Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 669
United States Minutes of the Opening Meeting of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Mendès-France, at the White House, November 18, 1954, Noon¹

secret

Washington, November 18, 1954

Participants

• US

  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Merchant

• France

  • Prime Minister Mendès-France
  • Ambassador Bonnet
  • M. Seydoux
  • M. Soutou

The meeting began with the exposé by M. Mendès-France of the ratification prospects for the Paris accords.² M. Mendès-France said that the treaties had been submitted to the National Assembly and that the Foreign Affairs Committee had appointed as a rapporteur General Billotte, who was favorable to ratification. M. Mendès-France said that he had set a deadline for Assembly ratification before the end of the year, although he could not guarantee the exact date on which it would take place. He emphasized that action by the Assembly would in effect be final acting, as the Assembly has the final authority in France. M. Mendès-France said that the French Senate would take the treaties up immediately after the Christmas vacation and would vote on them before the 15th of February. He said there would be a large favorable vote in the Senate. In the Assembly he said that the debate would be difficult and there would be no doubt on the results. He estimated that he would lose not more than 40 votes, compared to the preliminary vote in October when there were 360 favorable votes. M. Mendès-France said he was sure that he would receive an absolute majority, which would be in the neighborhood of 320 to 325 votes in favor of the treaties. The maximum of the vote against the treaties would be 260 provided the MRP voted against the treaties. If they merely abstained, the vote against the treaties would of course be much smaller.

The President asked why the MRP were opposed to the treaties, and M. Mendès-France answered that their opposition was primarily based on internal political reasons, namely their opposition to his government, but that it was also based to a lesser extent on their great attachment to the EDC.

The Secretary then asked for M. Mendès-France views about the ratification situation in Germany. M. Mendès-France replied that he thought the situation in Germany would be satisfactory. He said that Adenauer was having some trouble on the Saar but that that had been expected. M. Mendès-France said that the French were trying to help Adenauer and in the recent talks between Blankenhorn and Soutou³ they had given the Germans a number of things which they had requested. For instance, they had agreed to international supervision of the referendum by a commission composed of all the representatives of the Western European Union treaty, except France and Germany. Mendès-France said it was impossible to change the basic Saar agreement but that they were doing everything they could to help Adenauer on procedural questions connected with the implementation of the agreement.

The Secretary then commented that he had observed a better atmosphere of Franco-German understanding at the London and Paris conferences than he had seen in the past. M. Mendès-France said it was necessary not only to have a complete Franco-German reconciliation but that it was also necessary to have close Franco-German cooperation in all fields, particularly the economic. In this connection, Franco-German economic negotiations would start on November 23.

The President then stated his belief in Western Europe and said that it should be the third great force in the world. All that was necessary was close cooperation between the various countries of Western Europe. He said that the US was related by culture and blood to countries of Western Europe and in this sense was a product of Western Europe. For this reason we favor a strong Western Europe.

The President then said that within Western Europe the one major problem has been the age-old Franco-German problem. He said that he was all for Franco-German rapprochement and had been very pleased at the London and Paris accords. He said that he applauded them and particularly the fact that Great Britain had thrown in her lot with the Continent.

M. Mendès-France then said that he would like to mention two items concerning the Saar. First, the Saar agreement with Germany provided that the two countries would jointly ask the US and the UK to guarantee the agreement up to the peace treaty. The Prime Minister said he realized that there were some Constitutional problems involved but he understood that a wording somewhat along the following lines might be possible: “Any violation of this agreement would be a grave threat to the peace and we would have to consider the situation arising from such a violation”. The Secretary said he thought it would be possible to work something out along this line. The Prime Minister then emphasized that it was not only a question of aggression against the Saar but would cover the whole of the treaty. The President then said he saw no reason why something satisfactory could not be worked out by the experts. Mendès-France said that this was satisfactory to him.

