Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5411 Series

No. 776
Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 5411/2

[Washington,] April 15, 1954.

U.S. Policy Toward Italy

general considerations

1. The “cold war” loss of Italy to Communist control would result in profound political, psychological and military damage to the free world. Such a loss would:

a. Be a clear defeat of Christian-European ideology by Soviet-Communist ideology at the historic seat of the Roman Catholic church; and place behind the Iron Curtain a country whose cultural and historical influence has played a great part in the development of Western civilization.

b. Possibly strike a damaging blow to the national will of anti-Soviet and so-called neutral countries to resist Communism, and to the hopes of the peoples of Satellite countries for ultimate liberation from the Soviet yoke.

c. Reduce appreciably the total available NATO defense forces, and deprive the NATO of industrial capacity capable of assisting in meeting the needs of the armed forces of other NATO countries.

d. Deprive the Allied Powers of strategically important air and naval bases from which to support NATO ground forces in southern Europe, to support the over-all air offensive, and to defend sea and air lines of communication in the Mediterranean area.

e. Require drastic revision of the present NATO strategic concept for the defense of Europe, because of the pivotal geographic location of Italy in the NATO defense perimeter and the commanding position of the Italian peninsula and Sicily with respect to the Mediterranean.

f. Seriously impair Yugoslavia’s over-all capability of contributing to Western defense, and greatly increase the pressure on that country to effect an accommodation with the Soviet Bloc.

g. Add substantial manpower, military equipment, technical skills, and industrial capacity to the Soviet Bloc.

h. Make possible Communist control of Italian Somaliland.

2. Up to the election of 1948, grave danger existed that Italy would fall under Communist domination. In these elections, Communism was rebuffed and a Center government established, due in part to large-scale economic aid and firm moral support from the United States.

3. From April 1948 to June 1953, Italy under De Gasperi made progress on many fronts. Communist control of the labor movement was diminished by the growth of non-Communist labor federations. With large-scale American aid, the economy improved. Production and the real wages of those employed rose well above prewar levels. Steps to meet basic problems were initiated in such fields as tax reform, land reform and a program for southern development.

4. Despite these advances, however, grave problems have persisted. Italy, poor in most raw materials, has one of the highest densities of population in Europe. Tax and agricultural reforms and the southern development program have proceeded slowly. Per capita income is low, and there are wide discrepancies in standards of living. About 20 per cent of the labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Labor disputes have continued. Basic feelings of insecurity among the workers and long-entrenched popular sentiments of anti-clericalism and anti-governmentalism are important political factors. The resulting pessimism and cynicism about Italy’s future have made a substantial part of the Italian population a fertile field for Communism and intensified authoritarian tendencies.

5. The Communists have built up over many years an effective machine of subversion reaching down to the block and village level. Italy has the largest Communist Party outside the Soviet Bloc; the Communists and their allies, the Nenni Socialists, together control about 35 per cent of the vote. There is a distinct trend on the part of the labor and lower middle classes from the Center to the pro-Communist Left, which is the principal force of opposition to the Government. Popular support for the Communists has been furthered, and strong action by the Government has been made politically difficult, by relatively moderate “popular front” tactics, the Soviet peace campaign, popular acceptance of the Communist Party as a legitimate organization, and disunity among its opponents.

6. Since 1948 the Center government has been outspoken in its anti-Communism, improved its internal security forces and reacted vigorously to Communist threats to public order, but it has failed to discredit Communist appeals or take adequate steps to undermine the vast Communist organization. This inadequacy has in turn strengthened the forces of the Right.

7. Before the 1953 election, Italy under De Gasperi and Sforza collaborated closely with the Western Powers, particularly the United States; gave vigorous support to NATO, and early assumed a position of leadership in the movement for European integration, motivated not only by long-range security considerations but by hope that through European unity its economic and political problems might be alleviated.

