611.41/7–1254: Telegram
No. 447
President Eisenhower
to Prime Minister Churchill1
Dear Winston: I have given much thought to your meaty message of July 9.2
You ask for my reactions to what you say about your proposed trip. You must, of course, know that never for one moment would this create any difference between two Governments which are headed by you and me, or alter in the slightest my profound confidence [Page 1044] in you dedication to the principles which have so often united our two nations in time of peril, and which today constitute a most precious asset and the best guarantee of peace. I cannot, of course, undertake to deliver unto you what you refer to as the “United States public”. I fear that it may reflect some doubts. But I pledge you that I will do my best to minimize whatever may be the immediate and unfavorable reaction. There will, I am confident, be general acceptance of the sincerity and lofty motivations of your efforts. Probably the majority will consider it, as Hoover is supposed to have said of Prohibition, “a noble experiment”.
I am glad that you will not be willing to meet except on a basis of full equality, as indeed I had always assumed. Also, I am reassured that you share the view I have often expressed that Russian deeds are necessary as well as words. Certainly, nothing but evil purpose can prevent their liberation of Austria, where our Foreign Ministers at Berlin accepted all of the Soviet terms.3 The same applies to my atomic project which cannot possibly harm them and which could reestablish confidence if that be their desire.
Let me now turn to the other subject of your telegram, namely Red China. I too was amazed at the storm which was raised in the press about your presumed intentions. I cannot explain its origin. Foster’s recollection is the same as Anthony’s as to what he said and is as you put in your message to me.
I have just been told of the statement on this matter which you have made today. The word came as I was writing this message to you. I am confident that what you have said will indeed ease American minds. Already I think, as a result of what Foster and I have said, there has been a subsiding of Congressional emotion and its action now contemplated does not bear the bellicose note which was originally threatened.
Neither Foster nor I have ever used the “never, never” theme and we can only rejoice if ultimately the rulers of Red China behave as decent civilized persons. Even this, of course, would leave us the problem of loyalty to our friends on Formosa whom we cannot turn over to the untender mercies of their enemies. This, however, is a matter for the future.
Foster tells me that the talks here with reference to SEATO are going forward in good spirit and at good speed.4 I earnestly hope that we shall quickly create something to stop the onrush of communism [Page 1045] in Southeast Asia. The French position is crumbling alarmingly.
I am talking now with Foster about whether we should participate in the Geneva Conference. We have agreed that he should offer to meet with Anthony and Mendes-France in Paris tomorrow evening if they desire, with a view to seeing whether in fact we can create a “united front”. Our great concern is to avoid getting into a position at Geneva where we should be forced to disassociate ourselves publicly and on the basis of principle from a settlement which the French feel they had to take. This would, I feel, do much more lasting harm to Western relations than if we did not appear at a high level at Geneva.
I am glad to see that you have resumed talks with the Egyptians. It would indeed be happy if this friction could be settled and your forces in the Suez made available as a more flexible reserve.
I feel confident that in these and other ways the value of our visit together will progressively manifest itself. The memories of it remain fresh and pleasant in my mind.
With warm personal regard,
As ever,
- This message was transmitted to London in telegram 213, July 12, with the instruction that it be delivered to the Prime Minister.↩
- Supra.↩
- For documentation on the Four-Power Conference held at Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 601 ff.↩
- For documentation on the work of the U.S.–U.K. Study Group on Southeast Asia, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 600 ff.↩