M. Mendès-France then took up the second Saar problem and said that France would like the US to agree to support the present Saar settlement at the peace treaty. He said that the US and the UK had agreed on such a course in the past and in particular he cited statements by Dean Acheson on January 18, 1950,⁴ and by Ambassador Dillon on June 8, 1954.⁵ The Prime Minister said he would like these to be confirmed by the US. The President asked what the Prime Minister’s idea of a time limit would be on this commitment and Mendès-France replied that the commitment might last 100 years or so. He said that he had no idea how long it would last and it would have to be regarded as indeterminate. However, he pointed out that it was most important that the US take such a commitment, as otherwise the French Assembly would feel that the Saar settlement was precarious and fragile instead of a permanent settlement. He admitted that such a pledge by the US might be difficult for Germany, but he said that the Germans knew that France intended to make this request. He then pointed out that the settlement at the peace treaty would be subject to agreement by the population of the Saar in a referendum and stated that this provision meant that we would not be forcing a solution on the Saar population if we agreed to the French request.

The President said that this raised a real Constitutional problem, as he could not make a commitment of this nature which was not approved by the Senate and which would be binding on his successors. The Prime Minister said that he had never heard before that there was a Constitutional problem involved here, and he read the statement made by Dean Acheson on January 24 [18], 1950. The Secretary then pointed out that Dean Acheson’s statement was the reason why a Constitutional issue had been raised. He pointed out that Dean Acheson’s statement was not binding on the present administration, that was presumably why the French wanted a new statement, but any new statement that he would make would not be binding on future Administrations. The Prime Minister then reiterated the importance of this matter and said that it would be raised certainly in the French Parliament during the course of the ratification debate. M. Mendès-France then read from a Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Dillon and Maurice Schumann covering a conversation held on June 8, 1954 in which, according to Mr. Schumann, Ambassador Dillon had given assurances that the US would support the Saar agreement at the peace treaty, provided the EDC came into being. M. Mendès-France also pointed out that such an agreement to support the settlement at the peace treaty was a basic part of the Van Naters’ report on the Saar,⁶ which had greatly influenced the present Saar agreement.

The Secretary then pointed out that the situation was different at that time under the EDC. The Germans and the French then both wanted the Saar to be permanently fitted into the European framework. The present settlement, he stated, was good but not as good, and the present agreement asked only for a US and UK guarantee up to the time of the peace treaty. M. Mendès-France interrupted to say that the French have always and still do want a definite settlement. He pointed out that their original position had been a flat one that the settlement would have to be definite and final and that they had only modified this position to accommodate the Germans so as not to prejudice the consideration of the German frontiers in the East at the peace treaty. However the French attach great importance to the present settlement being definite.

The President then said that while he felt the French certainly had the right to take our past statements at face value he thought it was most important that we do not make Adenauer’s task more difficult. M. Mendès-France said that he agreed that we must make things as easy as possible for Germany, but on the other hand he felt it was vital that the Saar be permanently removed as a bone of contention between France and Germany. The Saar must be a finished subject that would not rise up again to plague Franco-German relations.

The President closed the discussion by saying that he agreed in general that it was better to tidy things up and settle them but that in this case we must look out for Adenauer’s interests and must try to be helpful to both sides.

1. Drafted on Nov. 22. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a brief index, were circulated as document MFT Min 1. A summary of this conversation was sent to Paris in telegram 1873, Nov. 21. (396.1–PA/11–2154)
2. For documentation on the Paris accords, signed at the conclusion of the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences in Paris on Oct. 23, 1954, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.
3. For reports on the Blankenhorn–Soutou talks, see vol. vii, Part 2, pp. 1403 ff.
4. Reference is to a statement by Secretary Acheson at a press conference in Washington on Jan. 18, 1950; he said that “the political future of the Saar is a matter which should be determined by the peace treaty which will conclude the war with Germany.” (ON files, lot 60 D 641)
5. Not further identified.
6. Regarding the van der Goes van Naters report, which recommended the Europeanization of the Saar, see vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1452.