8. Italian domestic progress and international cooperation have now been jeopardized as a result of the 1953 election. The previously firm governing majority of pro-Western parties has been replaced by an unstable situation in which it is very difficult for the Christian Democrats to form a viable government. If present conditions continue, there is grave danger that a succession of weak governments will increasingly discredit the Center and strengthen the Right and Left extremes. However, the Communists and Nenni Socialists are unlikely to obtain power within the next two years.

9. Italy’s value to the West would be appreciably lessened under rightist or authoritarian regimes. Although a moderate rightist government would probably continue cooperation with the West, its domestic policies might aggravate internal frictions and ultimately strengthen the Communists. An extreme rightist government would be almost certainly authoritarian, probably ultra-nationalist and opposed to European unity, and possibly neutralist. However, even a right-wing authoritarianism would be far less dangerous than a Communist regime.

10. In this situation it is clearly in U.S. interests to give maximum feasible support to a reinforcement of center strength as broadly based as is consistent with implementation of the reforms necessary to improve basic social and economic conditions in Italy.

11. During the last five years, our policy of seeking to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western alignment has, in the absence of a Trieste settlement, placed severe strains upon our relations with Italy. The Italians maintain that our policy has improved Yugoslavia’s bargaining position and diminished its readiness to agree to a compromise solution on Trieste. This situation has delayed parliamentary consideration of EDC and negotiations on NATO facilities in Italy for U.S. use. An early Trieste solution of a kind in which the Italian Government can acquiesce is important to popular confidence in any government based on the Christian Democrat Party, and essential to achievement of Italo-Yugoslav defense collaboration.

12. While Italian forces cannot be expected to make any substantial contribution to the defense of Europe outside Italy itself, they are expected to develop the capability, when supported by naval and air forces of the other Western Powers, of protecting the southern flank of Allied Forces Central Europe and, in conjunction with the Yugoslavian forces, of defending the western flank of Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe. Additionally, the Italian peninsula and Sicily constitute an area of great strategic importance as a base area for the air and naval forces of other NATO nations. Furthermore, the heavy industry and the oil refining facilities of Italy have been rehabilitated to the point that they can now not only meet the needs of the Italian armed forces but, through the cross-servicing system, help to fulfill the matériel requirements of the armed forces of other NATO countries. Italian forces can be expected to fight effectively if at the outbreak of hostilities the United States is able, through NATO or directly, to provide effective leadership and support.

objective

13. An Italy free from Communist domination or serious threat of Communist subversion, having a constitutional, democratic government and a healthy self-sustaining economy, and able and willing to make important political, economic and military contributions in support of the free world coalition.

courses of action

. . . . . . .

Italian Collaboration in the Free World

27. As long as Italy continues to meet its defense obligations to the West, continue appropriate military assistance toward equipping and maintaining currently-agreed Italian forces.

28. Acting whenever appropriate with the support of or in concert with other friendly governments:

a. Support Italian participation in the movement for European integration and encourage Italy to reassume a primary role in this movement.

b. Promote strengthened Italian political, economic and military collaboration with the United States and Western Europe through such organizations as NATO, OEEC, CSC and EDC.

c. Seek to persuade the Italian Government that it is in the best interest of Italy to ratify EDC promptly.

d. Encourage the Italian Government to fulfill its NATO commitments for combat-effective forces, and to this end to maintain its defense spending consistent with its economic capabilities.

e. Continue, as appropriate, attempts to obtain Italian admission to the UN.

f. Continue efforts to bring about an Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement, particularly through an early solution of the Trieste problem of a kind which would make such a rapprochement possible.

Future Contingencies

29. In the event of an external attack against Italy, the United States should make such use of its military power as it may agree to be necessary under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

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1. In an attached note of Apr. 15 to the NSC, Executive Secretary Lay summarized the decisions of the NSC at the meeting of Apr. 13 and stated the following: “The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5411/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. The Financial Appendix enclosed in NSC 5411/1 and the NSC staff study enclosed in NSC 5411 (revised to reflect changes in the statement of policy) are also transmitted herewith for Council information. Accordingly, NSC 67/3 is hereby superseded.” The 6-page Financial Appendix and the 35-page Staff Study are not printed.