Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/6–1953

No. 747
Memorandum by Walter K. Scott and Edward G. Platt of the Executive Secretariat to the Secretary of State¹

confidential

Washington, June 25, 1953.

• Subject: Ambassador Luce’s Analysis of the Recent Italian Elections

The attached letter from Ambassador Luce encloses a 17 page analysis of the Italian elections.² She suggests that copies of her analysis be made available to Senators Wiley and Ferguson and Speaker Martin if you think it advisable.³ Your personal reactions would be greatly valued by Mrs. Luce.

Following are the chief points of Mrs. Luce’s analysis:

1. The practical results of the elections, while not all that we hoped for are far from disastrous for U.S. policy. However, De Gasperi’s margin of control is so fragile and small that he will be hard put to it to prevent his party from splitting in every future major parliamentary decision.

2. America’s support of De Gasperi and his acknowledgement thereof, helped him in this election rather than as is generally believed, worked to his disadvantage.

3. The reason the four Center parties failed to attain the 50.1% majority guaranteeing them 65% of the seats, is that the Right and Left ganged-up because they realized this “prize” could only be awarded to the Center; neither fear of Moscow nor need for U.S. aid were as compelling elements as in previous elections; after five years many grievances and complaints have piled up against the party in power.

4. The opposition of the Right made fewer gains than were expected because unlike the Left, it is itself split into two different and differing parties (Fascist and Monarchist). The Monarchist leaders unlike the Fascists, are not basically anti-West in the field of foreign affairs, though they are conservative, even reactionary in domestic policy, which makes it all but impossible for De Gasperi to take them into his government.

5. The Communists made greater gains than expected because domestic issues, poverty, unemployment determined the outcome. Soviet actions removed much of the fear of Russian aggression, and the curtailment of American aid negated two factors which had previously helped to unite most non-Communists behind De Gasperi. At the same time, the Communists pounded home the contradictions of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Italy:

a. Our failure to honor the tripartite declaration on Trieste.

b. Battle Act implementation which precludes Italy from trading “normally” with the Soviet Bloc, coupled with the difficulties in trading with America whereby trade losses incurred under the Battle Act could be offset.

c. Although America preaches Christian policy, the McCarran Bill is exclusive and discriminatory. De Gasperi could not defend this charge and had to ignore it.

d. The U.S. supports Tito on strategic grounds but refuses to support Franco on ideological grounds.

e. America has curtailed aid for “normal and peaceful” aspects of Italian economy, but has stepped up aid for all “military and warlike” fforts.

The Right also used the issues of Tito and Trieste.

6. Mrs. Luce stresses that our task in Italy is becoming more difficult because the Italians are increasingly aware of these three major contradictions in our policies: Trieste, immigration and trade. If either of the first two issues had been resolved in favor of Italy De Gasperi would have easily gained his 50.1% majority. The third issue, however, will steadily become more of a hazard for the U.S. in Italy. The trend will be to trade with the Communists sub rosa at first and later openly. A diplomatic solution to Trieste and a legislative solution to immigration and trade must be found, otherwise our investments in Italy may prove to have been in vain. The great lesson of this election is that Italy is now slowly and steadily moving toward the Kremlin.

7. We must continue to express officially and publicly the correct view—that De Gasperi’s party won the battle against Communism, while striving to eradicate the contradictions in our foreign policy which resulted in such a close shave for his party.

1. A handwritten notation in the margin reads, “Sec saw 29 June.”
2. Neither printed; in the letter to Dulles, dated June 19, Luce stated that she had drawn from the facts reported in the Embassy’s daily telegrams “certain conclusions which I feel I must report to you.” Regarding the 17-page analysis, she said, “If this analysis of the lessons of this election is correct, and if we do nothing about it,’ we risk imperiling our whole policy in Europe.” Luce indicated that she had sent a copy of the analysis to the President and asked, if Dulles thought it advisable, that copies also be sent to Senators Wiley and Ferguson and Speaker of the House Martin. Luce also sent a copy of the analysis to Merchant as an attachment to a letter of June 26. (765.00/6–1953)
3. Martin acknowledged receipt of the analysis and thanked Dulles for having it sent in a letter of July 20. (765.00/7–2053) Ferguson did the same in a letter of July 21. (765.00/7–2153)