Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 672
United States Minutes of the Second Plenary Meeting Between United States and French Representatives, at the Department of State, November 19, 1954, 10:45 a.m.¹

secret

Washington, November 19, 1954, 10:45 a.m.

Participants

• US

  • State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. McCardle
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Moore
  • Mr. Beigel
  • Mr. Young
  • Mr. Utter

• Defense

  • Assistant Secretary Hensel
  • Admiral Davis
  • FOA
  • Governor Stassen
  • General Porter

• France

  • Premier Mendès-France
  • Ambassador Bonnet
  • M. Juniac
  • M. Roux
  • M. Boris
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Soutou
  • M. Perouse
  • M. Millet
  • M. Andronikof
  • M. Froment-Meurice
  • M. Vimont
  • M. Tine

Indochina

Cooperation

The Secretary initiated discussion by saying that the US had given further thought overnight on certain matters and he wished now to make it quite clear there was no feeling on the part of the US that positive results could be achieved in Indochina in any way except by the closest of cooperation between the two countries. He said that historically French influence existed in the area which must be dependent upon to help hold Indochina. Therefore, whatever the US does should be done in close cooperation with the French. US may have its own ideas but in the last analysis if the French do not feel that they can usefully cooperate on such a basis as the US might propose, the US would shift to a basis upon which there was agreement.

He said he still considered it inadvisable to set up bipartite, tripartite, or quadripartite committees. Rather in all fields our representatives should be under instructions to cooperate with each other. He suggested the drafting of an outline instruction to US and French representatives in Indochina indicating how they should work together and proposed that a small drafting committee be set up for this purpose.

The Secretary stated that he contemplated initially that bilateral talks be held between US and French representatives and then others might be brought in such as the Viet-Namese, UK, et cetera, as the situation warranted.

The Secretary said that in addition US thought it was desirable to have monthly or more often talks in Washington at a higher level so as to assure that co-ordination was taking place.

Premier Mendès-France said that he wished to express agreement with what the Secretary had said, that he was grateful regarding his remarks concerning French responsibilities. He said that the French considered Indochina policy as only one part of overall policy in Asia in which the US has the highest responsibilities. He said that perhaps there would be some decisions along lines that the French had not proposed or that the French did not feel was best that France would make the necessary compromise in that general spirit. He said that it was necessary that the important things be discussed first before they are accomplished facts, France wished to be included in the preparation of policies and programs.

He said that he agreed on the proposals on the organization of work including the drafting of joint or similar instructions.

He said that on the subject of Seato there was a procedural point in that Sir Anthony Eden had expressed to him the British desire that the UK Ambassador be included. Subsequent discussion indicated that there would be a meeting at 3:30 Friday afternoon on this subject in which the British Ambassador would participate.²

Collins’ Minute of Understanding³

In response to an inquiry from the Secretary as to whether he had anything to say concerning the memorandum General Collins had discussed with General Ely, Premier Mendès-France stated that he was worried about it. Referring to the text, he said that Article 1 could be discussed further on the expert level, that Article 2 concerning the autonomy of the Viet-Namese National Army, the French had no objection and hoped that responsibility could be transferred by July 1 but was not sure that it could be accomplished by that date.

He said that the difficulties arose over the next paragraphs. The statement that US would be responsible for all military assistance is likely to raise very important objections. Also the fact that the use of “more” French people in training program was forseen, however, if the main body of the instructors was French it would be difficult to understand why the political responsibility for training is in American hands. Another objection was from the point of view of the Geneva agreements and he expressed doubt that the Collins plan was consistent with these agreements.

The Secretary asked which provision of the agreement he had in mind, Premier Mendès-France said that the agreement provided that no military help could be brought in from the outside to Viet-Nam from foreign sources, but this didn’t apply to French forces, only to say other foreign forces. He said he believed this would bring about very great reactions on the part of the Communists. He said it would also bring reactions on the part of the French within the Expeditionary Corps in particular. If the corps felt it had no more responsibility other than merely to defend the area in case of an attack it would have a bad impact on morale—this was dangerous to the fighting spirit of the only real free force in the area. He said that the difficulties in Article 4 derived from those in Article 3 and that the same objections apply. This was also true with Articles 5 and 6.

The Secretary said that in line with what he had said earlier, the US did not wish to press for any formula if the French found it seriously objectionable. He said the US did not wish responsibilities unless it could discharge them. He said the basic question is who is to be responsible for training. He said that our military had views concerning the method and theory of training which had been used with some success in Korea and Formosa. The people training cannot do the different kinds of things at the same time, thus there should be decision between the use of French methods or American methods. This does not mean that the French personnel would be eliminated but the basic theory should be established as one or the other. The US is willing to take on the training job if it is to be the US responsibility.

Admiral Davis said that at present Generals Collins and Ely were considering all the pros and cons on this subject and he suggested that no firm decision be made at the meeting on this point while the two Generals were busily and he believed successfully negotiating.

