Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 445
Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower¹

top secret

[London, July 8, 1954?]

Dear Friend: I hope you are not vexed with me for not submitting to you the text of my telegram to Molotov.² I felt that as it was a private and personal enquiry which I had not brought officially before the Cabinet I had better bear the burden myself and not involve you in any way. I have made it clear to Molotov that you were in no way committed. I thought this would be agreeable to you, and that we could then consider the question in the light of the answer I got.

2. Much grass has already grown under our feet since my telegram to you of May 4, 1953.³ I should be grateful if you would glance again at our correspondence of that period. I have of course stated several times to Parliament my desire that a top level meeting should take place and that failing this I did not exclude a personal mission of my own. I have never varied, in the fourteen months that have passed, from my conviction that the state of the world would not be worsened and might be helped by direct contact with the Russia which has succeeded the Stalin era. However, as you say this is now past history.

3. I thought Molotov’s reply was more cordial and forthcoming to what was after all only a personal and private enquiry than I had expected. It strengthens my view that the new government in the Kremlin are both anxious about the thermo-nuclear future and secondly, attracted by the idea of a peaceful period of domestic prosperity and external contacts. This is certainly my view of what is their self-interest. I was struck by the fact that they did not suggest a meeting in Moscow but respected my wish to leave the time and place entirely unsettled. Of course it would be much better to have even the two power meeting about which I enquired in Stockholm or Vienna or Berne and if the Cabinet decide to go forward with the project a margin of six or eight weeks would be open to us for fitting the timing into the movement of events both at Geneva and in Indo-China.

It is on all this that I most earnestly seek your advice, while being willing to bear the brunt of failure on my own shoulders.

4. I fear that grave military events impend in the Tonkin Delta and indeed, throughout Indo-China. I have heard that General Ely⁴ does not think that there is any hope of holding an effective bridgehead in the Delta. There is, I am told, no doubt which way the Viet Nam population would vote if they were freely consulted. I well understood the sense of disaster and defeat in Indo-China may produce a profound effect in the United States as well as far-reaching reactions in Siam and Malaya. It is my hope that an increasing detachment of Russia from Chinese ambitions may be a possibility, and one we should not neglect.

5. Meanwhile, we shall keep you most thoroughly informed and I shall not seek any decision to make an official approach until I hear from you again. All I have said to Molotov in thanking him for his telegram is that a few days will be needed before any reply can be sent. There can be no question of a public announcement before our two governments have consulted together about policy and also agreed on what it is best to say.

I have impressed on the Soviet Ambassador the importance of absolute secrecy.

With kindest regards,

Yours ever,

Winston

1. The source text was attached to a note from Ambassador Makins to President Eisenhower which stated that the Prime Minister asked that it be sent to the President.
2. Summarized in Document 443.
3. Document 404. For the President’s reply, see Document 405.
4. French Commander in Chief in Indochina.