Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.65/8–753: Despatch

No. 751
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State

secret
No. 357

Rome, August 7, 1953.

Eyes only Secretary of State. With reference to Department telegram, Circr 53 of July 23, 1953, 1900¹ the following is an analysis of the situation as I see it today:

1) Historically, the foreign policy of modern European nations has always been essentially motivated by self-interest, and guided by expediency. To most Europeans any other motivation seems quixotic, immature, imprudent, and even unpatriotic. This is especially true in Italy—the home of Machiavelli whose wide acceptance as a political thinker has long since made amorality in statecraft highly respectable in the chanceries of Europe.

Most Europeans assume that US foreign policy is similarly motivated by self-interest, and guided by expediency.

2) So long as the self-interests motivating American policy coincide with the self-interests of any European nation, the “motivations” of the policy will not be questioned, and the polemic or the propaganda America uses to further it will seldom be publicly criticised, since by definition, self-interest permits and approves the employment of all useful terms of expression and persuasion.

3) Between ’46 and ’51, American policy by and large coincided with Italian basic self-interest:

(a) Truman policies of Marshall Plan aid and ECA served to rehabilitate the economy, rebuild the devastated country, and succor the stricken citizenry.

(b) TrumanNATO policies served to restore the shattered strength of Italian armed forces, and the battered prestige of the Italian State.

(c) American reaction and consequent White House action to meet the menace of Russian power (supreme on the continent at war’s end) supported non-communist Italy internally against political absorption, and safeguarded it externally from military absorption by the Soviet Union.

(d) The Truman-inspired 1948 Tripartite Declaration on Trieste made America the protector and ally of Italy against its worst-hated enemy, Tito. This indeed was the high point of the convergence of non-communist, Italian self-interest with American foreign policy and thereupon the high point of American popularity.

4) During the post-war period of convergence and coincidence of self-interests there was little criticism—except by the common enemy, the Communists—of American policy, or its mode of expression, often couched in terms of a “crusade” for the preservation of Western Civilization under American leadership. In America, the frequent claim was made at this time that the Democratic Administration was primarily motivated by a concern for the common defense and common welfare that transcended all purely American self-interest, which domestic political commentators often pointed out was the basic premise of “isolationism” identified with Republican policy. This claim of idealistic motivation went unchallenged, since to challenge its validity served no useful purpose in Italy, and not because Italians altogether believed it.

5) For many Europeans, including Italians, a divergence of self-interest began to manifest itself.

(a) When ECA changed to MSA, with its enlarged emphasis on military support to Italy, and its greatly lessened emphasis on aid to the Italian non-military economy.

(b) When the threat of Russian military aggression abated, owing:

(1) to the recrudescence of general European strength; and

(2) to peace gestures from the Kremlin.

(c) When Italy became aware of US “unwillingness to honor the Tripartite Declaration,” while giving increasing aid and support to Tito, the Yugoslav, the historic national enemy, and to Tito, the Communist, the avowed “common” ideological enemy.

6) Today, to most Italians, and possibly Europeans, US foreign policy seems:

(a) Committed to the maintenance of military and political tension between East and West, and consequently to a continued American effort to control and manipulate all vital European national military and political decisions—i.e., military and political intervention.

(b) Committed to the withdrawal of support to national non-military economy—i.e., economic isolation.

7) Italian self-interest no longer agreeably coincides with present American policy (as Italy views it) for the following reasons:

(a) Italy increasingly believes in the possibility of peaceful co-existence with Soviet Russia, since she believes that the Soviet State is also largely motivated by self-interest. Evidences that peace is to the interest of the USSR are:

(1) The Malenkov peace moves;

(2) Trouble behind the Iron Curtain in the satellite countries, as well as in the Kremlin itself.

8) Many Italians are beginning to believe that peaceful co-existence can best be assured by:

(a) A mild return to historic European balance of power politics. The belief is gaining ground that in the foreseeable future Europe will be sufficiently rearmed by NATO to constitute a real Third Force between the USA and Russia, a free-wheeling role impossible to play if European nations are too deeply integrated militarily with the USA.

