Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Memoranda from S & U”
No. 559
Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation1
Participants:
- Mr. Frederick J. Lawton
- Mr. Acheson
I telephoned Mr. Lawton this morning. I said to him that, while it was not within my jurisdiction to know the facts on which they had arrived at the estimated expenditures figure for previously appropriated foreign aid in the forthcoming budget presentation, I hoped that if there were an area of judgment to be exercised in fixing the figure, it would be possible to raise it somewhat. I said that we had a cable in from Paris commenting on the fall of the French Government.2
The cable said that foreign affairs had played a large part in the fall, and that the enemies of the Government were hoping to eliminate Schuman and to have a review of the entire foreign affairs policy of the French Government, including North Africa and their relations with NATO and with us.
Early in September we had told the French that we expected to spend in fiscal year ’53 for foreign aid a sum which is almost exactly the combined sum now in the budget for economic and military aid. I said to Mr. Lawton that he could see what the effect would be if the French opposition could point out that we were slipping behind this figure and could say that the Americans could not be trusted. I hoped that we might be able to be a little more optimistic in the figure we put in.
Mr. Lawton said he did not think it was a case of being pessimistic or optimistic and the trend of his reply was that we must be [Page 1287] realistic about the figure that goes in. For one thing we were falling behind the figure which had been put in the ’53 budget and the French could read what was happening in the monthly public statements of expenditure figures. However, he thought that in the second half of fiscal ’53 we would proceed at a rate 10 or 15% greater than we had in the first half.
I asked Mr. Lawton if the figure he was coming out with was 3.6 billion. Mr. Lawton said it was 3.6 for end item aid. Some of this would be in the military budget.
He said there were several problems in setting the figure. One was the difficulty of getting an accurate judgment from the military; that they got several different figures, depending upon the person who was putting the figure in; that change in strategy in Korea was causing the more rapid use of ammunition and resulting in the transfer of military expenditures to Korea, which was a factor in dropping behind on foreign aid. Another factor was the necessity for a tight and tough estimate which would be realistic and on which no one could accuse the President of padding. In arriving at this figure he was trying to draw a line between a cold realistic judgment of a figure which could be delivered and one in which over-optimism would be reflected. He thought a third problem was the lack of will in the Pentagon to get behind the foreign aid items. A fourth problem was the attitude of Congress which had definite ideas about how much offshore procurement there should be. The figure he mentiond was that 40% of the procurement should be in this country. The Pentagon consequently was very uncertain of the figures on offshore procurement.
I said that I realized these problems, that they were very discouraging, but that I knew Mr. Lawton would do his best to arrive at an acceptable figure.
- Drafted by Marian Evans, Acheson’s personal secretary.↩
- Presumably a reference to telegram 3622 from Paris, Dec. 23, which informed the Department of State that Prime Minister Pinay had announced his intention to resign on Dec. 23 in the face of probable defeat on a series of confidence votes in the National Assembly. (751.13/12–2352) According to telegram 3648 from Paris, Dec. 23, President Auriol accepted Pinay’s resignation that same day. (751.21/12–2352)↩