Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.5 MSP/2–1053: Telegram

No. 567
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, February 10, 1953—noon.

4461. For Stassen from Dunn. Re Paris circular 811, January 29.¹ Following is text statement requested reference telegram setting forth country team appraisal prime problems and major accomplishments MSP in France:

Begin statement. 1. MSP in France has been directed toward solution two prime problems:

(a) Enabling France play her full part in the undertaking to organize political, economic and military resources Atlantic community and, to this end, provide leadership for creation strong European community, economically solvent and militarily capable assuring own defense;

(b) Buttressing defense Southeast Asia by assisting French continue struggle against Communist rebels Indochina and raise, train and equip Indochinese forces which can ultimately assume responsibility for security that area.

2. Major difficulty besetting efforts solve these problems has been that in terms French resources alone, progress beyond certain point towards solution of either of them could be achieved only at expense progress towards solution the other. Given limitations on total French resources, heavy commitments in other fields—i.e., expansion and modernization of basic industries, reconstruction of war damage, housing, economic and social development dependent areas—severely limit French material and financial resources available for defense. Necessity allocate large portion such resources to active operations Indochina has meant that amounts remaining for European buildup inadequate create forces considered desirable by NATO. Situation has even brought into question France’s ability match projected German defense contribution, condition regarded as essential in winning political acceptance EDC within France.

3. By providing important increments military equipment both for European forces and for troops fighting in Indochina, and by furnishing sizeable amounts financial assistance in support French overall military budget, MSP has enabled France make steady progress towards solution above problems and has encouraged substantial expansion her own defense contribution. French overall defense budget, which represented 23 percent total budget and 6½ percent GNP in 1950, today stands at 37 percent total budget and 10½ percent GNP. French army 1952 force goal of 12⅓ divisions committed to NATO was met toward close year by activation two divisions which were below minimum NATO standards. These will reach proper standards early in 1953 when it is expected that necessary equipment will have been provided. Complete transition from piston-type day fighters and fighter-bomber aircraft to modern jet-type aircraft for front-line forces committed to NATO has been made. Naval aviation has been revitalized by supplying under US end-item program one aircraft carrier and planes for two carriers, while stimulating naval ship building by programming 25 French-built warships under MDAP. French have made outstanding progress in fields of logistics and training. In Indochina 179,000 French Union regulars and 60,000 auxiliaries are engaged in combat against Chinese Communist-supported Viet Minh. Progress has been made in formation national armies Associated States.

Vietnamese army, 50,000 strong beginning 1950, today numbers 147,000. These solid accomplishments due primarily courage and determination French leaders and people. However, clear that without MSP assistance such accomplishments would not have been possible. Consequences such a situation would almost certainly have been full-scale reappraisal by French Government of all external commitments, followed by either withdrawal from Indochina or adoption neutralist policy in Europe, or perhaps both. Thus fair say that in case France major MSP accomplishments have been (a) secure continued French participation European defense build-up and (b) assure defense Indochina.

4. Prime problems confronting US in immediate future are how MSP can continue be used to consolidate progress already realized and carry through to successful conclusion French endeavors Europe and Indochina to which we have given our support.

(a) In Europe problem centers around securing French acceptance EDC ratification and, after that, moving forward within EDC framework to bring French defense forces to optimum level. MSP has important bearing upon EDC ratification, for one main root French doubts and hesitations is fear that given her heavy extra-European commitments, France will be unable maintain parity of forces in Europe with Germany. It seems clear that, as has been case up to now, French can achieve this objective in Europe while maintaining effort in Indochina only with help continued US assistance during remainder build-up period. Reciprocally, European integration movement offers best possibility for creating conditions under which Europe can become independent of external aid. Thus it contains within itself promise for orderly termination MSP assistance once its objectives accomplished.

(b) In Indochina problem remains one of developing program whereby France can eventually pass major part defense responsibilities to Associated States. For MSP this means in part assuring that during interim French Union forces engaged there are adequately equipped maintain effective resistance against Communist enemy. But, of longer-term importance, it means finding ways accelerate expansion national armies. One of most troublesome problems is limitation imposed by rate at which Indochinese officers can be trained, particularly higher grades. Difficulty financing costs national armies—particularly shares allotted Associated States—has also been limiting factor. Nevertheless, French confident that program can be brought successful conclusion. Thus, by continuing assistance to this undertaking, MSP not only helping France solve her defense problems but also contributing development independent nations Indochina capable shouldering their share own defense.

5. Summarizing, two major accomplishments MSP in France have been (a) supporting and encouraging French action within framework NATO and European integration movement, looking towards creation political, economic and military structure in Western Europe independent external assistance; (b) assisting French successfully defend Indochina. Prime problems in carrying MSP to successful conclusion are (a) aiding French make continued progress towards goal effective, balanced defense contribution within framework NATO and European community; (b) finding means eventually relieve French of large part present burden Indochina by organizing defense potential Associated States.

Dunn

1. In this telegram, Stassen, newly-appointed Director for Mutual Security, requested that each Ambassador inform him of the prime problems confronting, and the major recent accomplishments of the Mutual Security Program in the Ambassador’s respective country. This circular telegram was sent to the capitals of all the countries participating in the Mutual Security Program. (700.5 MSP/1–2953)