Affairs. From that I am going on to a broader statement of Canada’s defense posture at this time and for the near future, with special reference to the priorities which should govern Canada in defense planning.

Background

Certain factors must always be taken into account in appraising Canadian capabilities in the light of military, economic and political situations:

1. The Canadian people, and hence the Canadian Government, do not share the sense of urgency of the American people and of the American Government toward creating a strong defense against Russian aggression as quickly as possible. In the Canadian view the United States is “Pearl Harbor minded.” Current developments, including many apparently authoritative statements originating in the United States, have led the Canadians to believe that we are slowing up in the drive to create strong western defenses. The Canadian sense of urgency is thus weakened further.

2. This is an election year in Canada and one of the principal election issues is the high level of defense expenditure, which takes close to half the budget. The Government is charged by its political opponents with waste and extravagance in the defense field and with failure to provide adequately for home defense. The fact that Canada has given priority to contributions of military forces to the UN in Korea and to NATO in Europe, taking a calculated risk in the field of home defense, is not understood by the general public. However, the Government is beginning to feel the political pressure and will soon have to make a better showing in the field of home defense.

3. Canada is economically strong but thinly populated and should be regarded less as a source of military manpower than as a source of economic strength for NATO in raw materials and in manufactured goods, including military end-items. In the field of military activity the Canadians wisely devote their greatest energies to development of air power, which is costly in money but economical in manpower.

4. The Canadians reacted promptly to the Korean aggression by undertaking a sizeable military contribution to the UN and to NATO and have not revised this to any material extent. The greater part of the program will be completed this year, after which it is the intention to devote more resources to home defense unless it is determined that there is a greater need elsewhere.

5. In connection with its defense buildup Canada has developed a considerable range of industrial activity for defense production and it is currently heavy. Unless a continued requirement for Canadian military end-items is found, however, defense production will soon slow down and its structure become disorganized.

For a considerable range of important reasons, therefore, Canada now finds itself at a crossroads, with its original defense effort nearing completion, with imperatives for a new orientation looming large. Hence the Prime Minister’s current concern to examine the future with the President and to discuss the priorities which Canada should take into account in future planning. As indicated in the attached Memorandum of Conversation, the official mind in Ottawa is thinking in terms of three main alternatives for further Canadian effort, as between Korea, North America and Europe.

Korea

The recruitment and despatch of a Canadian Brigade to Korea and its incorporation in the Commonwealth Division were accepted by the Canadian people as necessary and desirable. Canadians are proud of the record of the 25th Brigade and the Government will undoubtedly maintain it as long as the fighting continues. The Prime Minister is looking ahead, however, to the time when fighting ceases in Korea and to the possibility of popular demand for the withdrawal of Canadian troops. The United States of course faces the same possibility.

For some time there has been a certain volume of complaint in the United States because we are carrying the brunt of the war in Korea. If the troops of other nations are withdrawn promptly from Korea after an armistice, leaving us to carry the occupation burden alone, we might have a serious political situation at home. It would seem to me highly desirable, in the interest of UN coherence and unity, that the Commonwealth Division be expected to remain on duty in Korea along with a considerable body of American troops, and that the Canadians be expected to play their part. There would undoubtedly be some grumbling in Canada, but I cannot believe that the Government would be seriously embarrassed if the situation were properly explained.

The assumptions made by NATO military planners that the 25th Canadian Brigade, if withdrawn from Korea, would then be available for stationing in Europe, would present great difficulties in Canada. The Canadians have strongly resisted all proposals that they increase their forces in Europe and they regard the 27th Brigade as a token force without real military significance. They argue strongly that deployment of Canadian troops in Europe is uneconomical, particularly as compared with the deployment of European troops.

North American Defense

As intimated above, the Canadians have tended to postpone the development of their home defenses in favor of the NATO buildup. Their home air squadrons are equipped with obsolete aircraft and the RCAF has stripped itself of trained manpower for the squadrons in Europe. In theory there is an airborne brigade in Canada to check a surprise invasion of Canadian soil, but its personnel are scattered, the unit is seriously undermanned, and it lacks the aircraft to become operational. The Canadian naval program is at best feeble and is greatly in arrears. Canada has no organized anti-aircraft defense.

