765.00/3–1154: Despatch
No. 767
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State
No. 1770
- Subject: Current Political Situation; Memorandum of Conversation between the Honorable Paolo Emilio Taviani, Italian Minister of Defense and Elbridge Durbrow on February 27, 1954.
I called on Minister Taviani at his request and during the conversation discussed with him the current political situation. The following is a summary of his ideas on the subject.
Minister Taviani thought that the Scelba government had a chance to survive but it was an outside chance. He stated that it might fall on one of the secret votes on the budget. According to Taviani, the hardest budgets to pass as far as the Scelba government is concerned would be the labor, public works and public instruction budgets. In regard to the first two, it might prove most difficult to go as far as Saragat desires in social reform and public works investment and therefore it might cause the PSDI in a secret vote to vote against the government and cause its fall. The vote on public instruction might cause the fall of the government because it would not suit the desires of the Liberals. Taviani added that if the government should fall on one of the secret ballots, it would be absolutely necessary to hold elections.
In view of his conviction that elections should be held if the Scelba government falls, I asked Taviani whether it might not be advisable to try another combination including the Monarchists [Page 1654] rather than holding elections, which in my estimation would be very risky, since there is no clear-cut issue and the Social Communists might gain considerably. Taviani replied that in his estimation it would not be possible to work out any combination including the Monarchists since such a move would jeopardize, if not shatter, Christian-Democrat solidarity. By this he did not mean that the Christian-Democrat Party would fall apart but that certain elements of the Party would refuse to follow the leaders and with the inevitable loss of the PSDI in any Monarchist combination it would in all probability not be possible to form a government. He added, however, that one other possibility of forming a government did exist, namely to induce the Republicans to join a Christian-Democrat-Monarchist-Liberal coalition, in which event the presence of the Republicans in the government would make it possible to hold the entire Christian-Democrat Party together. In this connection he stated that every effort should be made to get Pacciardi to induce the Monarchists to join a government in which the Republicans would be represented. While he thought that this possibility did exist, he pointed out that although Pacciardi was willing to work in a government with the Monarchists, his two principal colleagues, La Malfa and Reale, in all probability would not join in such a combination. He expressed the hope that maybe eventually if such a combination including the Monarchists and the Republicans could be created, it might even be possible to bring in the Social-Democrats to form a really solid democratic front against Communism.
In discussing the prospect of elections, Taviani stated that if they should take place it would in all probability mean for all practical purposes the end of the three minor parties. He was not too certain as to what would happen to the Monarchists, but there was the possibility that they might even gain. He made it quite clear that in any election this year he definitely was of the opinion that the Christian-Democrats would gain strength and seemed to hope that they might even attain an absolute majority. In regard to the prospects of the Social Communists, Taviani seemed convinced that in an election they probably would gain a few more percentage points of the total electorate. When I pointed out that if they gained about four or five percent they might become the largest party in the country, he stated that he was certain that their gains would not be that large. He thought that perhaps the Nenni Socialists might hold their own or possibly lose 100,000 votes while Communists would gain because of their growing strength in the south. In this connection, he gave the following reasons for his conviction that the Communists would gain in the south. In the depressed south the majority of people are what he termed “subproletarians”, [Page 1655] who for religious and sentimental reasons vote for either the Christian-Democrat or the Monarchist Parties. As soon as the standard of living of these ignorant people is raised they will automatically become proletarians and switch their vote to the Communist Party. They will continue to vote for that party until such time as the standard of living in that area is raised considerably higher, when they will become what he called “qualunquists” and eventually they will become petite bourgeoisie. This process, which has gone on in the north, unfortunately will take some time. In regard to the north, he stated that political situation there has now stabilized with most of the former proletarians either being “qualunquists” or petite bourgeoisie. He expected therefore that the Communists’ strength in the north would gradually diminish. He seemed to hold out hope that if elections should take place it would be possible, if vigorous efforts were made, to win to the Christian-Democrat Party, or possibly even to some of the minor parties, the 1,800,000 votes made up of the Cucchi-Magnani, Corbino, etc., groups.
Again expressing concern about the dangers of new elections, I pointed out that I could see no real issue to go to the country with and therefore felt that if elections were to take place a real issue must be developed. He replied that the issue is already there if elections are necessary, namely, the impossibility to govern with the present parliamentary set-up. Taviani stated that if we thought that new elections were too dangerous we should do all in our power to back up and encourage the minor lay parties. By this he obviously meant that these three parties should adhere very closely to, and back up, Christian-Democrat policies.
… As indicated above, he seemed to feel that a small Communist gain was inevitable and added that we should prepare the American public and Congress for this eventuality by explaining to them all the factors which make up the Communist appeal in Italy. We should emphasize that by far the vast majority who vote Social-Communist are not Communists in any sense of the word but represent protest and anti-clerical votes and those who believe Communist propaganda. I pointed out that the American public and Congress had already been disillusioned once by claims that there were very few “Communists in China”, but actually China is now behind the Iron Curtain. Therefore Americans would be very sceptical of any claims that Italian Communists were not really Communists.