Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

752.5/7–552

No. 860
Record of a Meeting Between United States and Spanish Representatives, Madrid, July 5, 1952¹

secret

Madrid, July 5, 1952

Arguelles said that he had called us together because the Spanish Government on the military, economic and political sides had been doing a good deal of soul searching during the last few days and had decided that it would be useful to give us as clearly as possible the essence of the conclusions the Spanish had come to. It was obvious that these derived from a cabinet meeting on July 4, 1952.

Arguelles spoke in English throughout (something he has never done heretofore). He made it clear that although talking only to the economic side of the U.S. negotiating team, he had been instructed to talk officially and express the views of the Spanish Government.

He said they considered that the negotiations had come to a “standstill”; that Arburua had had lengthy discussions all week with General Vigon from which it was apparent that General Vigon was not satisfied that the amount of military aid thus far suggested ($12 million² plus the entire $25 million³) would permit him to provide adequately for the defense of the national territory in the light of the increased vulnerability of Spain which would result from an agreement now to permit the U.S. to construct and utilize air bases under the terms and conditions we have outlined; that realizing that the U.S. position was such that a total of $125 million is all that will be available in Fiscal ’53, the Spanish Government had considered how far it would be willing to go within the limitation of the sums available and had decided to suggest the following:

1. Negotiate and sign an Economic Aid Agreement

2. Negotiate and sign an MDAP Agreement

3. Negotiate and sign an agreement providing for the construction of air bases (here he parenthetically added that the Spanish Government would pay peseta costs from counterpart)

4. Negotiate and sign a conditional agreement covering the utilization of the bases. In this connection, he said that a final agreement regarding use of the bases cannot be a quid pro quo for the agreements suggested in 1, 2, and 3 above and expressed the opinion that progressive negotiations for the use of the bases should be developed “au fur y mésure” as Spain’s economic and military capability developed as the result of implementation of the MDAP and Economic Agreements.

In reply to Mr. Train’s question as to whether a conditional time-phased agreement for progressive utilization of the bases would be possible of execution together with the other three agreements, Mr. Arguelles was somewhat doubtful but agreed to explore the matter further in the light of the consideration that the U.S. could hardly use appropriated dollar funds for the equipment of bases with respect to the use of which, in given circumstances, the position was unclear. Mr. Train suggested consideration of conditions begin from an unconditional commitment by Spain for immediate utilization of the bases in the event of war. Mr. Arguelles said that he would provide Mr. Train with a written memorandum⁴ of the Spanish government proposal within two or three days and that the present discussion was intended to explain and clarify the thinking behind this memorandum. Mr. Arguelles made several interesting statements and gave the impression of speaking with unusual frankness—always on a personal and friendly basis—in the course of the conversation. For example, he said that in the matter of increased vulnerability, the opinion of the Spanish army and its officers had to be taken into account. In fact, he said that in a country where public opinion does not exist, the responsibility of a government for making decisions affecting the nation was even more grave than would be the case if there was such a thing as public opinion. He certainly intimated that (a) the position of the Spanish Government depends on the support of the army and (b) that the army would not be satisfied to see a base agreement executed unless it was given sufficient equipment to permit its officers to become more actively operational, presently or prospectively, than would be the case with the amount of funds now proposed for military assistance. Mr. Train explained the difficulty of supplying equipment to a Spanish army which would have a purely defensive role, stating that unsatisfied prior commitments to NATO countries for scarce equipment precluded, in his opinion, the immobilization of such equipment in Spain or anywhere else. Mr. Train also stated that there was a strong impression, whether well founded or not, among many officials in the U.S. Government that General Franco would never permit Spanish ground forces to fight outside Spain, to which Mr. Arguelles replied that there were elements in Spain which did not wish to see any agreements with the United States.

Mr. Train repeatedly urged Mr. Arguelles to use every effort to persuade General Vigon to permit the staff level discussions requested by General Kissner to commence immediately and intimated that this was the “next step” indispensable to consideration of the Spanish suggestions.

Conclusions

1. It is not possible to obtain a base agreement in the form we now propose in consideration of $125 million military and economic aid, no matter how we slice this figure. We have convinced the Spanish that this is all we are prepared to offer at this time. It is possible to get an agreement to begin base construction at once, an MDAP agreement and an Economic Aid Agreement based on $125 million.

2. If General Kissner’s staff level discussions result in conclusions that the Spanish army can be satisfied with equipment to be delivered at some future date costing say $150 million over a period of three years or $50 million annually in addition to the military component of the $125 million presently authorized, it is my opinion that we can get a base agreement on the terms we want.

1. The participants in this meeting, which took place at 11 a.m. in Arguelles’ office, were George F. Train, Ivan B. White, and Richard S. McCaffery, Jr., for the United States, and Jaime Arguelles and Francisco Javier Elorza for Spain. No indication of authorship was found on the source text.
2. This figure was the sum allocated for military aid in DMS D–7, Document 846, and proposed in Train’s aide-mémoire,Document 851.
3. This figure was the sum appropriated for Spain in the Mutual Security Act of 1952, P.L. 82–400 (66 Stat. 141), June 20, 1952. No restrictions were placed by Congress on its use within Spain.
4. Transmitted in telegram 41 from Madrid, infra.