Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Secretary’s Memoranda, lot 53 D 444, “David K. Bruce”

No. 81
Memorandum for the File¹

secret

[Washington, August 8, 1952.]

Subject:

• Meeting of Mr. Bruce with Messrs. Linder, Schaetzel, Leddy, Corbett and Sohm, 12:00 Friday, August 8, 1952.

U.S. Representation With Respect to Schuman Plan

1. Mr. Bruce stated that he was concerned about the U.S. representation with respect to the Schuman plan. He explained that he had been talking to Mr. Merchant and he felt that some positive action should be taken on our representation. He explained that the site of the operations of the Schuman plan is indefinite. It has been assumed that our contact with the Schuman plan would be through SRE. Mr. Leddy stated that he thought the arrangement with SRE was satisfactory, but he had understood that this had been a long-standing agreement between Mr. Bruce and Mr. Katz. Mr. Bruce said that this was not true, but he had no objection to SRE taking on this responsibility. Mr. Bruce was primarily concerned about the character of our representation. He noted that there had been some discussion of a U.S. delegation of 30 to 40 people. He was against this. He pointed out that Mr. Batt and a deputy had been suggested as a possibility. Mr. Bruce had no objection to this.

2. Mr. Leddy stated that we need someone to represent us by August 10 or 11. Mr. Tomlinson will probably go to the meeting but he will need some help, especially on the German problems. Mr. Leddy felt that at least for the next few months we should not have a high level representative. He felt that a small group of two or three people should be sufficient to handle the task at hand. He added that Mr. Riddleberger is worried somewhat about the appointment of Mr. Tomlinson mainly because of his orientation to the French side. Mr. Bruce stated emphatically that he wanted very competent people at the right level appointed to do our job on the Schuman plan. He said that he felt so strongly that he would be willing to take the matter to the Secretary if it became necessary. Mr. Bruce said that he would have no objection to the appointment of Mr. Batt, who in turn would report to State and SRE, but he felt that the top position should be left unfilled at this stage. He felt that Mr. Tomlinson should be appointed as the deputy, so that he could cover both the Schuman plan and the Federation developments. The second best man would be Stan Cleveland who has an excellent German background. The third best, and this man would be satisfactory as the head of the U.S. side, would be Bob Buie (?) [Bowie], but Mr. Bruce doubted that he would leave Harvard. Mr. Bruce felt that we should create a position at a high level but should not fill it at this time. He stated that it is important to have someone at the Schuman plan assembly, and he felt Mr. Tomlinson should be nominated. He wanted to get the reaction of E and then he would discuss the matter with Mr. Martin.

3. Mr. Schaetzel explained that Mr. Bruce’s views were consistent with what E had in mind. Mr. Leddy felt that Mr. Batt’s background be reviewed if he is considered for this job because of his SKF connections. Mr. Bruce said that his main concern with Mr. Batt is that it might be difficult to keep him from intervening at a high government level on certain matters on which we should refrain from reacting at such a level. He said that at some stage it might be necessary to take this function away from SRE and create a regional ambassador to do this and other jobs, but he felt this should not be considered now. In conclusion, he said that our representation should be settled on a temporary basis because we might wish to change the entire character of our representation at a later date.

4. Mr. Leddy noted that we do not appear to have the problem any longer of MSA attempting to force money into the Schuman plan organization. Monnet says he has no desire to obtain U.S. funds at this stage.

[Here follows discussion of the feasibility of an international trade policy study.]

1. The source text is undated and unsigned.