Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, “Churchill–Eden Visit”

No. 475
Memorandum of a Meeting of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill at the White House, June 26, 1954, 5 p.m.¹

top secret
CEV MC–5

Washington, June 26, 1954, 5 p.m.

Participants:

• United States

  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Livingston Merchant
  • Mr. Henry Byroade

• United Kingdom

  • The Prime Minister
  • Mr. Anthony Eden
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Sir Harold Caccia

Subject:

• Egypt

The discussion on the above subject was resumed² in the White House at about 5 o’clock on Saturday, June 26.

Mr. Eden opened the discussion by reporting that the British Cabinet had accepted the concept of withdrawal of all military forces and continued maintenance of the Base by civilian contractors. They also now plan to reduce considerably the size of the Base to be maintained. They would retain only certain essential facilities, including air facilities. As a larger withdrawal was now contemplated, it would take longer for the British to clear out of the Base. In references to the equipment and supplies on the Base, Mr. Eden said “we will sell some, move some, and scrap some”. All of this would necessitate changing the withdrawal time from the previously planned fifteen months to about twenty-four months. Mr. Eden also indicated that in view of the new concept to withdraw all military forces, he believed the Egyptians should agree to a longer term agreement than the previously agreed seven years. He indicated he was thinking in terms of ten to twelve years.

Mr. Dulles asked Mr. Byroade what the effect of the extension of the duration would be in Egypt. Mr. Byroade reported that he felt it would cause a political problem of some difficulty as it has been generally publicized in Egypt that agreement had been reached upon a seven-year period. He asked Mr. Eden if it would be possible to have at least part of the agreement for seven years; then perhaps another part, including “availability”, for a longer period. Mr. Eden stated he thought that might be a possibility.

Mr. Dulles stated he thought another approach might prove politically acceptable. Now that the British have decided to greatly reduce the extent of the Base area, they could point out to the Egyptians that a part of the Base would be handed over to them within a relatively short period, say two years. In return for this the Egyptians might accept longer term arrangements on the remaining portion to be maintained by civilian contractors. Mr. Eden thought this a valuable new suggestion.

Mr. Eden stated that secrecy as regards discussions on this subject in Washington should be strictly maintained. This was agreed.

Mr. Eden also asked that the U.S., in its public statement at the time of the final agreement, indicate our support for freedom of transit through the Suez Canal as the British-Egyptian agreement will contain a reference on this subject. The President indicated his agreement.

The Prime Minister reiterated his feeling that the United States interest in this matter should be so great that we should be willing to endorse the agreement. He had long felt that it would be better to have a Tripartite agreement. The President replied that he did not understand what the Prime Minister expected us to do. We could not very well join the negotiations and sign the agreement unless we were asked by both parties to do so. There followed a general discussion in which the President stressed that he thought we could be helpful in a declaration at the time the agreements were reached.

There followed a general discussion regarding the extension of U.S. assistance to Egypt. Mr. Dulles referred to the President’s letter to Naguib of July 11 [15], 1953³ and read the portion which indicated that the U.S. was prepared to see firm commitments entered into with Egypt in economic and military fields as part of an overall solution. The letter also indicated the President’s hope that such action on our part would be simultaneous with the signature of the Base agreement. Mr. Dulles pointed out that negotiations of these agreements took some time. He did not see how we could live up to our commitment unless our own negotiations could proceed at an early date. It could be understood that our agreements, barring unforeseen circumstances which would call for further consultation, would not be signed or placed into effect prior to the British-Egyptian agreement. Mr. Eden welcomed concurrent negotiations under this concept, but indicated we should first determine Egyptian reaction to the new British proposals. In other words, we should wait to see the atmosphere after their initial discussions. This was agreed.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden stressed their desire that we make it clear to the Egyptians that continued assistance from the United States was dependent upon Egyptian fulfillment of their agreement with the British. It was generally agreed that this would be the case and that it should be accomplished in a manner which would not indicate to the Egyptians an advance distrust that they would in fact not live up to the agreement. Mr. Dulles stated he believed one way might be in the provision of a “whereas” clause in our own agreements which would refer to the fact that Egypt is providing bases for the defense of the free world, etc. Mr. Eden felt this a good approach and it was left that some way as this would be found to meet the British point.

The discussion ended with the agreement that the respective staffs should prepare an agreed minute on the subject of Egypt.⁴

1. Drafted on June 28.
2. For a record of the previous discussion of Egypt, see Document 468.
3. For texts of General Naguib’s letter to President Eisenhower, July 11, and President Eisenhower’s response of July 15, see telegrams 44 from Cairo and 69 to Cairo, vol. ix, Part 2, pp. 2115 and 2121.
4. Document 484.