765.00/6–2153: Telegram
No. 745
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State
5210. For eyes only of President and Secretary of State.1 Yesterday Prime Minister De Gasperi talked to me alone for one hour about the political situation that now faces him in Italy. Much of the conversation, which I am covering in its entirety in a separate message,2 concerned the internal political situation. But the points he made about the possible consequences of the election to American foreign policy are so grave and so urgent, I am bringing them without delay to your attention.
Mr. De Gasperi said that apart from the domestic factors involved, the outcome of the election was “a reflex of the European situation.” He said that during the long pre-election period the Malenkov peace offensive had been increasingly effective in persuading Italian public opinion that the threat of communistic aggression in Europe had ended with Stalin’s death and that peaceful coexistence with Soviet Russia was now becoming possible. He said that Churchill’s speech3 had done incalculable damage in the election by giving vast credence to this impression and that it had also greatly undermined everywhere in Europe the validity and urgency of the whole NATO European defense community and European political community concepts which have been the basis of Christian Democratic foreign policy. He said that Churchill’s call for the neutralization of Germany foreshadowed a British policy calculated to collapse all efforts to create a strong united anti-Soviet Europe. During his severe condemnation of Churchill, he said “Churchill himself is younger than his ideas.” These, he said, are the ideas of a mid-Victorian British imperialist.
He said “there are only two conservative and reactionary powers in the world today—Great Britain and Soviet Russia.” He said that Churchill’s indirect attack on the unity of Europe was based on a desire to reduce Europe once again to a collection of small ineffectual [Page 1615] mutually fearful and suspicious nations in order that Great Britain might embark once again on historic balance of power politics by playing the role of mighty mediator between the world and Soviet Russia. He warned that if “la politique de Churchill” persisted and prevailed, it would eventually bring down Adenauer, deliver Germany into the hands of German socialists and neutralists, enhance the same neutralist socialist forces already strong in France and destroy the whole Christian Democratic movement in Europe. All of these things he said he intended to tell Churchill on the occasion of the luncheon they are having together this Tuesday in London.
He said that the success of the policy presently indicated by Churchill must also result in the withdrawal of American forces in Europe and consequently an end of American leadersip in Europe. To Malenkov’s peace offensive and Churchill’s speech which had helped so greatly to create a climate of opinion favorable to the Communist cause in Italy, he added as a lesser factor the emotional capital the Communists have been able to make of the Rosenberg case, especially since all sections of Italian opinion from the left to right advocated clemency. He also referred briefly to the political capital his entire opposition had long been able to make of America’s repeated failure to enact immigration legislation or take world leadership in the problem. He then said that the adverse effect on the election of all these factors was heightened by the curtailment of substantial American direct aid to Italy’s economy. He said that in view of Italy’s needs and the importance of the outcome of the election “twenty million dollars was very little.” He discounted any very favorable effect on the voting public of the substantial sums represented by American military end items and offshore procurement since any public discussion of them necessarily revealed them to be essential war preparation efforts, and in the atmosphere created by Malenkov’s peace offensive and Churchill’s underwriting of it, this discussion further aggravated Italian antiwar sentiments which in turn helped the Communists.
He then turned to the question of Trieste and here his statements became most emphatic. He said that if the public had not become so fascinated with the attempt to attain or defeat the 50.1 electoral majority, the issue of Trieste would certainly have been the decisive issue of the campaign in which case he might have suffered an even worse setback. He said and repeated several times “Italy may yet be lost on the Trieste question.” He said that it would now be more difficult than ever for him to discuss any solution so far proposed by Tito because without a strong majority in the Parliament it would be impossible for him to present to the country an agreement on Trieste that was not clearly favorable to [Page 1616] Italy. He said that the relative weakness of his government once again required him to maintain that his Trieste policy was firmly based on the triparte declarations. He said his government would certainly fall if he accepted a solution which included a corridor that permitted Yugoslavia to construct a Yugoslav port in competition to Trieste. He said that if new elections were consequently precipitated in the present uncertain international situation, Italy might then go Communist. He said that “the Pentagon in its fascination with Yugoslav divisions” had pursued a course that might yet lose Italy without which Yugoslavia could not long be supplied in battle. Here again he touched on British policy which consistently supported Tito and condemned British political elements which he said foolishly imagined that Tito could yet be turned into a West-European style socialist. He then said it was his intention to carry on be it “to my defeat or my death” the foreign policy to which he was by profound personal conviction, internal political necessity and logic of the European situation, committed.
He said that the creation of a “third force” a united Europe was necessary or Europe was doomed to communism. He said that all rumors to the contrary he was now going to form a government of such elements of the center coalition as seemed politically loyal and effective and he would not take in either left or right. He said that he intended this government to be as stable and durable as possible and desired it to be viewed abroad in this light and that the rumors of the formation of an interim or “caretaker” government were being circulated by the Communists who were seeking in advance to destroy party and public confidence in the integrity, strength and stability of the new government in order to precipitate a series of crises and new elections. He did not discount the possibility of the fall of his government and a call for new elections in the months ahead, but he said that if his government falls it must not fall on a domestic issue which would benefit the Communists but on an international question which would decisively and finally test Italian public opinion on the whole question of his policies of Western defense and the integration of Europe.
He then expressed the fervent hope that American policy would take vigorous action in the international questions mentioned above, but particularly he stressed the importance of the United States Government making no policy statements concerning Italy which it could not translate with reasonable speed into concrete action. While expressing understanding and sympathy for the political necessities confronting your administration, he said that the announcement of desirable policies vis-à-vis Italy, especially in the field of aid which were then embarked on a vacillating manner, would increase the present doubt in Italy as to whether the US [Page 1617] Government was strong enough domestically to pursue its own policies but even more importantly he said that any measures advocated in Italy’s behalf at high levels if later abandoned would confirm Italian skepticism that such measures were advanced simply in order favorably to manipulate Italian public opinion in times of political crisis—clearly another reference to US’s abandonment of the tripartite declaration. He then expressed sincere gratitude for American support, both in the past and during the election.
He said he hoped these thoughts would immediately be brought to your direct attention, and I said they would, and he expressed satisfaction.
- In transmitting this telegram to the President, the Secretary of State noted in a covering memorandum of June 23, “I think you may find the attached cable from Clare Luce interesting, particularly in reference to our coming Bermuda talks. De Gasperi’s strong views on Churchill’s role certainly raise some interesting questions. On the Emergency Refugee bill, I will have my Congressional liaison people get in touch with General Parsons.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)↩
- A detailed memorandum of Luce’s conversation with De Gasperi was attached to a covering letter, dated June 22, from Luce to the Secretary of State. (765.00/6–2253)↩
- See Part 1, Documents 409 and 410.↩