740.00/7–1352: Telegram

No. 64
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State1

top secret

306. Eyes only Secretary and Under Secretary. Restrict distribution very closely. Subj: Eur Polit Community.

Before conversation between Schuman and Brit Amb reported in Embtel 305 July 12 [13],2 Hayter discussed Brit reply with Monnet. Monnet then drafted memo to brief Schuman for his talk with Brit Amb. Copies were given on strictly confidential and personal basis to Hayter and Tomlinson. Hayter says that unfortunately Schuman did not have time to read it before talking to Brit Amb.

Fol is translation Monnet memo:

Begin text.

1.

As agreed between us by telephone, I submitted to Chancellor Adenauer text of govt’s decision to propose creation of a Eur polit auth, embracing the six countries belonging to the Coal and Steel Community, and to entrust the preparation of the project to the assembly of that community. I indicated to him that this text still had to be put in final form and that you had already given it to Mr. Eden.

I suggest that the time has now come to communicate text officially to five govts concerned and to submit it officially to the US Amb.

2.
During mtg of Interim Commission, which has just been held in Brussels, chief of Ital del told me that De Gasperi was intensely interested in proposal to create a polit auth which was awaited from Fr Govt, that he sincerely hoped that Fr Govt wld decide to entrust this task to assembly of Coal-Steel Community, and that he wld like to know just as soon as possible terms of mandate to be given that assembly.
3.
During my conversations with Chancellor Adenauer and Mr. Hallstein, I was assured of the determination of the Ger Govt to pursue policy of building Eur and of integrating Ger with the West. [Page 123] But the Ger Govt is in a difficult position. It is obvious that time is short. There will be elections in Ger by May of next year. We must not close our eyes to the fact that certain temptations may arise: Ger is recovering and developing. She will need export markets. What will be the reaction of Ger leaders to those we are dealing with today in face of a Russia which offers Ger both unification and the opening of all the markets of the East, from Poland to China? Direct dealings between Ger and Russia wld represent the most deadly peril to the hopes of peace.
4.

This peril reminds us that one of the essential purposes for building Eur is to bind Ger to the West, to dissolve her into an entity larger than herself, and thus to preserve her, in her own interest as well as in our interest and that of Eur, from the temptation of rebuilding as a natl power in the service of a nationalist policy.

To achieve this, a decisive step must be taken: We must pass beyond the stage of negots between govts and associate the people in the building of Eur—this means that we must arrive in 1953 at the direct election of a common Parl.

But such rapid progress can only be achieved if we bend our efforts to complete the construction already begun of a union of the six countries. It is this union which has sufficient concreteness and cohesion for Ger to be truly integrated in it. It is this union which today has the support of Amer, without which we cld not have overcome some of the obstacles with which we have been faced.

To accomplish this task it is, therefore, not possible to include everybody, nor to ignore Amer.

It is for this reason that we cannot act within the Council of Eur; it is thus necessary that the mandate to work out the polit auth be entrusted to the assembly of the Coal-Steel Community. It is not the proper function of nine countries which are not able belong to it to debate the statute for a polit community to which six others wish to belong. Moreover, the institutions of the Coal-Steel Community and of the Council of Eur are essentially different in nature. The Coal-Steel Assembly has effective powers; the Strasbourg Assembly is entirely consultative. The Council of Mins of Strasbourg deliberates on a wide variety of questions and votes only by unanimity; the Council of Mins of the Community has precisely defined duties and makes its decisions by majority vote.

In the Council of Eur, England is on the same footing as a number of other Eur countries. Our association with her ought to be much more definite and much more direct.

In addition, we must look present realities in the face. There is no Brit policy separate from Amer policy. Amer has an important role to play in helping with the building of Eur.

What we ought then to propose is that, in the preparation of the project for a polit auth by the Schuman assembly, as in the preparation of the Eur def treaty, there be Brit observers and Amer observers. England has a legitimate desire to be informed about the preparation of the new institution. She will be kept informed in this way, not as one of a host of other countries, but in concert with Amer.

5.

It is not in the preparation of the common institutions but in the cooperation between the community and other countries that the Council of Eur will have a very useful role to play. It will form a natural framework within which the six countries will debate questions with other countries; the members of the assembly will mix in with a larger assembly; the govts of the six countries will participate in the Council of Mins at Strasbourg. This is the way in which continuous cooperation shld be assured. It will develop naturally from the fact that the community is itself part of the Council of Eur. But the Council of Eur cannot be a part of the community, any more than the Pan-Amer Union is represented in the US Govt.

This is the way that we shld understand and welcome the Eden Plan; we interpret it as acceptance by England without reservations, of the creation of a Eur community, and as symbolizing the desire to find concrete means of association with that community.

[End text]

Dunn
  1. Repeated to London eyes only for Spofford and to Bonn eyes only for McCloy.
  2. Supra.