Public opinion, reflecting reviving nationalism (always sensitive to “infringement of sovereignty”) tends more and more to this point of view.

Italy does not wish to abandon NATO, but she does wish it to be a more responsive instrument to Italian defense concepts, and less of an “American show”. All American failures to consult Italy in European defense matters involving Italian interests (the Yugoslav talks, for example) increase this desire, and greatly agitate criticism of USA NATO dominance.

(b) A policy of gradually proffered reciprocal “peace moves” towards Russia in military, political and economic fields—especially in the field of East-West trade.

(c) Getting off the American “ideological bandwagon” as well as the Communist “ideological bandwagon”. Italians are increasingly frank in pointing out that neither the American way of life nor the Russian way of life is the Italian way of life—or should be.

9) Italy thinks that not only is the lessening of East-West tension a possibility, but since the end of the Korean war, that it is also a necessity for survival.

Many Italians view the Korean war as a miniature World War III. They note that it resulted in no clear victory, military or political, for either side, non-victorious American and Communist armies withdrawing from a Korea still divided physically and politically. Italy tends to see its fate as the fate of Korea in the event of an actual conflict between the USA and Russia, unless the H-bomb were used freely to achieve a conclusive victory. But a victory in which the H-bomb were used in Italian skies would not be a victory for Italy—it would be the final catastrophe.

10) The rancor and irritation expressed against the US today by many Italian sources spring from an Italian awareness that non-communist Italian leaders are caught in a tough political dilemma, created by consistent American policy vis-à-vis Russia, and Italy’s growing desire to co-exist with the USSR.

(a) Pre-election Italian leadership, diplomatically committed up to the hilt to EDC, European Integration and NATO military policies, is also financially obligated to the support of policies which are more and more experienced as political handicaps vis-à-vis the electorate. The budgetary burden these policies represent, no less their consequent “concessions to sovereignty” are hard to defend to a people eager for less “infringement of sovereignty”, more distension, more non-partisanship, more East-West trade, and above all, more generous domestic economic programs. And yet, non-communist Italian leadership, however much expediency might suggest it, cannot now wiggle off the NATO hook for the following reasons:

1) NATO is still the safest and best instrument for achieving Italian defense and security;

2) NATO planning and programming is Italy’s best, perhaps only reliable source of American dollars;

3) Even the appearance of abandoning EDC and NATO will play into the hands of Italian Communists, as a political victory for the Soviet line;

4) In the event Europe may have “guessed wrong” about Russian intentions, they still want to be able to count on the rapid arrival of American forces, and to fight on the American side.

I venture to suggest the task of shrewd Italian politicians caught in this dilemma of trying to have their defense cake and eat it too, will be to defend the Atlantic Pact, EDC, European Integration policies while stretching out, cutting back, and stalling in achieving concrete goals and results, in order not to stop abruptly the dollar flow, end items, etc., lose American good will, or expose themselves to Communist “I told you so’s.” Meanwhile they will be especially critical and chary of all agreements involving the charge of “sacrificing sovereignty” (i.e., facilities agreements). And Italian “public opinion” will give increasingly critical vent to its inherent skepticism concerning American pronouncements and propaganda efforts which seek to explain US policy in ideological terms of devotion to universal concepts of justice, liberty and human dignity.

11) This skepticism, it must be honestly noted, is given some substance by the following contradictions in a US foreign policy which claims to be dedicated to the preservation and extension of democratic values:

(a) The contradiction between America’s interventionist military policies and its isolationist economic policies—

1) US persistent willingness to appropriate billions for a possible war effort in Europe, and its increasing unwillingness to appropriate for peace efforts.

In Italy this contrast is seen in a 800-million offshore procurement program, as against a begrudging 20-million direct aid to normal or peacetime economy.

2) US discriminatory trade and immigration policies.

(b) The contradiction between America’s ideological war against Communism and Totalitarianism, and its support of renegade Communist dictator Tito—the most consistently hated man in Italy— hated by all classes and sections, from the Fascist right straight through the Christian Democratic center to the Communist left.

