611.42/11–1952
No. 955
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State1
secret
[Washington,] November 19, 1952.
- Subject: Material on Canada
Problem
To take full advantage of your visit to Canada November 21–23 to bring
Canadian attitudes, policies and actions into conformity or harmony with
those of the United States, and to dispel or mollify Canadian
apprehensions regarding United States action on matters of common
interest.
Recommendations
- A.
-
General Attitudes
It is recommended that, to the extent that the nature of your
visit permits, you take every opportunity that presents itself
to indicate to Canadian Cabinet Ministers our conviction that
there is no cause for complacency. It could be observed that
fundamentally there is no lessened danger of aggression by the
Soviets than existed in the tense days of the Berlin blockade
and the onset of the aggression in Korea. (Your speech2 has been designed for the same
purpose.)
You could add that every NATO
partner has got to see how it can best contribute to collective
security, especially at this time when the organization is
threatened by the strains experienced by Britain and France. The
present moment is an opportunity for Canada to provide an
inspiring example in NATO, thus
contributing to a confident attitude at the next meeting.
Based on past experience that direct U. S. approaches on these
matters can do more harm than good, it is recommended that you
not raise the Canada–NATO issue
frontally but, by private conversations with Cabinet Ministers,
build up a favorable climate for a NATO approach.
- B.
-
Bilateral Defense Matters
If opportunity presents itself, you could express hope that the
execution of our joint responsibility to defend the North
American continent can be carried forward without bickering and
in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. You could note that there
seems to
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be evidence
of defects on both sides when recent problems are
examined—unilateral planning on one side, and hypersensitivity
regarding political repercussions on the other; but that we
cannot allow the joint defense job to become bogged down by such
considerations. You could add that the United States has no
desire to put one more soldier on Canadian soil than is
necessary to discharge the job at hand, taking into account the
portion of the total defense task which Canada is presently in
position to handle. You could assure them as to Canadian
sovereignty—we completely respect it.
- C.
-
St. Lawrence Project
If the Seaway and Power Project is raised by the Canadians, you
might express gratification that the two countries seem on their
way, finally, toward making use of a great natural resource. The
understanding and cooperative attitude of the President could be
noted, and also—on the point of the authority of the FPC to name the power entity—Mr.
Truman’s remark
to you on the telephone that “God, Himself, couldn’t move the
FPC.” It would be well to
mention that by the terms of the Federal Power Act, a licensee
of the FPC is not granted
immunity from litigation by opponents and we would be unwise not
to expect litigation, perhaps of long duration.
- D.
-
Hoof and Mouth Embargo
Only if this subject is raised by the Canadians should you
express confidence that the U.S. Department of Agriculture will
not maintain the embargo any longer than necessary; that you
believe the Canadian livestock industry concurs in the need to
control hoof and mouth disease and that the embargo is not a
protectionist device. You might express optimism, in a nebulous
way, about resumption of our meat imports from Canada but not be
specific in this matter, and certainly not with Minister of
Agriculture Gardiner, whose speeches have done more harm than
good.
Discussion
General. A few salient points regarding present
Canadian attitudes are provided at Tab A. It is clear that Canadians are
becoming increasingly complacent, introspective and engrossed with
internal politics. To the extent that Canadian interests on the
international scene are or could be endangered, there is a concomitant
endangering United States interests.
Bilateral Joint Defense Matters. A résumé of
difficulties encountered with the Canadians in getting approval of
either U.S. or US–Canadian joint defense projects in Canada is given at
Tab B, a memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary Matthews.3 The
Permanent
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Joint Board on
Defense, Canada and the U.S. is encountering heavy going and while the
fault is not all the Canadians’, they certainly share the blame.
St. Lawrence
Project. You will recall the exchange of letters between Prime
Minister St. Laurent and
President Truman in which
the Canadians outlined reasons why they considered the 1941 Seaway
Agreement as superseded. The most recent developments and the present
position of the project is outlined at Tab C.4 The Canadian Government fears
that the St. Lawrence will be
an important issue in the next election unless steady progress is shown
in bringing it to fruition. The Government has pressed the Department to
have the entity named on the U.S. side to construct the power works,
presumably the New York State Power Authority, and seems unable to
understand that this is beyond the power of the Administration since the
U.S. entity will be that authorized by permit of the Federal Power
Commission or—theoretically—authorized by Congressional action. It is
probable that the Canadians do not appreciate the extent to which any
non-federal entity undertaking construction would be exposed to
litigation on the part of interests opposed to the project.