Premier Mendès-France said that he didn’t know if the matter was that simple and whether it had to be either one method or the other. He said that if Generals Ely and Collins agree it would be all right with the French for they were in Washington to help General Ely. He said he would be surprised if Ely accepted Articles 3 and 4. For example, he said, Article 4 speaks of “for a given time” that French help would be necessary. This had definite long run implications.

The Secretary referred to the cable General Collins had submitted on his conversations with General Ely in which it was reported that General Ely had specifically agreed with the assignment of responsibilities. He said that General Ely had agreed with all the principles contained in the memorandum except one important point and that was Paragraph 5. He said that perhaps General Collins had gotten an inaccurate impression of General Ely’s views.

Premier Mendès-France said that he had a cable from Ely sent November 17 and the report was not at all the same. He read from the cable which was to the effect that if the Collins proposal was accepted it would result in the eviction of French influence. It said General Collins envisaged sending to the US hundreds of Viet-Namese officers each year. This would weaken French cultural influence in the country. It proposed the eventual replacement of the French cadres with US, running a risk for the morale of the French Expeditionary Corps; the telegram stated that he has not given his approval to General Collins. The cable also made reference to the probable Viet-Minh reactions. Mendès-France then said that he repeated that if agreement were reached in Saigon there would be no objections in Paris.

US Objectives in Indochina

The Secretary said that he would like to make some comments which he hoped would not be misunderstood. The primary purpose, he said, was to build up a strong national force in free Viet-Nam. The object was not to establish US influence in a new area or to bolster French influence in an old area. First regard was for the build up of Viet-Namese strength. Unless priority was given to that, no US nor French influence would be remaining a year from now. First consideration should be given to what will strengthen the national force as soon as possible. We should not let considerations of national prestige compromise the achivement of this objective. The US recognized that the cultural and commercial interests in the area were 90% French. He said he begged that everything possible be done not to allow respective national prestige consideration to compromise the issue. He said that if Mendès-France ever thought that the US had any ulterior motives in this respect to notify the Secretary of any specifics and he will undertake to correct it. He said that he realized it was hard to always live up to these principles for the people on the spot sometimes get enthusiastic or nationalistic. He asked Mendès-France to try very hard in this direction and the US shall do likewise.

Premier Mendès-France said that because he was in full agreement is the reason why he had said that the people on the spot could make the decisions. The Secretary said that perhaps the matter can then be referred to Generals Collins and Ely. Premier Mendès-France said that he hoped General Collins would not make any public statements on the matter before an agreement was reached and the Secretary said that he understood the French concern.

Force Levels

The Secretary referred to the size of the Viet-Namese forces and the proposals that they be reduced and inquired whether Mendès-France had any comments. Mendès-France replied that this matter could be discussed by the people on the spot. Mr. Hensel stated that a 50% reduction in the Viet-Namese forces was anticipated and again stated that it was clearly understood that there were not to be two forces. Premier Mendès-France said there must be some misunderstanding for Ely had specifically discussed the problem of respective pay scales in the two Viet-Namese forces. The French had planned on a national army of 200,000 men, an army in the strict sense of the word and yet there seemed to be an idea of another force for internal order. The Secretary stated that the concept was to have one force totaling some 83,000 men following a reduction of the present forces of 170,000 men through a selective discharge process. He said this would take six months to do and the costs were estimated to be $200 million a year.

Premier Mendès-France said that the French really didn’t understand. He said that he was not really able to discuss military matters but as he understood it at the end of 1955 there would only be 100,000 in the French Expeditionary Corps. He said that Diem wants all French forces out in the spring of 1956 and if Diem insists the forces will all come out. But who then would be responsible? The Viet-Minh forces have been increased, and are still being increased. If the Viet-Namese had only 90,000 men he didn’t see what they could do, perhaps internal order, that would be difficult but perhaps possible, but they could not resist aggression. He said there seems to be something he didn’t understand.

The Secretary said he wished to express his understanding of the situation. He said the main purpose of these troops was to maintain order against subversion and only to provide a blocking force against an open armed attack from without. If there was an open attack, the area was subject to protection from outside under the Manila Pact. He said he thought that US would be prepared to throw some forces in this situation. He said he believed that this would serve to deter that kind of an attack. He said it may not but the US did not feel it possible to build up the forces strong enough to throw back any attack. The burden was too prohibitive. Already we had a very heavy burden in Korea and even there if there was an attack the US would respond on an attack on Northern Korea or Manchuria presumably in connection with its allies under the 16 power declaration. This deterrent was supplemented by the local operation in Korea which cost some $500 million annually. In Viet-Nam, the proposed force would cost some $300 million annually. If one attempted to build sufficient Viet-Namese forces to cope alone with this situation it would cost well over a billion a year and not only is there a problem of the costs of the army alone but in such a situation with large numbers of men serving in forces the whole economy would become a public charge and require subsidies. He said that the US theory was to have adequate local forces to deal with subversive activities and to serve as a small blocking force. Reliance for the principal deterrent would be on the obligations undertaken by the signatories of the Manila Treaty. This concept seemed the only practical one to the US and the US even with all of its strength cannot maintain in all the troubled spots of the world forces to cope with the forces that can be mounted by the Soviet Bloc, so that it was necessary to rely on deterrent forces from without and the maintenance of the centralized mobile reserve. This was the basic strategy underlying the recommendations of General Collins.

