Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Schuman Plan—1952”

No. 66
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs (Camp) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 18, 1952.

Various Schuman Plan Questions

A number of problems relating to the Schuman Plan, some of an administrative character and some of a substantive character, will arise with the coming into force of the Schuman Plan and with the expected assignment to the Assembly of the Schuman Plan of the task of elaborating a European Political Community. Some of these problems, and suggestions as to the position which the Department should take on them are set out briefly below. If these recommendations are concurred in by E and GER as well as other interested offices in EUR, it is recommended that we seek to obtain MSA’s concurrence on those points which are of interest to them and then inform Mr. Draper. SRE has already commented on many of these points in Repto 133 [113] (copy attached)² and has asked for comments from Washington.

Nature and Composition of U.S. Representation at the Seat of the Schuman Plan

Until the institutions of the Schuman Plan (High Authority, Court, Assembly, Council of Ministers, Consultative Committee) have organized themselves and have agreed upon their location or locations, it is difficult and probably unwise to seek to finalize our views on the best method of U.S. representation. However, on the assumption that the High Authority and Assembly of the Schuman Plan meet, at least initially, in Strasbourg, it seems desirable to move ahead with preparations for an adequate staff in Strasbourg to maintain close contact with the Schuman Plan institutions from their outset, leaving open for future decision the question of whether a U.S. observer would be formally accredited in any way to the institutions or simply available in Strasbourg for consultation and for reporting purposes. Although it is clear that the U.S. has such a strong interest in the development both of the Schuman Plan and of the European Political Community that we must have firstclass people on the spot from the start, it would be a mistake for the United States to formalize a relationship with these organizations too quickly. There is already an excessive tendency to regard the development of the Schuman Plan and European Political Community as things which the Europeans are doing because the U.S. wants them to be done rather than because the European countries concerned believe in them, this is one reason for moving cautiously. It may also be desirable to see what type of relationship the British will establish before finalizing ours.

Our representation in Strasbourg might be strengthened in one or two ways—first, by reorganizing and strengthening the Consulate General and giving it, in addition to the reporting functions now performed with respect to the Council of Europe, similar functions with respect to the Schuman Plan and the planning of the European Political Community. In view of the fuzzed-up relationship between the Schuman Plan Assembly and the Assembly of the Council of Europe, it is probably desirable for us to have the same people concerned with both. An alternative to the strengthening of the Consulate would be to establish a small U.S. Mission at the seat of the Council of Europe and Schuman Plan which would receive administrative support from the Consulate but which would be independent of the Consulate with a separate communication system, etc. The first arrangement is probably preferable, at least initially, for two reasons (1) it gives us an opportunity to put a very good person in Strasbourg in the position of Consul General without having to set up a separate job and define at this time the precise relationship such a person would have to the Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan. It will probably be several months before the Schuman Plan organizations are sufficiently developed so that we really know what kind of an organization we should have in Strasbourg. By letting the relationship grow from the Consulate we would avoid having to define the nature of our relationship and the scope of our interest as clearly as we would if we established an independent Mission. Secondly, it avoids the inevitable awkwardness of two American Missions in a reasonably small city.

Channels of Communication and Backstopping

Whether or not the Mission in Strasbourg is an integral part of the Consulate, it would seem desirable to establish the following pattern of communications for all Schuman Plan–European Political Community–Council of Europe and related matters:

(a) State Department series would be used with some series prefix (similar to Excon which is used on all East-West trade matters) to indicate the interdepartmental distribution at this end.

(b) All telegrams from Strasbourg to the Department would be repeated to Paris for the Embassy and SRE. All telegrams from the Department to Strasbourg would be repeated to Paris for the Embassy and SRE. SRE would be able not only to comment on all telegrams in either direction, but would have authority to hold up instructions from Washington to Strasbourg if they disagreed with the instructions until the matter could be satisfactorily resolved between Washington and Paris. This is roughly the same system as is used for the U.S. Delegation to the ECE in Geneva and as was used with HICOG in connection with instructions to the U.S. Delegation to the International Authority for the Ruhr. It has proved workable in both cases, and there have been very few instances of instructions being held up. In Washington, the primary backstopping for the whole complex of activities in Strasbourg should be in the Department of State. Telegrams having to do with the economic aspects of the Schuman Plan would be cleared with the MSA, as would other telegrams as appropriate.

U.S. Financial Assistance to the Schuman Plan

There is a tendency in MSA to wish to give assistance to the Schuman Plan as a device for increasing U.S. influence in the development of the Schuman Plan. This type of approach should be strongly resisted. No case has yet been made out, either by the MSA or by the Schuman Plan countries, as to why dollar assistance is required. In view of the difficulty of finding a need for dollars, it is more probable that the MSA, and perhaps also the Schuman Plan countries, will shortly broach the subject of counterpart contributions to the High Authority. It may prove to be desirable for counterpart generated either from U.S. coal deliveries to the Community or capital equipment required for the coal and steel industries to be placed at the disposal of the High Authority, but this depends largely on the competing needs for counterpart. There is obviously no inherent relation between the counterpart of coal or coal equipment and the needs of the High Authority for funds, and a decision as to whether or not to put counterpart at the disposal of the High Authority and if so, how much, should be determined in the light of the needs of the High Authority for local currencies and their ability to raise money independently. The incoming telegram from SRE raises the question of counterpart and indicates that it is being further explored. Until we have further information it is difficult to take a firm positon.

One type of question which will require particular watching is the interpretation to be placed on sentences like the following in Repto 113: “U.S. aid should be considered only if other possibilities impracticable or if needed promote important U.S. interests.” The underlined³ section is clearly correct if it means precisely what it says, but there is frequently too great a tendency to assume that the furtherance of U.S. policies is facilitated by the giving of aid, an increasingly dubious proposition.

For some time, it has been generally agreed that we would allocate funds for use in connection with modernization or development of coal and steel industries only if the projects had received the approval of the High Authority. We should, of course, reaffirm this position.

General Policy toward European Coal and Steel Community as in Repto 113 (attached)

Except for the specific point on the nature of the U.S. representation to the High Authority, the incoming telegram is generally satisfactory. However, the governing principles are stated so broadly that it is difficult to determine whether in fact a real meeting of minds between Washington and Paris exists. The area in which differences are most apt to arise between the Department and MSA on the one hand and probably also between the Department and SRE on the other is the extent to which the United States should become directly involved in the development of the Schuman Plan and of the European Political Community. There will be general agreement on the desirability of preserving the European initiative. There will also be general agreement on the proposition that the United States has a sufficiently large stake in the success both of the Schuman Plan and the European Political Community that we can not afford to take a completely “hands-off” position if things seem to be going badly. There will undoubtedly however be a continuing problem of restraining our people from premature or excessive interference. Not much can be done about this problem in advance of particular situations except to emphasize at all times the fact that the Schuman Plan is the first organization to be established as the result of a genuine European initiative and the over-riding importance, if it and the European Political Community are to be supported with conviction by the European countries, of having them be genuinely indigenous developments and not jerry-built structures bought with American aid.⁴

1. Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum to Byington in which Camp noted that Perkins generally approved of this memorandum. Camp requested any comments which Byington’s office would have on the subject.
2. Document 58.
3. Printed here in italics.
4. In a memorandum to Camp, dated July 23, Byington concurred with the suggestions contained in this memorandum, particularly the recommendation concerning the use of the Consulate in Strasbourg for U.S. representation rather than a separate mission in that city. (850.33/7–2152)