Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.00/7–1152

No. 60
Memorandum by the Finance and Economic Adviser at the Embassy in France (Tomlinson) to the Ambassador in France (Dunn)¹

secret

Paris, July 5, 1952.

In a conversation with me before his departure for London to participate in discussions on British policy towards European federation, Hayter made following points:

1. Schuman in talks with Eden last week on this subject had been quite vague and had left an impression in London of French Cabinet intentions which differed from the reports Hayter had received in Paris from the Foreign Office and Monnet. Hayter thought this confusion was one of the reasons that the British reaction to the French proposals had initially been rather negative, and he hoped he could clarify the question during his visit.

2. Hayter said he was anxious that the British Government give a clear indication that it supported the idea of the Schuman Plan Assembly taking an immediate initiative in drafting proposals for a European political community.

I told him that you had discussed the matter briefly with the Secretary and his party while in London and that their reaction had been favorable. We were, of course, anxious that the French proposal be made in a way which would encourage a quick ratification of the EDC Treaty and would not risk postponement. In particular, we did not wish the arrangements for participation of the Council of Europe in this affair to open up new questions of approach or membership.

Hayter agreed that France and the other countries had always asked for public approval of the Schuman Plan and the EDC on the basis that a common political authority would follow. He seemed to support fully the French Government view that work had to be at least started on the creation of a political authority before the EDC Treaty could be ratified. Hayter also agreed that the U.S. and the U.K. could not permit themselves to be pictured as opposing or wishing to delay the creation of such a political authority. If this happened, the U.S. or the U.K. might delay the ratification of the EDC or at least be blamed for any difficulties the countries might have in obtaining EDC ratification.

3. Hayter said that his Government did not insist on the details of the so-called Eden proposals. The proposals had been presented primarily to indicate a willingness of the U.K. to associate with the development of political unity on the Continent and that his Government would be quite willing to work out changes the Continental countries might wish to propose.

I replied that at first the U.S. Government had been quite skeptical about the results of the Eden proposals but, while the vagueness of the proposals had created some confusion, at the same time there had been a very positive gain in obtaining the support of the French Socialists and others to close British association with, rather than participation in, the Continental grouping. In my view, therefore, care should be taken so that the eventual solution could somehow be interpreted as consistent with the Eden proposals. Hayter thought this could be worked out and commented that there would not have been a problem if Spaak had not insisted on giving the impression that the Eden proposals were in direct conflict with the Schuman Plan.

Hayter said that Monnet had pressed even harder than Schuman for a new and closer U.S. and U.K. association with the Schuman Plan Grouping. He seemed to be seeking some positive formula to insure that the U.S. and U.K. association with the Schuman Plan countries would develop along together with the gradual approach of these countries to a European Federation. Monnet was quite insistent that the framework of the Council of Europe is not now adequate for this development and that more positive results could be obtained in the framework of the North Atlantic Community.

4. Hayter confirmed that there was no question of French proposing that Schuman Plan Assembly be made a constituent Assembly. In fact, the French Government would probably resist going beyond the progressive approach of having the Schuman Plan Assembly prepare a draft Treaty limiting the initial powers of the European political authority to those necessary to take over EDC and the Schuman Plan. The really new element was the idea for European elections for a European Assembly early in 1953. Hayter seemed to accept Monnet’s views that if a decision to have these elections could be taken now, many of the present difficulties, not only with EDC and the Schuman Plan, but also in connection with German and Italian elections next year would be solved.

1. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 104 from Paris, July 11.