Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

MSA telegram files, lot W–130, “Paris Repto”: Telegram

No. 540
The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Mutual Security Agency¹

secret
priority

Paris, September 11, 1952—9 p.m.

Repto 849. Cotel—Wash eyes only. As you will see from Paris Embtel 1522 of Sept 11,² Amb Dunn and I have discussed at length the question of a reply to the Pinay ltr and the level of aid which might be notified now to the French Govt. I have stressed the impact of decisions concerning French aid on other NATO countries and on the success of the NATO annual review. I realize the force of the Lisbon and Letourneau commitments and agree that they require some special handling of aid in the case of France. The proposed solution, while indicating to the French our recognition of these commitments, wld also indicate the manner in which we interpret those commitments (i.e., that they require adjustment for the effects of Congressional action and are dependent upon French acceptance of a satisfactory program in Indochina and in the NATO annual review). This solution will also give some further scope for aid negotiations with the French within the framework of the NATO annual review and their Indochina effort.

Amb Dunn accepts the force of the point of view I have expressed but does not feel that he can agree to a lower figure than $650 million in absence of Washington decision to that effect. As a result of our discussions, it was agreed that my responsibilities for the multilateral work cld be met by the kind of approach which is incorporated in the draft reply to Pinay contained in ref Embtel. The use of a range for aid provides a minimum figure in fulfillment of our commitments on the basis of which the French can begin programming for the year but also establishes an area within which the French may receive additional aid depending upon their performance with respect to the NATO annual review recommendations and in Indochina. Finally, it provides a maximum upper limit which will get across to the French now that Congressional cuts and fairness to other countries have made it impossible to reach the $650 million figure on which they are still planning. It seems to me that this preserves the maximum for both our bilateral and multilateral points of view and on this basis I cld argue at NAC, if the question were raised, that France has not been treated entirely as a special case inasmuch as the final level of aid for France wld depend upon the NATO exercise as for other countries; on the other hand, that a minimum annual planning figure had been announced to the French in recognition of written prior commitments made in connection with their acceptance at Lisbon of a defense effort higher than recommended by the TCC and in recognition of the fact that France is actively fighting a war against communism in Indochina.

I trust that Washington can reach a rapid decision in this matter and authorize the dispatch of a draft reply to Pinay along the form and content (as set forth in Embtel 1522) in which I fully concur.

You will note that the amount and range of total budget support aid which I am now recommending is different from that outlined in para 3 of Repto 521.³ The former figures were based upon the assumption that the Letourneau commitment had been $150 million not a range of $100–$150 million, and also did not appear to provide adequate leeway for negotiating additional aid in the context of the multilateral exercise.

Draper

1. Repeated to London.
2. Supra.
3. This telegram recommended a reduction of 10–15 percent in the $500 million figure agreed at Lisbon. (MSA telegram files, lot W–130, “Paris Repto”)