Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

611.41/8–1053

No. 421
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

secret
air priority
No. 699

London, August 12, 1953.

Ref:

• Depcirtel 53 July 23, 1953¹

Subject:

• British Attitudes toward U.S. Policy

1. I have been concerned over the questions raised in Depcirtel 53 of July 23 and welcome this opportunity to report on British attitudes toward U.S. policy and leadership. This despatch has been prepared in consultation with senior officers of the Embassy. Its observations and conclusions are fully borne out by my own experience since taking office as Ambassador.

2. While the substance of this despatch deals with the special problems of British confidence in U.S. leadership and American prestige in the past six months, this current short term problem must be viewed in the perspective of deeper British attitudes reflecting the altered power relationship between Britain and the U.S. in the post-war period. I earnestly recommend a re-reading of the Embassy’s telegram No. 4022 of January 20, 1951² which was written during another period of low American prestige in Britain and which, mutatis mutandis, is largely applicable today. Paragraph 5 of that telegram which deals in large part with British views of American diplomatic tactics is of particular validity at present.

3. In addition to this continuing situation resulting from the altered power relationships, we regret that the concerns mentioned in Depcirtel 53 are most emphatically justified. There has been in recent months an appreciable decline in British confidence in American leadership and in American prestige generally in the U.K. If this trend is not reversed, it may seriously impair the attainment of our foreign policy objectives. The points made below are generally applicable to both public and official opinion.

4. We find no noticeable mistrust in Britain of the motives underlying our policy towards the Soviet Union. There has, however, been a marked lessening of confidence in (a) our ability to provide sound and constructive leadership for the West, (b) the constancy of our purpose to cooperate with and to provide essential military and economic support for our Allies, (c) our readiness to give proper weight to their legitimate interests and concerns in the formulation of our own policy, and (d) our ability and willingness to establish sound, long-term economic relationships with the rest of the Free World. There has been no change in the basic awareness that successful leadership of the Free World can come only from the U.S.; there has certainly been a marked falling off in the willingness to follow whole-heartedly that lead.

5. The main reason for this disturbing development is a series of factors creating doubt as to our capacity for effective, consistent and constructive leadership. Pre-eminent among those factors are the following:

A. McCarthyism: By “McCarthyism” the British mean not only Senator McCarthy’s own activities but other developments which they believe reflect an hysterical fear of Communism, excessive intolerance of non-conformity and a willingness to employ or to tolerate methods of the Star Chamber and police state. During the past several months “McCarthyism” has occupied a dominant place in both news reporting from and editorial comment on the United States. In British minds, “McCarthyism” tarnishes America’s claim to leadership of the Free World and offers to the Soviets powerful propaganda weapons in their efforts to split the Western alliance. The campaign against the execution of the Rosenbergs won such widespread support in Britain only because of a climate of opinion reaction against “McCarthyism”. “McCarthyism’s” continued existence has inculcated doubts as to the strength of America’s adherence to traditions of freedom of thought and speech and of respect for the individual; it has therefore raised doubts as to the integrity of our institutions, the strength of our democracy and our reliability as Free World leaders. Among the major incidents creating this attitude are the following:

(1) the Cohn and Schine trip to Europe;

(2) the use of “witch-hunting” methods, ineffectively combatted, in Congressional investigations of Government employees, college professors, school teachers, and UN employees;

(3) the “book-burning” controversy which has largely discredited our information program abroad;

(4) cases arising from the McCarran Act, notably the Charlie Chaplin incident (Chaplin is a symbol here and no account is taken of the actual man behind the symbol);

(5) McCarthy’s dealings with the Greek ship owners and his wholesale reaffirmation of charges about British trade with China which the British believe they have factually refuted but which have not been effectively rebutted by the Administration.

B. The Administration’s Relations with Congress: The British have been concerned and disappointed at what they regard as weakness in the Administration’s leadership of Congress. This concern is centered primarily in the field of foreign commercial policy but it applies also to the advancement of the termination date of the Mutual Security Act, heavy cuts in MSA appropriations, major compromises on immigration legislation and alleged over-readiness to compromise with an extreme minority within the majority party. The post-session assessments of the legislative record have relieved to some extent the British concern on this point but the net impression of limited Congressional results remains.

C. Rigidity of U.S. Foreign Policy: There has been an increasing apprehension that American foreign policy is over-rigid, formulated without adequate consideration of its impact on our allies and overly responsive to mass emotions in domestic political opinion. (The British believe that true leadership consists in guiding public opinion, ignoring their own failures in this respect.) They fear that what they consider our inflexibility may cause the West to fumble away chances for a settlement with the East and even to misinterpret developments within the Soviet bloc. The British firmly believe that we must avoid giving the impression that we are irrevocably committed in advance on points which well might be used in bargaining with the East. Three major fields to which this concern applies are the following.

(1) High level talks with the Russians: At present, as a result of Churchill’s unfortunate speech of May 11³ which “hit the jackpot” of public approval, there is widespread resentment at our failure to respond enthusiastically to the lead which Churchill wished to give. Because of the nature of the Soviet reply to our note of July 15,⁴ it is possible that the wisdom of our approach will sink in, but it is too early to tell. Apart from these immediate exchanges there is an endemic feeling in Britain that excessive rigidity in American attitudes is a major stumbling block in the way of progress toward an overall East-West settlement.