In these circumstances consideration should be given to agreement that the next Canadian priority should be the development of home defenses, in which so much needs to be done. From the viewpoint of the United States we would have to consider whether or not we would welcome such a Canadian buildup as a contribution to the defense of North America. It is clearly a NATO area, both technically and as a practical matter. If the great North American economic basis for the NATO structure is not defended we would face a sorry future in an emergency. From the military point of view, also, there may be merit in encouraging the Canadian development of home defenses, if for no other reason than to provide a solid base for Canadian military contributions overseas. At the moment the RCAF squadrons in Europe have little behind them at home in terms of equipment or trained men. The ground troops abroad, also, however effective and self-sufficient in themselves, do not have behind them a solid structure of trained men and adequate equipment. To all intents and purposes the Canadians have no usable reserve forces, and even as training cadres they are thin. Considerable progress is being made in producing military stores for an army buildup in the event of an emergency, but even this is spotty and there are many crucial deficiencies.

As the situation stands today, the United States is almost exclusively responsible for the defense of North America, including the defense of Canada in the event of an emergency.

NATO in Europe

For some time the Canadians have prided themselves on having undertaken an important program of contributions to NATO defense in Europe, including the 27th Brigade and twelve fighter squadrons. They developed this program at an early stage of the Medium Term Defense Plan and have not changed it except for a slight increase in the number of air squadrons. They regard it as a real program, in contrast with the “paper” commitments of other countries, and insist that it will be completed in full and on time. They do not know where they will go from here in Europe and would prefer to go nowhere.

In all the NATO meetings, including the TCC, the Canadians have consistently refused to increase their land forces in Europe. Although admitting that they are capable of maintaining a division in Germany they have argued against it in terms of unnecessary expense.

In the current Council Meeting the Canadians have refused to participate further in the air buildup in Europe. In our view they could not accept any important commitment of this nature without a drastic revision of existing programs. In terms of trained airmen their organization is very thin and is subject to excessive strain to man the squadrons now in and preparing to move in Germany the next few months.² In terms of equipment they would have real difficulty. Canadair is already in arrears of several months with its deliveries of F–86 fighters to the UK and could not step up its production in the predictable future without taking drastic and possibly undesirable steps, such as dropping its current program of producing T–36 and T–33 trainers, some of them for the United States. The company would also have to build a new plant to accommodate an extension of operations, and this would be a lengthy and costly matter. The recruiting of the necessary additional labor would present other difficulties. To sum up, the Canadians feel that the Canadair operation is presently operating at about the proper level and should be considerably expanded only in a grave emergency.

Production of the Canadian CF–100 all weather fighter is much in arrears but Canadian-built Orenda engines are in increasingly good supply and will soon be installed in F–86 fighters. Output of the CF–100 is earmarked for the home squadrons.

All of this, taken in conjunction with the apparently growing general impression that the United States and everybody else is having second thoughts about the defense structure in Europe, would make it difficult to convince the Canadians that European defense should have a high priority in their planning during the next two years.

Defense Production

Studies prepared in this Embassy and recommendations which we have made as a result, have led to the conclusion that the best way to recruit additional Canadian strength for NATO would be to develop end-item aid programs further. We believe that room could be found in the next Canadian defense budget for an increase in the mutual aid program to perhaps $500 million, assuming some corresponding decrease in other defense budget items. The Canadian defense industry will clearly be in need of additional orders in 1954 if production lines are to keep going.

The chief difficulty in realizing such a program is to determine exactly what items Canada can best produce and to find outlets for this defense production among the NATO countries in areas where such assistance is really needed. In our view a high priority should be given to a careful examination of the possibilities, with a view to proposing to Canada the development of an industry for defense production and the generation of a sufficient demand for its output to give the advantages of large-scale production and of continued operations for a sufficient period to justify the capital investment. The capital investment itself would not be a serious problem in Canada.

Conclusions

1. The Canadian 25th Brigade should remain in Korea and is not available for transfer to Europe.

2. The next phase of the Canadian defense buildup should be oriented to strengthen North American defenses.

3. Additional Canadian contributions to NATO in Europe should take the form of military end-items delivered under mutual aid.

Don C. Bliss

1. Reference is to a report by Bliss on his conversation of Apr. 23 with Acting Under Secretary Ritchie and Assistant Under Secretary MacKay regarding matters they believed the Prime Minister would wish to raise in his scheduled meetings with President Eisenhower in Washington on May 7 and 8. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, not printed, is attached to the source text.
2. A penciled notation on the source text at this point indicates that the squadrons referred to here were presently in the United Kingdom and were preparing to move to Germany in the next few months.