Hoof and Mouth Embargo. The greatest caution is
required regarding the fact that the Department of Agriculture is taking
positive steps to lift the embargo imposed last February 25 when hoof
and mouth disease was confirmed. Premature leakage regarding the steps
contemplated by the Department of Agriculture could upset these plans.
The embargo stopped meat and livestock exports to the U.S. worth
$100–135 million per annum. By internal adjustments and price support,
plus a triangular deal involving the U.K. and New Zealand, it has been
possible to avoid serious difficulty but reopening the U.S. border would
be welcomed economically. The matter is of political significance and
especially so to Minister of Agriculture Gardiner, who has been
personally criticised for his part in coping with the initial outbreak
of the disease in Canada.
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Tab A
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge
of Commonwealth Affairs (Peterson)5
Canadian Attitudes
- A.
- International Affairs
- 1.
- The Canadians are almost always with us on the major
issues in NATO and in
the UN (notable recent
exception: Korea), in GATT, and multilateral trade matters, and
in bilateral defense and economic collaboration. While
they understand in theory the nature of the Soviet
threat (and know what militant communism would do to
their social and economic system, which remains based on
private enterprise with only modest socialistic
adjustments of a welfare nature), they seem to feel no
immediate threat to Canadian national interests.
- 2.
- They are enjoying a boom as their country is developed
and industrialized, which is a cause for pride. They are
looking inward, very much as this country did in the
’20’s, with little real interest in international
affairs.
- 3.
- Where the Canadians diverge from us, or oppose us, is
chiefly in matters of execution, method and timing. The
sense of urgency prevalent in Washington is not matched
in Ottawa nor generally in Canada.
- 4.
- A feeling persists that the United States is awkward
and hasty in its role of leadership in the Free World,
inclined to be “trigger happy” and lavish in its
provision of defense facilities and forces, reluctant to
take time necessary to plan carefully and thus to
economize.
- 5.
- The feeling of peril following the attack on Korea has
practically disappeared in Canada. There is no urgency
about preparations for any direct attack from Russia.
Inevitable delays and frustrations in carrying out their
defense program are being accepted with equanimity. The
Canadians prefer to keep hemispheric defense in the
planning stage rather than follow our lead in actually
placing forces and facilities in position.
- 6.
- Canada, despite the buoyancy of its economy, does not
feel that it can match the U.S. in the liberal or
continuing provision of unrequited exports to NATO countries or other
destinations calculated to support the free world. The
Canadians, who pride themselves as frugal and pragmatic,
want and feel they require payment for their staple
exports and it is upon this firmly-held conviction
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that NATO and U.S. hopes for
Canadian economic aid to Europe have floundered. It is
believed that the Cabinet will maintain its adamant
position in the matter of economic aid.
- 7.
- The pressure of food surpluses, as consequence of
excellent grain crops and the hoof and mouth embargo in
the United States is not excessive and the agricultural
community is a decreasingly important segment of the
electorate and hense unable to force the government to
finance food exports. Canada’s share in the Colombo Plan
is $25 million and Finance Minister Abbott last August
stated his flat opposition to any increase.
- 8.
- Canada has consistently refused to accept enlarged
force commitments in NATO or speed up deployment. They did
accept at Lisbon6 an additional $100 million of Mutual Aid
support, but this was used chiefly to finance transfers
of existing arms, built to British specifications, which
are now non-standard in Canada and have been extensively
shipped overseas for forces of other NATO countries.
- 9.
- Conversely, Canada could be attracted to a program of
increased free transfer of military end items to NATO because this would
satisfy a desire to contribute to mutual security
without weakening Canada’s economic underpinnings and
concurrently would support the industrialization of the
country and maintain its defense production base.
- 10.
- The NATO examining
group at Paris is convinced of Canadian economic
capability to provide increased support to NATO.
- 11.
- Canada is not likely to catch up to the average NATO country’s
mobilization in relation to population because
conscription is one of the most serious, deep-rooted
political issues between French and English Canada and
in any event, the Canadians argue that their ratio of
manpower to resources makes it advisable to use its
resources and that the use of Canadian manpower in
forces represents a waste.
- 12.