Premier Mendès-France said that he understood the general principles and they appeared feasible. He said they would have to be studied by the military men on the spot and the matters should be left up to Generals Collins and Ely.

Refugees

The Secretary raised the matter of the Catholic refugees which were being deterred from moving to the South by the Viet-Minh and inquired whether this might be brought up in the United Nations. He said this was a clear breach of the Armistice. He said he greatly admired the action the French had taken in this situation and the great perils that have been faced to get the people out. He said that public opinion should be focused on this situation and it might thereby bring pressure on the Viet-Minh to cooperate.

Premier Mendès-France said this matter was the primary responsibility of the International Control Commission. He said he was disappointed in the weakness of the Control Commission on this point. He said he had spoken to Mr. Pearson who is sending instructions to the Canadian members of the Commission but that was not enough. He said he felt it was necesary to try to do something with the Indians. He said that perhaps other countries should join in on this and that perhaps something could be done via the Vatican which had already expressed an interest to the French on this problem. He said it might impress the Indians for they appear to want to be on good relations with the Catholics due to the Goa situation and others.

The Secretary said the US did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Mendès-France said that perhaps other channels could be used to reach the Pope. The Secretary said that he thought that presenting the matter at the UN would be the best way to issue opinion on the situation, perhaps through a letter from the Vietnamese Observer to the Secretary General. Premier Mendès-France said that this would be dangerous for the people concerned and it was not the normal procedure under the Geneva agreements. The responsibility rested on the chairman of the Commission to do more in this matter. He said he couldn’t see that UN action would have any effect on the Viet-Minh—perhaps unlike the Soviets and the Communist Chinese, the Viet-Minh were totally disinterested in what the UN might do in this matter. He said he was thinking not as much of representations but merely diplomatic approaches to the Indians and that perhaps something could be done towards Nehru personally, who would be morally obliged to act particularly due to his recent attitude towards his meeting with Mao. Perhaps it is best that the UK approach Nehru personally and that at the same time France, US, and UK would make approaches to the three members of the Commission so that India would not be singled out. The Secretary said he was not sure of the US position for at the Geneva conference the US had never adhered to the final act. Premier Mendès-France said that US had made a statement that it would not countenance a breach of the agreement and that if this matter could not be taken up in common with the US it perhaps should not be done at all. The Secretary said he would take this up with his legal advisers. Premier Mendès-France said it would be bad if the impression was created that the US was not interested in this problem.

Financial Aid

The Secretary said that he proposed that US and French representatives concert their thinking on aid matters as soon as the French financial people were ready. Premier Mendès-France referred to reports in the morning’s press and said that he preferred that the discussions be held next week and not a part of the present talks. He said he did not want to give any impression that political decisions were dominated by financial considerations.

Cambodia

The Secretary referred to Cambodia and asked if the French believe that the Control Commission had a responsibility for supervising the elections. Premier Mendès-France said that the French felt they definitely had no responsibility. At Geneva it was set forth that Cambodia and Laos were independent countries and the elections would only be the normal ones. This was different from Viet-Nam where there were no governments but only provisional authorities. The Secretary said that it was also the US view that the Commission should not supervise elections. Premier Mendès-France said there would appear to be a legal difficulty in that at the last minute on that very funny night of the Armistice negotiations, when Molotov agreed to everything, Cambodia introduced a new paper and insisted that it be made part of the Armistice agreement and everyone agreed. The Communists now make the legal argument that because this paper is now included in the Armistice the Control Commission is competent to supervise the elections. He said that he was quite sure that this did not really give the Commission that right and that the maximum that was involved was that if any Cambodian citizen felt after the elections that he had not had the full rights entitled to him under the Armistice he might protest to the Control Commission. He mentioned that the Canadians were worried about this particular Article 6 and found it to be embarrassing.

It was agreed that the next meeting to be held at 3:00 Friday afternoon and that a working party would by that time develop draft joint instructions to the US and French representatives in Indochina.⁴

1. Drafted on Nov. 26. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a brief index, were circulated as document MFT Plenary Min 2a.
2. For a record of the meetings held between U.S. and French officials and between U.S. and British officials on Nov. 19, which resulted in the creation of a Manila Pact Working Group, see the memorandum of conversations by Galloway, Nov. 19, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 986.
3. The minute of understanding and the agreement ultimately signed by Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the President’s Representative in Vietnam, and Gen. Paul Ely, French High Commissioner, on Dec. 13, 1954, is documented in vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 2366 ff.
4. For a record of the talks held later that afternoon, see Document 674.