Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.5 MSP/7–1352: Telegram

No. 527
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, July 13, 1952—3 p.m.

309. Cotel. Personal for Secy and Under Secy; pass Def personal for Lovett and Foster; DMS personal for Harriman and Gordon; MSA personal for Kenny. Limit distribution.

As indicated Embtel 303 July 12,¹ I informed Pleven yesterday of US response to Fr May 6 proposals. In presenting this response I stated it was the result of extremely careful exam by all depts and agencies concerned and that full consideration has been given to all milit, Econ and polit factors.

2. In long conversation which followed, Pleven expressed on personal basis gravest disappointment and strongly urged that US revise its decision in light polit factors which he had frequently explained in previous conversations, particularly that with the Secy on May 29 (Embtel 7482, May 30²).

3. Pleven said limited character US decision creates exceedingly difficult problem for Fr Govt. While he welcomes decision procure aircraft and ammo, Pleven said this not sufficient permit Fr Govt to maintain level of milit prod compatible with overall level Fr defense effort. He was most emphatic in stating his own opinion that without an adequate production program Fr Govt cld not expect to receive continued Parl support for milit budget in present form. Pleven stressed that it is polit impossible further to cut back aircraft production plans, and that it wld be almost equally difficult to reduce other production. Thus, he personally felt it almost certain that cuts in other areas milit budget, notably infrastructure, wld be inevitable; while this might not affect the 1952 force goals agreed at Lisbon, goals for later years wld be seriously affected, and some slippage of parts of 1952 milit program wld be unavoidable.

4. In connection his argument that Fr milit production must be maintained, Pleven pointed out that in order to carry out milit expenditures agreed at Lisbon, Fr Govt had already been obliged cut back planned appropriations for investment, housing and other econ and social requirements.

Having once made cuts in civil budget with adverse social and polit results, Pleven felt Fr Govt wld be unable defend cuts in milit production budget which wld have similar consequences.

5. Pleven inquired whether US decision was indicative of a shift from original US post-Korea policy of vigorous encouragement milit production in Eur, to a new policy under which all major equip items wld be produced in US, with Eur countries limited to production ammo, spare parts and soft goods. I replied that quite the opposite is true as evidenced by fact that for first time US prepared to buy complete aircraft in Eur under OSP.

6. Pleven told me that if Govt came under expected attack for present extremely serious state of affairs in milit production field, he may have to take position that he Pleven, has been at fault in failing adequately to explain Fr needs to US. In such circumstances, Pleven said he might have no alternative but to resign.

7. Pleven had little comment to make on our memo re total US assistance. In his present preoccupation with problem financing milit production prog, particularly aircraft, he did not appear to feel that this info wld be particularly useful.

8. While seriousness with which Pleven views situation may arise in part from his own personal involvement, and while he emphasized that he was not speaking for govt, I feel it is certain we are now entering upon a very difficult period in our relations with Fr both in matters relating to NATO build-up and our wider polit objectives. Pleven did not commit himself as to steps he planned to recommend in light decision I had communicated to him; however, we shld shortly learn of adjustments Fr Govt will make in accordance parliamentary requirements reported Embtel 7962 June 19.³ Whatever these adjustments are, we can be certain that they will have an adverse effect on France’s ability to reach milit goals. This will certainly become more clearly apparent during NATO annual review, which promises, as far as France is concerned, to present problems even more difficult than last year.

9. The Pinay Govt is probably the best govt in sight for some time and I feel it is extremely important that we do everything we can to assist it in carrying out its program not only with respect defense build-up but also of promoting polit and Econ stability in France during period when important proposals for Eur unity are being considered. If there is any way in which we can contribute to Fr stability by means further assist to Fr milit production prog, I am convinced situation warrants giving all possible consideration to doing so.⁴

Dunn

1. Supra.
2. This telegram summarized the U.S.–French meeting in Paris on May 29 concerning offshore procurement. See Document 519.
3. This telegram informed the Department of State that the French National Assembly had approved a resolution requiring the government to report to the Assembly on the possibility of achieving its production program before July 15. (751.5/6–1952)
4. The subject was raised at the Secretary’s daily meeting on July 15. (Secretary’s Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609, “July 1952”)