- Three statements made October 23 by Arnold Heeney,
Permanent Representative of Canada to NAC, in the examination of
the Canadian response to the NATO Annual Review questionnaire are
significant:
- (a)
- “The Government of Canada is not yet in
position to give any firm figure for the
expenditure it expects to make in the fiscal year
1953–1954” (e.g., no comment on defense outlays
contemplated after March 13, 1953, despite NATO’s urgent need to
plan at least 12 months ahead).
- (b)
- “On the other hand, there is no disposition to
reduce the Canadian force commitments.” (Canada’s
record is good in fulfilling
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its original MC 26/17 commitment but she has refused to
take on more: e.g., does not consider any part of
the unallocated aircraft deficiency calculated at
Lisbon as a Canadian obligation.)
- (c)
- “In general it may be said that while the
Canadian Government will take the necessary action
to complete and finance its declared physical
programme, it appears unlikely that the Canadian
financial appropriation will exceed that for the
current year.”
- 13.
- Political considerations outweigh and over-ride
economic considerations in formulating the Government’s
attitude toward defense projects, whether bilateral or
multilateral. The Federal Government, in power over 17
years, is apprehensive about the coming election in view
of the landslide in favor of the “outs” in the United
States and in view of Liberal Party defeats on local
issues, notably in the Provincial elections of New
Brunswick. Taxation, prices which are irritatingly high,
and the continued impediment to dollar exports and
consequent dislocation of foreign trade are basic
election issues. Public criticisms of waste and
inefficiency in Government operations and expenditures
have been chiefly directed at the defense program. A
continued budgetary surplus is criticised as
inflationary by the Opposition. It is believed that
during this Canadian election period the Prime Minister
will weigh his every action in terms of the effect upon
the chances of the Liberal Party in the election. This,
in absence of some international development which would
result in a return of the mid-1950 feeling of urgency,
probably as a practical matter precludes any possibility
of an expanded Canadian defense effort or more Canadian
troops for Korea.
- 14.
- The NATO Central
Organization seems not to have made a serious effort to
bring Canadian productive capacity into its planning to
the same extent that it has with European countries.
Canada has some reason to feel she is outside the NATO European circle. Some
U.S. recommendations designed to correct this are now
under consideration in SRE [S/AE?].
- B.
- Bilateral Affairs
- 15.
- The Canadians examine with care and deliberation every
request put forward by the United States regarding new
or additional defense facilities. They are anxious to
protect their sovereignty and are wary of long-term
arrangements and fixed tenures. They consider
Newfoundland compromised its sovereignty in the 99-year
leases, which was a bitter pill to swallow when
Newfoundland became a Canadian Province.
- 16.
- There exists a decided antipathy in Ottawa toward the
stationing of additional U.S. military forces in Canada
during peace time, especially when they are posted in
populous areas. (The Torbay base area at St.
John’s, Newfoundland, is a case
in point.) The attempt to cover up the fact that U.S.
forces are in Canada has at times involved ludicrous
limitations, e.g., requests regarding the location of
office space and the wearing of civilian attire rather
than uniforms.
- 17.
- U.S. military forces have been circumspect and correct
in Canada, are welcomed locally—especially in
Newfoundland where there is an appreciable degree of
support to the economy as result of defense
expenditures.
- 18.
- Canadians are sensitive to bilateral pressures from
the United States and resent and will reject dictation.
Canadians have scant sympathy for problems with Congress
and requests for Canadian action to ease Congressional
problems carry little weight. There is justification,
however, in the U.S. pointing out that through Marshall
Plan purchases and off-shore procurement we have
materially supported the Canadian economy and it is only
equitable that Canada should aid the U.K. in any crisis;
and that their hard-headed business attitude must give
way when national security is jeopardized.
- 19.
- While there no longer exists much fear that enlarged
North-South economic interchange is a forerunner of
political domination (which was the issue in the
Reciprocity question in 1911), there is a latent
uneasiness about the extent to which U.S. capital is
joining in the recent development of Canada. The idea
seems to be that Wall Street is muscling in on the
Canadians’ birthright and they will be left as “hewers
of wood”. There is, for example, some criticism of the
St. Lawrence
Waterway as permitting Labrador iron ore to move to the
States. “Why not use it here?” is a common attitude,
especially among those moderately educated in economics
but whose opinions, as entrepreneurs and managers, are
held in respect by the rank and file.
