Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

762.00/10–1152: Telegram

No. 546
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, October 11, 1952—2 p.m.

2240. Rumors of secret Franco-Sov convs reported in Bonn’s 1498, Oct 4,² and 1505, Oct 4,³ brought forth Schuman’s emphatic denial (Embtel 2090, Oct 6⁴).

Any idea that the present Fr Govt wld undertake such talks without informing us can be firmly excluded. It is also unlikely that any unauthorized contacts of any importance between non-Commie Fr and Russians have taken place. What seems to us more important is to examine background of these rumors i.e., is there any likelihood of a trend toward Franco-Sov rapprochement in near future? This ques derives added importance from new emphasis which Kremlin appears to be putting on efforts to split our Eur allies from US. It is a very large topic but we believe substantially correct answer can be found in examining certain allegations which are being used to lend plausibility to rumors of secret talks.

These include:

1. That the Fr wld like to do a “deal” on Indochina.

2. That the present sitn is similar to that which led to the Laval–Stalin pact of 1935.

3. That France and Russia have a common interest in preventing the revival of Germany, a common interest reflected concretely in the Franco-Sov pact of 1944 which has never been denounced by either side.

4. That the French are becoming increasingly cool toward Americans and Amer policy and increasingly interested in greater “independence” from US.

Our evaluation of these questions is as follows:

1. Most French wld very much like to get out from under in Indochina (as many Amers wld like to get out of Korean war) but do not see how it can be done on any tolerable terms. They are nevertheless continuing to devote substantial percentage of French manpower and approx $1 billion a year to Indochina in operation which appears to many as little more than holding operation.

2. Suggestion of similarity between present sitn and that lead to Laval–Stalin pact of 1935 obviously derives from prospect of Ger rearmament in each case. Similarity seems to end there. In 1935 France was confronted on her eastern frontier by a powerful Germany under fanatical and almost openly aggressive leadership of Hitler. Beyond Germany were France’s Little Entente allies and beyond them comparatively inert mass of Russia. Russia was Commie but absorbed in domestic probs and recent US recognition had added to her respectability. Internally in France Croix de Feu and other extreme right groups were more in evidence than Commies. Today, Adenauer’s still convalescent and truncated Germany raises no immed threat, whereas from Elbe to Pacific there is new power mass and totalitarian threat whose significance, intentions and tactics are gradually becoming more clearly seen in France. Internally, it is obvious that only danger is from Commie. Such popular interest as there is in France for “talks with Russians” derives more from apprehension than from any friendliness.

3. France and Russia have a common interest in assuring that Germany does not again become a mil menace. So has everyone else. Otherwise it is less correct to speak of common Franco-Sov interest re Germany than of interests parallel in certain aspects. Both countries desire that Germany have minimum influence in world affs, polit and militarily; Ger absence from NATO and division of country serve this end. Some Fr may consider that united and “neutral” Ger wld be less danger to France than rearmed powerful FedRep in EDC and wishfully believe such a united and neutral Germany might be kept out of Sov orbit. At this point parallelism ends and conflict begins. Permanent nightmare for France as well as rest of west is any kind of Russo-German rapprochement and Fr seem largely to have accepted policy of integrating FedRep with west as best form of insurance against it. Franco-Sov pact now has no more practical meaning here than has corresponding Anglo-Sov pact, in fact it has little more reality than Byrnes 4-power pact proposal, altho denunciation or threat of denunciation by Moscow cld cause much popular apprehension as to Sov intentions.

4. Traditional Fr friendliness toward US has survived such strains as Vichy period, North African landings, allied bombings, years of intensive and sometimes clever Commie propaganda and currently presence of large numbers of Amer armed forces in France in peacetime with all only comparatively minor damage. There is some apprehension as to use to which US will put its growing mil strength, irritation from time to time at what looks like Amer attempts to intervene in their internal affs along lines and to extent they know US wld not itself permit, and gnawing doubts as to our willingness, in view of great disproportion between our strength and that of our major allies, to place Atlantic community on true partnership basis. To this must be added real psychological problems arising from long-terms stationing of large numbers of troops of one country on territory of a friendly (rather than ex-enemy) country. While the sitn does require utmost tact and real statesmanship on US side, any French wavering from US in direction of neutralism derives less from any sinister motives than from occasional annoyance with us and hopes for ending of east-west tension.

To sum up, many Fr are still wholly in their search for peace, many hope for 4-power talks, some even believing they might lead to settlement, and some may have personal or commercial urge to talk to Russians. On other hand, understanding of Sov intentions and tactics has increased here in last 2 or 3 years to point where majority of Fr have belatedly come to recognize that in final analysis USSR is enemy Nr 1. While Eur idea naturally encounters difficulties when applied concretely, it has incomparably greater appeal than any idea of rapprochement with Sov Union. Hardheaded French realize, when they really think about it, latter wld mean abandonment of US friendship and support, increasing Commie control internally, eventual satellite status and, in fact, renunciation of western way of life.

Nevertheless it wld obviously be folly to underestimate danger of new Sov divisive tactics or seriousness of troubles they may cause us. Clearly US must give intensified attn to means of countering such tactics not merely in propaganda but in substance. We will be making recommendations with respect to France in this connection from time to time, but I wld like to make fol gen suggestions now. If we are to maintain and strengthen our Atlantic partnership, we have got to treat our partners truly as partners. We must use our great strength and influence very gently and tactfully. We must consult our partners more and earlier in formulation of our own policies. We must be careful not to give impression of intervening in their internal affs and not to ask them to do things we are not prepared to do ourselves. Some of our actions and sometimes the way we do things, give ammo and tend to give plausibility to Commie charges that we dominate Eur “satellites”. NATO can be of great importance, if we proceed soundly, boldly, and tactfully, in maintaining and developing fuller and deeper unity in both political and econ fields.

Dunn

1. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 1498 reported on a conversation with Social Democratic leader Wehner in Bonn in which Wehner attempted to substantiate his charges that French circles were in touch with the Soviets in order to perpetuate the division of Germany. (641.61/10–452)
3. Telegram 1505 reported Adenauer’s opinion that Wehner had not been able to substantiate his charges of secret French–Soviet conversations. (641.61/10–452)
4. Telegram 2090 briefly summarized Schuman’s denial of these secret talks in a statement given to the press. (762.00/10–652) Schuman discussed this denial with C. L. Sulzberger during their conversation at the French Foreign Ministry on Oct. 15. For a record of this talk, see Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, p. 782.