Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.00/11–2954: Telegram

No. 682
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Paris, November 29, 1954—8 p.m.

2259. Political situation facing Mendes-France on his return from American trip is one of uncertainty even for France. Virtually all major political forces with exception Communists seem to be in state of flux. As result it is difficult to predict what success Mendes-France may have on any of various specific problems facing him, and it looks more than ever he may be forced rely on shifting majorities without any fixed majority support. Though not unusual this situation always causes Premier much scrambling to obtain favorable vote on ad hoc basis on each issue.

One possibility which has not crystallized but might render Mendes-France position acute is old tactical alliance between right and left extremes which plagued third force governments and made them in effect minority governments after withdrawal Socialists from government. This was mentioned in Embtel 2234² and there are various indications pointing in this direction:

1) Communists have adopted policy all-out opposition to Mendes-France and now seem out to upset him (Embtel 2202).³ They doubtless realize his initial strong following among neutralist and intellectual groups on left is minimizing Communist influence and in effect isolating Communists more than under previous regimes.

2) Bulk of moderates (Independents, ARS and Peasants) have always opposed Mendes-France, and he has never obtained many of their votes. Pinay and Reyaud have continued their opposition and the influential Independent leader Duchet is taking more and more virulent line both in interviews with press and in articles in Independent House organ.

3) One possibility in this connection is reversion at least some of Social Republicans to opposition. These ex-Gaullists have publicly indicated their reluctance be saddled with major responsibility reporting London and Paris agreements in assembly committees (Embtel 2208⁴) and position of many may depend on De Gaulle’s December 4 statement. Some of Gaullists will certainly support accords but others may defect.

4) Tactical anti-Mendes alliance between rightwing groups may be sealed by general rightist opposition to his North African policies. Independents and ex-Gaullists are most influential French parties in North Africa and have bulk of colon clientele. As result they tend strongly to follow policy advocated by colons which is that of repression.

5) Specific instance of possible things to come was moderates (Independents, Peasants, and ARS) support along with Social Republicans for communist-proposed measure reducing taxes which Mendes-France desired to impose on bouilleurs du cru (legalized “moonshiners”). This alliance passed measure, which of course affected farm elements being wooed by communists and peasants and industrial clientele of Independents and Social Republicans, by vote of 264 to 220 (Radical Socialists, MRP and UDSR opposed) with Socialists abstaining. While issue is not settled and measures have not even been debated this vote shows how easily Mendes-France can be placed in minority on issue such as this where Socialist interest does not follow Mendes policies.

6) Gaullist vacillation towards Mendes-France is having direct bearing on MRP position. While bitterness towards present government remains in MRP quarters, this strongly pro-Atlantic Party would hardly be able afford let London agreements be rejected because of switch of Gaullist votes and MRP votes probably available if required. Over weekend Schuman spoke in favor of ratification London accords. Furthermore vote on alcohol issue mentioned in para 5 above shows MRP can vote with government if required, and some of its members have previously on North African policy.

7) Conclusions to be drawn from above straws in wind hardly firm. Tendency may be for Social Republicans to give him less votes. This could be compensated by MRP support since many MRP policies such as on North Africa not too distant from those of Mendes-France.

8) Soutou states Mendes today more cheerful over domestic political situation than since his return fom U.S. following talk with Palewski who apparently indicated De Gaulle’s December 4 speech would not be as bad as feared (Embtel 2258⁵).

Only firm conclusion possible is that Mendes parliamentary situation typically confused and normally shaky and will require all of his great maneuvering abilities to prevent deterioration either over budget or North Africa after ratification London accords which still appears safe, provided no new unfavorable element enters situation before debate.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. Telegram 2234 reported on an alleged conversation between Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov and De Gaulle and noted the extent to which the French Communist Party had been successful in obtaining allies on the far right in their fight against German rearmament. (751.00/11–2754)
3. Telegram 2202 summarized several Humanité articles attacking the policies of Mendès-France. (951.61/11–2454)
4. Telegram 2208 reported on the prospects for ratification of the Paris accords by the French National Assembly. (751.00/11–2454)
5. Telegram 2258 summarized a conversation with Claude Guy, former private secretary to De Gaulle in which Guy verified that De Gaulle had met with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov at De Gaulle’s country home 3 weeks before. Guy then explained De Gaulle’s views on several issues, including his desire to maintain cordial relations with Ambassadors of all major governments. Guy also noted De Gaulle’s desire to renew contact with the American Ambassador. (751.00/11–2954)