765.00/6–1253: Telegram
No. 743
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State1
priority
5112. Italian elections reaffirm fact that Christian Democratic Party (CD) is largest single party in country and thereby represents in Embassy opinion a distinct party victory. CD vote was substantially larger than entire combined left and almost double size of next largest party, the Communist Party. Elections represent at same time distinct setback for De Gasperi’s attempt through center coalition accord and electoral law to combine diverse democratic forces to obtain political stability and prevent extremist solutions. Despite pessimistic forecasts on outcome senatorial elections center emerged with majority, but 93.76 percent turnout of voters failed to give center votes required to receive premium in Chamber under electoral law. Decisive factor in elections probably was electoral law on which both extremes focused their attacks against center. Whether premium should have gone to center is still obscured by 1,300,000 contested and invalid ballots which is more than double corresponding figure in 1948. Situation of both national and international urgency surrounding Communist threat which marked 1948 contest completely lacking in this election. Neither extreme of right or left appealed to voters for extremist solutions.
In contrast to 1948 when prospects of increasing US aid helped CD victory atmosphere in this election permeated by sense of decreasing US aid. In addition there is growing feeling that Italy should with a policy reflecting “originality” and having distinctly “Italian” flavor participate to greater extent in decisions affecting Western security organization and acquire greater prestige and more favorable economic arrangements in return for past record of cooperation with West. This is particularly true with respect to Trieste, Yugoslavia, Balkans and Mediterranean area as well as with question of better trading opportunities.
Statistically Italian voters have moved toward left which showed greater increase in percentage of popular vote than did right as compared with 1951–1952 elections. This increase took place in face of repeated predictions by center and right that left had reached peak and demonstrates failure of voters to appreciate implications of extremist solutions and complacency with which they regarded substantive achievements of De Gasperi’s government. Increase in [Page 1610] left vote can be explained by contrast between revolutionary implications of Communist activity in 1948 and the present paralyzing effect of Soviet peace offensive as well as Communist electoral tactics of non-violence and systematic attack on corruption and electoral law. Lack of any vital or dramatic international or domestic issue aided both extremes in frustrating rally to center.
Any comparison with previous elections should take into account both increased electorate and special situation existing in 1948. Although for these reasons caution should be used in appraising CD performance compared with previous elections, it is clear that the CD Party is the only force, with which we have previously been working, left intact. The vote of the three small democratic parties dropped from 3,346,000 in 1948 to under 2½ million, a loss of 868,000 or over 25 percent. Their total representation in the Chamber has fallen from 58 to 38 and in the Senate from 19 to 7. The PRI has only five deputies and has disappeared from the Senate. On the other hand, CDs have only dropped from 306 to 262 seats (plus two Volkspartei and one Val d’Aosta seats making 265) in the Chamber and from 131 to 116 (plus two Volkspartei) in the Senate thereby retaining 44.4 percent of Chamber seats and 47.7 percent of Senate seats.
Despite fact that center parties combined have small majority in both Houses it is by no means certain at this moment that a center coalition government will be formed as failure to reach 50 percent plus one hangs heavy over scene and majority might be considered too small to be workable. For past two days press and prominent CD figures in private have been talking in terms of CD minority caretaker government with benevolence of small democratic parties and their support in votes of confidence. Such government would presumably be interim arrangement for few months subject to revision as CD finds bases of more stable solution. Move to bring in at least the more moderate of the 40 Monarchist deputies is not excluded as eventual alternative to democratic coalition formula with or without PSDI and PRI. However, bitter De Gasperi–Lauro post election debate makes straight CD–PNM government unlikely at this stage.
Despite intense activities by all parties to educate voters there was an unusually large number of contested and invalid ballots (about 400,000 more than Embassy estimate of 900,000 see Embdes 2536, May 262). Minister Interior statement attributes this to “precise instructions imparted by opposition parties” (Communists) to their representatives on polls committees to contest validity of as [Page 1611] many center votes as possible. Law provides contested votes not counted in first instance subject to later judicial review. Courts may take considerable period to inspect ballots. Not everyone in government has given up possibility that enough valid center votes can yet be found to put into operation the March 31, 1953 law awarding the premium, but center press points out that total of contested votes (as distinguished from null ballots, blank ballots, null votes) probably not sufficient to turn tide even if most of contested votes are eventually awarded to center. Minister Interior has not yet ascertained number of contested votes now before district courts of appeal. Political maneuvers are proceeding as if final outcome is not in question.
Rise of Cominform left, in both absolute and relative terms, is disturbing. It is also surprise, since it was generally predicted by center and right that any drawing away from center would be toward right. Communist-controlled left has advanced from 8,136,000 (31 percent) in 1948 to 8,545,000 (34 percent) in 1951–1952 to 9,562,000 (35.4 percent) plus Corbino ADN of 120,000 (0.4 percent) or a grand total of 9,682,000 (35.8) in 1953. This is apart from body of voters who support the camp between the left and center sectors, the USI (Cucchi–Magnani) with 225,410 votes (0.8 percent) and the UP (Calamandrei–Cadignola) with 171,000 (0.6 percent). The battle between PSI and PSDI for Socialist votes was clearly resolved in favor of Nenni. Saragat has admitted this publicly.
Election showed that vast financial means and/or a powerful mass organizational base are indispensable to electoral success at this stage in Italian history. Four parties having these attributes were the only ones to display impressive strength as compared with past. PNM’s money and Monarchist sentiment at its disposal on this occasion made up for lack of organized mass backing such as that afforded other parties by trade unions, Catholic action, et cetera. Campaign was fought with capillary methods and not in public squares, in contrast to 1948 situation. Election rallies, big-name intellectuals and historical relics were definitely less important than during 1945–1948 period. Vast turnout of votes, contrasted with lack of public enthusiasm during campaign seems proof of intensive organizational work of major parties. Case in point in CDs who drew small crowds but got big vote. No one doubts high efficiency of civic committees in getting out vote.
Tendency for big parties to get bigger and small parties to get smaller is result not only of greater means, mass base, and availability of flanking organizations, but also gravitation of Italian mind to two big conceptions of revolutionary socialism and Christian Democracy and to the as yet vague idea of traditional conservatism [Page 1612] of right (which has still to formulate itself systematically), with Social Democracy, liberalism and PRI-type radicalism fading.
Embassy considers that pessimistic view of situation is not warranted by foregoing facts and should not be expressed at this time. De Gasperi and all other center leaders are faced with necessity of making fundamental political decisions concerning organization and orientation of future government. Center leaders are convinced that full cooperation with US and West is in Italian national interest and that they will honestly try to formulate a policy which US can accept as basis for our future relations. Expressions of opinion that De Gasperi and center leaders will not be able to achieve this objective, or that US now questions validity of its present policy, will prejudice them in this fundamental task.