Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 450
Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

private and secret

London, August 8, 1954.

My Dear Friend: I have been pondering over your very kind letter of July 22,¹ and I am most grateful to you for this further proof of our friendship. One has to do one’s duty as one sees it from day to day and, as you know, the mortal peril which overhangs the human race is never absent from my thoughts. I am not looking about for the means of making a dramatic exit or of finding a suitable Curtain. It is better to take things as they come. I am however convinced that the present method of establishing the relations between the two sides of the world by means of endless discussions between Foreign Offices, will not produce any decisive result. The more the topics of discussion are widened, the more Powers concerned, and the greater the number of officials and authorities of all kinds involved, the less may well be the chance of gaining effective results in time or even of using time to the best advantage.

I have, as you know, since Stalin’s death hoped that there could be a talk between you and me on the one hand, and the new Leaders of Russia, or as they might be, the Leaders of a new Russia, on the other. It will seem astonishing to future generations—such as they may be—that with all that is at stake no attempt was made by personal parley between the Heads of Governments to create a union of consenting minds on broad and simple issues. This should surely be the foundation on which the vast elaborate departmental machinery should come into action, instead of the other way round.

Fancy that you and Malenkov should never have met, or that he should never have been outside Russia, when all the time in both countries appalling preparations are being made for measureless mutual destruction. Even when the power of Britain is so much less than that of the United States, I feel, old age notwithstanding, a responsibility and resolve to use any remaining influence I may have to seek, if not for a solution at any rate for an easement. Even if nothing solid or decisive was gained no harm need be done. Even if realities presented themselves more plainly, that might bring about a renewed effort for Peace. After all, the interest of both sides is Survival and, as an additional attraction, measureless material prosperity of the masses. “No” it is said, “The Heads of Governments must not ever meet. Human affairs are too great for human beings. Only the Departments of State can cope with them, and meanwhile let us drift and have some more experiments and see how things feel in a year or two when they are so much nearer to us in annihilating power.”

Now, I believe, is the moment for parley at the summit. All the world desires it. In two or three years a different mood may rule either with those who have their hands upon the levers or upon the multitude whose votes they require.

Forgive me bothering you like this, but I am trying to explain to you my resolve to do my best to take any small practical step in my power to bring about a sensible and serious contact.

I read with great interest all that you have written me about what is called Colonialism, namely: bringing forward backward races and opening up the jungles. I was brought up to feel proud of much that we had done. Certainly in India, with all its history, religion and ancient forms of despotic rule, Britain has a story to tell which will look quite well against the background of the coming hundred years.

As a matter of fact the sentiments and ideas which your letter expresses are in full accord with the policy now being pursued in all the Colonies of the British Empire. In this I must admit I am a laggard. I am a bit sceptical about universal suffrage for the Hottentots even if refined by proportional representation. The British and American Democracies were slowly and painfully forged and even they are not perfect yet. I shall certainly have to choose another topic for my swan song: I think I will stick to the old one “The Unity of the English-speaking peoples”. With that all will work out well.

Enclosed with this private letter I send you the telegrams I have interchanged with Molotov since I sent you my last on the subject. I told the Bedell to tell you that I was “an obstinate pig”.² Alas, the best I can do.³

Please believe me always your sincere friend,

Winston S. Churchill

Enclosure 1

top secret and private

[London, July 27, 1954.]

Prime Minister Churchill to Foreign Minister Molotov

I am sorry not to have been able to reply before now to your prompt and agreeable message of July 5,⁴ but I am sure that from your talks with Mr. Eden you will have realised that I had to wait until the end of the Geneva Conference. I am glad that an Agreement has been reached there and hope that it will not be disturbed.

After discussion with my colleagues I was about to send you a further message to suggest a meeting say at the end of August or in the first half of September at some half-way house such as Berne, Stockholm or Vienna. But in the meanwhile your Note of July 24 in reply to ours of May 7 has been published.⁵ This of course does not fit in with the plan I had in mind. My aim and hope was to bring about an informal Two-Power Talk between the Heads of our two Governments, but now after the Geneva Conference ended you have decided to propose a formal Conference of European States and of the United States to discuss again the proposals made some months ago by the Soviet Government on collective security in Europe, which I presume the Heads of Governments would not be expected to attend.

This has obviously superseded for the time being the small informal meeting I had suggested which might perhaps have been the prelude to a Three- or Four-Power Meeting on the top level.

Enclosure 2

[Moscow, July 31, 1954.]

Foreign Minister Molotov to Prime Minister Churchill

I have received your letter of the 27th of July.⁶

In your letter you write that our proposal, in the Note of July 24, to summon an all-European conference on the question of collective security in Europe has obviously replaced for some time the meeting of the Heads of our States proposed by you.

I must state, that we do not see the reasons for considering that the proposal for an unofficial meeting proposed in your letter of the 4th of July,⁷ a meeting furthermore without any kind of agenda, is necessarily dependent upon (has any bearing on) the question of the convocation in the course of the ensuing months of a conference concerned with the guaranteeing of security in Europe.

Enclosure 3

[London, August 1954.]

Prime Minister Churchill to Foreign Minister Molotov

Thank you for your letter of the 31st of July.⁸ It was not my intention to convey that I had changed in any way from my original project. But your unexpected revival of your Berlin proposal created a new situation since it would not have been possible to have a large formal international conference going on at the same time as the unofficial Two-Power top level meeting which I proposed and which I feel you think might do good.

The British, American and French Governments whom you addressed officially are now preparing their replies. Although Ministers in this and other countries are liable to be dispersed at this season of the year, I think it likely that an answer will be sent to your Diplomatic Note from the three Governments concerned in the course of this month. Let us therefore wait until we know what is going to happen about this and then re-examine my project in the light of events.

1. Document 448.
2. For a record of Under Secretary Smith’s conversation with the Prime Minister on July 22, see the memorandum by Smith, supra.
3. On Aug. 12 President Eisenhower, replying through the Embassy in London, answered that he had received this message from Churchill and that he would keep reading it until he had absorbed it thoroughly. (Telegram 875 to London, Aug. 12; 711.11 EI/8–1254)
4. Quoted in Document 443.
5. Regarding the tripartite note of May 7 and the Soviet reply of July 24 concerning European security, see the editorial note, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 1232.
6. Enclosure 1 above.
7. Summarized in Document 443.
8. Enclosure 2 above.