(2) Attitude toward Communist China: There is widespread criticism of our policy towards the CPR, with representation in the UN, the trade embargo and recognition all involved in varying degrees. It is a widely held view here that the U.S. refuses to recognize the “facts of life” concerning the de facto control of the Chinese mainland. There is a disturbingly general tendency to blame our policy on the machinations of the “China lobby” and to regard with mistrust our allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek whom the British consider a mischievous anachronism as well as an active obstacle to the achievement of a realistic modus vivendi in the Far East.

(3) East-West Trade: Although there is broad appreciation of the necessity of some prohibitions on East-West trade in actual strategic goods, a large section of British opinion believes that our policy in this field goes much too far and that our methods involve dictation to our Allies on an issue of negligible economic importance to us but of serious importance to Western Europe.

D. Foreign Economic Policy: Both official circles and the general public have been deeply concerned at alleged indications of revived protectionism in the U.S. and disappointed at delays in the evolution of a liberal foreign economic policy. It is not an exaggeration to say that, if the Administration could secure major measures liberalizing American foreign economic policy, much of the ground would be cut from under those consistently critical of the U.S. The following developments have all contributed in varying degree to doubts about our desire to give more than lip service to the slogan of “Trade not aid:”

(1) the original Simpson Bill extending the Trade Agreement Act;

(2) the “Buy American” policy, especially the Chief Joseph Dam episode;⁵

(3) delays in response to the Anglo-American economic talks in Washington last March;⁶

(4) the allegedly highly protectionist sentiments of the two recent appointees to the Tariff Commission;

(5) the emasculation of the Customs Simplification Bill;

(6) the nature and extent of the fight which it is understood that the Administration had to put up in order to avert retrogression on the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

E. Miscellaneous: Other factors worthy of brief mention include:

(1) A feeling that the U.S. initiatives in the field of psychological warfare are usually not fully thought through. In this connection, the concept of “liberation” has terrified the British since it was first voiced in the 1952 campaign.

(2) An undercurrent of Parliamentary and Governmental opinion fearing an American reversion to isolationism. It is felt that recent months have been marked by a decreased American interest in NATO. Events contributing to this concern include the sharp tapering of economic and military assistance to Europe and a fear that American preoccupation with Asiatic problems may be not merely in addition to, but rather at the expense of continued interest in Europe.

(3) There is a broad feeling that the U.S. has been almost exclusively preoccupied with a negative anti-Communism and that this preoccupation has not been equalled by our constructive interest in the world beyond the boundaries of the U.S.

(4) Most of the British people have only a slight understanding of American political life and of the difficulties of a new Administration representing a party 20 years out of office. They were uneasy at the extravagances of some of the campaign utterances of foreign policy, and this uneasiness has carried over into a fear of a partisan approach to the handling of international problems.

6. In the light of the above analysis, the following considerations involving British reactions to American policy must be borne in mind in future U.S. actions:

A. Advance consultation always pays large dividends in terms of British cooperation, both in favorably influencing official attitudes and in enabling the Government to handle British political and public opinion problems. Conversely, failure to consult can often be the deciding factor in inspiring only grudging British acceptance or outright opposition.

B. Without sacrificing the substance of our policies and positions, we can usually secure equally large returns in British cooperation by maintaining an appearance of flexibility.

C. American domestic political developments are followed closely and have great influence on British attitudes toward the U.S. American political speeches and actions inevitably affect the foreign as well as the domestic audience.

D. The great reservoir of British good will for the U.S. can be more effectively exploited. For instance, virtually every pronouncement of policy by the President has been well received and has boosted U.S. prestige. There is great trust and confidence in him and his speeches to the ASNE and at Dartmouth, and his message to the conference of Christians and Jews have done much to counteract criticisms of the U.S.

E. British reactions and proposals sometimes appear to be unrealistically weak or lacking in full appreciation of the Soviet menance. A good deal of this is due to (1) wishful thinking based on Britain’s tight economic situation and vulnerability to attack, and (2) a compensatory reaction in subconscious response to what is regarded as an American extreme of rigidity and provocativeness, Lectures from us on the Russian threat will not, however, dispel this “head in the sand” attitude.

8. [sic] Bearing in mind all of the above, Anglo-American relations must be viewed in perspective. There is a great deal of friendliness for and admiration of the U.S. here, and the majority of the British people realize the basic identity of our interests. Each nation is given to drawing attention to the mote in the other’s eye, and British irascibility occasionally leads them into public opinion extremes which bear little relation to their actual view of the U.S. When the “chips are down” we can count on the British as allies in the broadest sense of the word. It must not be forgotten, for example, that despite their grave concern over our Far Eastern policy, the British have consistently supported a much larger military contribution in Korea than any of our other allies, and there has never been any really serious consideration of its withdrawal. Indeed, it is this very consciousness of their being irrevocably tied to us that makes the British especially concerned at seemingly rash actions or attitudes on our part. Despite the dangers of the growth of present British doubts and hesitations, basically the British trust the good will, common sense and ultimate reliability of the American people and are aware that being irrevocably tied to us is fundamentally in the best interests of both countries.

Winthrop W. Aldrich

1. Not printed; in it the Secretary of State asked Ambassadors in 11 NATO countries and Austria and Germany for their frank confidential estimate and views on how the United States was regarded by the public and the governments in the countries to which they were accredited. (611.00/7–2353)
2. Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 1, p. 894.
3. Regarding this speech, see Document 409.
4. For the text of the note approved by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Washington, July 14, and transmitted to the Soviet Union on July 15, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1701.
5. The low bid on the turbines for the Chief Joseph Dam had been submitted by a British firm, but the contract was subsequently let to an American firm.
6. For documentation on the economic talks in Washington, Mar. 4–7, 1953, see Documents 375 ff.