(c) The contradiction between America’s frequent assertion that it stands for moral leadership, and its “refusal” to honor the Tripartite Agreement.

In short, Italian criticism will expose that aspect of American foreign policy which (in Italian eyes) is primarily based on American self-interest (and conflicts with Italian self-interest), contrasting it with professed American idealism in foreign policy, in order to justify the pursuit of Italy’s now somewhat diverging policy.

(In passing, Europeans think it politically childish of Americans to expect gratitude from foreign nations for its past support, military or economic. Gratitude is seldom shown even to a nation’s own heroes by an electorate—i.e., Churchill’s defeat after the war, and De Gasperi’s recently.)

Conclusion:²

If this analysis is correct, it must follow that the political power of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe, who have been most dominantly and militantly allied with pro-Americanism and Atlantic Pact thinking, will wane. There will then be a rise of the peaceful co-existence, non-partisanship, “moderator” parties—today the left wing non-cominform Socialists. (In the Far East, Nehru has already secured firm leadership of this non-partisanship, “moderator” movement, and Great Britain is eagerly seeking it in Europe.) I see no reversal of this trend unless Russia commits some new act of aggression in an area vital to European interests or security.

The major factors which should be borne in mind by USA policymakers and administrators in the months ahead is that Italians are beginning to think more abut pasta than guns, and more about national prosperity (especially trade with the satellite countries, Russia and the Far East) than European Integration, more about getting back Trieste than European military cooperation. And I believe that no amount of American propaganda couched in ideological terms will greatly alter this situation.

A realistic line of action would seem to me to be:

(a) US reassessment—strictly in terms of American security—of all NATO force goals in order to fix the absolute minimums we would consider effective within our present strategic concept.

(b) Firm deadlines for the meeting of these requirements. If they are not promptly kept, the US should then be ready to recast American defense plans accordingly.

(c) Settlement of the Trieste question, which was the bottom of much Italian criticism of US policy and greatly adds to Italy’s reluctance to follow America’s leadership in NATO questions.

(d) Discovery of diplomatic mechanisms to permit the smaller nations (especially Italy) to be more “in” on major military planning and political decisions affecting Europe.

(e) Revision of some of our categories of East-West trade for reasons implicit in the above argument.

(f) A revision of American-West trade policies.

(g) Some extension of direct aid to Italian non-military economy, on a business-like basis.

(h) A revision of our immigration policy, which has been the greatest weapon against the USA in the Italian Communist arsenal. (When the little Italian lost the hope that he might one day go to America to save himself, there was no hope left except the hope that Russia would come to Italy and save him.)

If all, or a part of these things could be accomplished, especially (a), (b) and (c), American popularity would be greatly restored, because there would then again be a greater convergence of Italian self-interest with the goals of American policy.

The change of Administration has, of course, been blamed in Italy for the “economic isolation” aspect of the present policy, which (apart from Trieste) is today the most unpopular one in Italy. It is easy to affix this blame to the Republican Administration, since “isolationism” has been identified with Republicanism since Woodrow Wilson’s time. Moreover, American Democrats at home or abroad quite naturally do not neglect emphasizing this, thus obscuring the fact that the situation described here has been some years in the making and would have developed much the same, no matter who had been elected.

In concluding, it is to be hoped that the American people can be made to understand that world leadership is not a popularity contest. In fact world leadership (vide 19th century Great Britain) is essentially an unpopular role. America’s prestige (not to be confused with her popularity) was never higher in Italy, because (a) America’s power was never greater, and (b) it is using that power to implement a foreign policy to which most thoughtful Italians agree in principle, if not in detail.³

Clare Boothe Luce

1. See footnote 1, Document 824.
2. A handwritten notation in the margin here indicates, “Luce Report: Begin Suggested Reading”.
3. In a letter of Aug. 20, to Luce, Merchant wrote that Dulles had personally made available to him despatch 357 and that he had found it “most extraordinarily perceptive and valuable”. (Luce files, lot 64 F 26, “Livingston Merchant”)