Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

741.5 MSP/1–2854: Telegram

No. 428
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

London, January 28, 1954—5 p.m.

3217. Pass Defense and FOA. Personal from Aldrich for Smith.

1. On July 29 last, I added my vigorous personal endorsement to UK country teams recommendation that financial support be given toward fulfillment RAF plan K in order secure maximum advantage for US security as Military Assistance Program tapers off (see Embtels 437 and 438, repeated Paris 50 and 51, Frankfort unnumbered²). In intervening six months, this matter has been exhaustively reviewed by all interested US agencies, military and civilian, in both Europe and Washington.

2. For reasons stated Embtel 2476, December 7,³ favorable decision would have been desirable before NATO Ministerial Council meeting in mid-December.⁴ I recognize reasons making that impossible. Prompt decision now, however, has become essential to UK parliamentary defense budget submission for 1954–55 and to decisions on specific aircraft production contracts. Defense estimates go to House of Commons on February 22, and must be ready for printing before February 8. Defense White Paper outlining future size and structure of UK program, in which plan K support is one critical element, goes to House on February 18, and must also be ready for printing before February 8.

3. As you know, an important share UK contribution to NATO air strength, both in numbers of units and equipment with modern aircraft that can do a real fighting job, depends on provision this support. This relationship has been clear throughout process 1953 NATO annual review.

4. I understand that military soundness RAF plan and crucial importance its fulfillment to air strength for European defense has been endorsed by Gruenther in his capacity both as SACEUR and as US CINCEUR. Since mid-December, British have been asked for and have given specific assurances and procedural proposals for linkage their medium bomber force with SACEUR; this was an essential condition of US support and I understand assurances meet SACEUR’s desires. I also understand SACEUR satisfied this plan will not as such impose additional tactical air force requirements on other NATO nations, including US. Validity production schedules underlying full plan K and validity financial aspects have been checked by competent US authorities. I understand funds are available for FY 1954 portion required support, and it has been made unmistakably clear to British that US consideration of support is limited to FY 1954 and recommendations to Congress for FY 1955, with no express or implied commitment beyond FY 1955.

5. Finally, apart from technical and military considerations, I would like to stress political desirability favorable US action which reinforces military and strategic factors. This support will make possible essential contribution to structure European defense strength as laid out by NATO Ministers in December on long-haul basis of sustained defensive shield. UK air contribution is vital component from viewpoint continental countries as well as US and UK and is essential part contemplated British underpinning of EDC. RAF not only makes largest European contribution to SACEUR’s tactical air forces, but is only European air force of demonstrated high combat quality. Failure US provide support would weaken European defense strength at crucial moment when events in Berlin are demonstrating need for West to keep its shield up. In addition, US has obvious direct interest in additional protection SAC bases. For these reasons, I consider this proposed investment US resources will repay its cost many times over.

6. Unless favorable decision already made, I urge that you personally make sure that in reaching final decision full account is taken of these political factors, which reinforce the military considerations.⁵

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Berlin personal for Secretary Dulles who was attending the Berlin Conference, and to Paris and Frankfurt.
2. Neither printed; the former reported various specifics on Plan K while the latter transmitted Aldrich’s endorsement of the plan. (741.5 MSP/7–2953)
3. Documents 426.
4. For documentation on the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 14–16, 1953, at Paris, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 454 ff.
5. On Feb. 15 the Foreign Operations Administration and the Department of Defense transmitted separate memoranda to President Eisenhower stating their support for providing the $200 million for Plan K. This proposal was approved on the same day by the President and executed by an exchange of letters between Secretary Wilson and Lord Alexander on Feb. 17 and 23. Copies of the two memoranda and President Eisenhower’s approval are in Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file; copies of the letters are in file 741.5/2–1954 and 2–2554.