Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

DMS files, lot W–1444, “France”

No. 578
Memorandum by B. E. L. Timmons of the Mutual Security Agency to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen)

secret

Washington, March 23, 1953.

1. I am attaching the brief paper you requested, setting forth my views on the problems confronting the Mutual Security Program in France, and the alternatives as I see them for FY 1954 and the immediately following years.

2. I have attempted to address myself to the major issues of policy, and to outline a coordinated action program that might be possible. I have not dealt with the question of how such a program as is envisaged should be presented to the Congress, or how it should be administered. Most aspects of these matters have been adequately explored by DMS and MSA staff members.

3. Before preparing the attached paper, I had the opportunity of talking briefly with a number of the key people in DMS, State and MSA concerned with France. The pressure of work on them, particularly in preparation for the Mayer talks, and my own time schedule did not, however, allow as full a discussion as I would have liked of the current Washington thinking on France. It is my impression that there does not yet exist in the Executive Branch a coordinated program for conducting an overall examination of the long-term French economic and military problems, and for attempting to work out solutions with the French. What in my opinion now needs to be done is to consider where France is going, in terms both of the NATO buildup and the war in Indo-China, whether it is possible to set in motion those economic and financial meaures upon which France must embark if she is eventually to become independent of external aid, and what more might be done through U.S. policies and aid programs to influence progress toward our security objectives. Such an examination would obviously have to be related on the one hand to our policy toward the entire NATO build-up, and on the other to the major political questions both in U.S.–French relations and within the Atlantic Community.

4. A great deal of useful work on some of these problems has been done in a short time in preparing the U.S. position for the Mayer talks. Such Ministerial talks, while useful for broaching questions and arriving at general understandings, are not likely to permit the extensive mutual examination of problems that now seems called for. The kind of program referred to in paragraph 3 above might well constitute the sustained follow-through that would be desirable to make the forthcoming Ministerial talks of maximum value to the U.S.

[Attachment]

Summary of Attached Memorandum on MSP in France¹

Section I—Reevaluation of MSP in France at this time is called for by new Administration’s overall security and budgetary problems. Also, French Government’s recent indication that French military costs, for the present minimum effort, will show alarming rise in 1954 over 1953, without any increase in French defense contribution from own resources, presents the most serious questions as to where France is going, both in NATO and in Indo-China.

Sections II, III, and IV—Our MSP objectives with respect to France (Section II) and where they stand (Section III)—Indo-China is stalemate; EDC ratification is in serious question and French will apparently take position that maintenance France’s present military commitments, with some increase in readiness standards, would necessitate increased U.S. aid over FY 1953 level; present French economic and financial policies are not now being directed toward the problems that must be solved if France is to become independent of U.S. assistance. The present economic and financial situation and outlook is unsatisfactory (Section IV).

Section V—The alternatives—The course of action foreseen that is considered most desirable in terms of our national interests is to continue aid to France, but, if possible, within a significantly different framework:

(a) Attempt work out urgently with French (both within NATO and bilaterally) something approaching a rational solution to the question of how large a NATO force contribution France can afford;

(b) Mutual examination of basic French strategic and political plans for Indo-China, and what can be done to seek an early acceptable military solution;

(c) Mutual examination of how it might be possible to set in motion those internal and external economic and financial measures which would eventually lead France to independence of U.S. assistance;

(d) Aid to be provided on a, say, three year basis so as to enable French to plan forward, but the focus of discussions would be on the programs of action to be carried out in connection with (a), (b), and (c) above, with aid as a balancing factor.

There can be no rigid or precise program in this field, and it may well be that major political factors would make such an approach impracticable. The alternative would then be, in my opinion, to continue aid on the present unsatisfactory basis to enable France to go forward on the present minimum basis.

1. This memorandum, not printed, was a detailed six-page analysis of the Mutual Security Program in France which contained numerous alternatives for U.S. policy in this area.