Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Schuman Plan—1952”

No. 48
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)¹

confidential

[Washington,] June 20, 1952.

Subject:

• U.S. Relationship to the Schuman Plan

1. There has been no decision as yet on the nature of U.S. representation at the seat of the Schuman Plan High Authority, the location of which has not been decided. The Department believes that it would be useful to have a U.S. official stationed at the seat of the High Authority to observe and report on developments, but that this official should have no formal relationship to the Coal and Steel Community or its institutions. His position would, therefore, be comparable to that of the U.S. Consul at Strasbourg, for example, rather than to our representatives at the OEEC.

Representation of this type would keep the U.S. informed of Schuman Plan developments, avoid the suggestion of U.S. domination of the institution or financial responsibility for it, and would permit us easily to modify the relationship if the development of the Communities’ activities made modification desirable. It is uncertain at this time what kind of relationship will evolve between the Coal and Steel Community and outside countries, and we would not consider it desirable or necessary to attempt to settle this question in a formal way at this time.

The British have now indicated to the French their desire to establish a “mission de liaison” with Schuman Plan institutions. It is not clear how this “mission” would function or the level of representation which the British may be contemplating.

2. With respect to arrangements within the U.S. government to provide representation of this sort, the Department would like to have communications channeled directly from the U.S. “observer” to Washington, with copies simultaneously to SRE and to interested embassies as appropriate. This arrangement is not incompatible with the centering in SRE of field responsibility for relations with the Schuman Plan and is, in fact, the same as that now in existence on communications from our ECE delegation. (It is contemplated that there would be differences, however, in the type of representation at Geneva and at the seat of the Schuman Plan Authority. Ambassador Draper is nominally at least head of an ECE delegation whereas the arrangements herein contemplated would not provide for a formal delegation or a formal relationship to the Schuman Plan).

3. Within SRE, the assignment of responsibility for Schuman Plan backstopping has not been determined but it appears from the cable² that Mr. Draper envisages his Office of Economic Affairs under Mr. Porter as performing at least the major part of this task. The Department would not wish overall responsibility for Schuman Plan matters to be assigned to the Economic Affairs side of SRE. We would also like to have it established that Schuman Plan economic work, except when specifically concerned with U.S. aid or the Mutual Security Program should not be considered an MSA/E function, even though it is performed in the Office of Economic Affairs. Such problems as the relationship of the Schuman Plan to GATT and the other commercial policy considerations are examples of economic matters which should not be an MSA responsibility. Responsibility for the whole gamut of political problems which will arise should similarly not be assigned to MSA abroad.

If it is desired to centralize Schuman Plan responsibility within SRE, one solution might be to assign this function to an individual outside of the Office of Economic Affairs or of the staff of the Political Adviser and responsible directly to Ambassador Draper.

4. The Schuman Plan problems with which the U.S. will initially be concerned are:

(a) The degree to which the European coal and steel industry under the Schuman Plan moves in the direction of a cartelized system of production and distribution or towards the type of competitive market contemplated in the Treaty.

(b) The relationship of the Community to outside countries on such matters as tariff and quantitative restrictions. The Schuman Plan countries are expected to apply for a waiver of various GATT obligations which they now accept, to permit them to lower trade barriers among themselves without applying similar reductions to the imports of other GATT countries.

(c) The desirability and nature of U.S. aid to the Schuman Plan. It is not certain as yet in what way financial assistance would be used by the High Authority, but is probable that any dollar requirements would be very small. Within MSA, some thought is being given to a U.S. contribution, which could be be made in local currencies or EPU units, in order to indicate firm U.S. support for the Plan, to strengthen the Community’s ability to borrow funds in Europe, and especially to enable the U.S., through the leverage of this aid to “influence” policy decisions along sound lines. The Department wishes to examine more carefully the real need for U.S. assistance, and is inclined to oppose the development of U.S. control over Schuman Plan operations, based on a U.S. financial contribution. We fear that the existing U.S.-European aid relationship is leading to increased resentment against the U.S. and at the same time creating an excessive reliance on the U.S.

5. The person selected for the U.S. representation at the seat of the High Authority should preferably be someone who, in addition to the other qualifications, is familiar with the problem of European cartels and restrictive arrangements, has had experience in combatting such arrangements, and is fully acquainted with problems of U.S. and international commercial policy. He should also be familiar with the background and development of the Schuman Plan. A separate memorandum gives you the name of an individual whom RA favors.³

6. Various locations have been suggested for the seat of the Schuman Plan High Authority. Among the places mentioned prominently have been Paris, Strasbourg and Saarbrucken. Latest information is that Germany considers Paris completely unacceptable, prefers Saarbrucken, but would accept Strasbourg. Schuman will probably propose Strasbourg as the temporary seat of the Schuman Plan institutions, pending further European debate on a permanent seat for all European institutions.

If Strasbourg should be decided upon, as seems possible, a problem might arise in the relationship of the Schuman Plan observer to the U.S. Consul at Strasbourg, particularly if a senior U.S. official should be chosen for the former position.

1. Drafted by Boochever.
2. Not further identified.
3. The person recommended by the Office of European Regional Affairs was Raymond Vernon, who was the current Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy. (Memorandum by Parsons, June 20; Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Schuman Plan—1952”)