Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38, “CSC—U.S. Representation”

No. 77
The Assistant Director for Supply of the Mutual Security Agency (FitzGerald) to the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe

secret
priority

Washington, August 2, 1952—5 p.m.

Torep 569. For Draper and Kenney from FitzGerald. US representation and communication channels respecting Schuman Plan.

1. Have just seen State cable 567 to AmEmbassy Paris,¹ which may be subject discussions in Paris during current conferences. Herewith our comments, which we plan take up with State. Because there is fairly wide difference opinion, have attempted set forth our reasoning at some length in following paragraphs.

2. Our major difficulty arises from view expressed in middle paragraph 2 reftel (and also briefly referred to in para 2(B) Torep 555²). In paraphrase, view is set forth that open and active US support of developments toward European economic and political unification tends give such unification an American coloring in European eyes. Implication is that this may have bad effects on European support for unification and thus success of this endeavor. Judgment in this matter affects all other issues concerning American relationships to CSC and possible European political community.

3. We profoundly feel that US should not adopt shy and diffident attitude toward instruments and organizations of European unification. While some Europeans may have adverse reactions to US stimulus, believe that many more Europeans follow and welcome it. Major speeches by Hoffman and Eisenhower in October 1949 and July 1951 respectively did not slow down progress toward unification but on contrary served to pull this project out of current doldrums. These speeches together with steady US pressure and support through various channels, have been major factor in transforming what appeared to be idle dream (at time Congress first inserted mandate on unification in ECA act of 1949) to vital issue in terms of internal politics of 6 continental countries today.

4. American diffidence appears to us be far more dangerous policy than strong support. Process unification is now and will for some time be far more difficult than any other important change now going on in Europe. Union reaches deeper into economic and social roots of European community than any other set of current economic and political measures, and will have more fundamental effects. To bring about radical changes in historic European community will continue require active US stimulus and support. CSC will need high level US representation, with whom European representatives can deal with confidence and respect. US’s support of financial and programming powers of CSC will also be important in process making this focus of European attention.

5. Also appears to us essential that US give maximum support to economic and political unification in order make possible proposed military unification. Erroneous impression is already current in Europe that US interested primarily in military unification, and this in turn primarily for purpose arming Germany. While support for economic and political unification important in itself, absence of such support might easily threaten ratification of EDC.

6. Reference second point para 2 reftel, we believe nature British representation with CSC important from many points of view but do not see why US should delay preparing own representation until British plans clear.

7. Respecting US organizational arrangements, we would not consider use consulate and consul general as appropriate interim US representative to economic and political institutions. Would favor preparations on US side for high level US representatives. For this post we incline to view that individual selected should have broad background in international affairs and preferably some experience in fields of CSC activity. Level should be roughly that of State Dept Assistant Secretary (or SRE deputy). As originally agreed with SRE, believe representative’s office should be small and be able to draw directly on US political and economic units in Paris, including on economic side expert or experts on steel, coal, productivity and general programming matters.

8. Concerning communications, it is essential for our purposes maintain adequate and effective channel for what we hope will be substantial activity on economic programming matters. Believe representative’s office should report to SRE, and communications should be tied in with SRE communications. Economic programming should be conducted generally in Torep/Repto series; political problems would be covered in Topol or other State series, and would presumably be tied in with Paris Embassy.

9. Foregoing recommendations, as well as virtually all other problems respecting US relationship to CSC, depend upon general line discussed which we believe important think through at this time. Wld it be desirable for Draper to discuss other members high authority or council of ministers type of US representation and relationship which they would favor?

Fitzgerald

1. Supra.
2. Not printed.