Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

611.41/5–2553: Telegram

No. 411
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Moscow, May 25, 1953.

1630. Most striking feature of Pravda editorial² is open attempt to play up to British Government and in particular Churchill personally in order to exploit current Anglo-American differences which are unquestionably greatly exaggerated by Soviet leaders (Embtel 1626³). The concept of Anglo-American rivalry has been standard in Bolshevik thinking since establishment of Soviet State and it is interesting to note that Pravda editorial which should be regarded more as diplomatic maneuver than a propaganda effort is in complete harmony with Stalin’s analysis of non-Soviet world in his Bolshevik article.⁴ It confirms what we have previously reported, that new direction is adopting different methods rather than departing in important respects from previous Soviet policy under Stalin.

The Soviet leaders will undoubtedly await with the greatest attention any reaction of the three Western powers and particularly that of British Government. If they are able to detect any important divergencies in such reaction, they will undoubtedly press further along this line in an attempt to disrupt Western solidarity and in particular to isolate the United States. In view of importance of effect on Soviet thinking it would be desirable if possible to nip this maneuver in the bud by some strong indication of three-power solidarity in relation to Bermuda meeting. From point of view of effect on Soviet leaders, we see no harm in openly acknowledging that solidarity and community of interests of the three leading Western powers is a fact of international life which Soviet Government will have to accept if there is to be any progress made in improvement world situation.

I have discussed editorial with British Ambassador who found it “discouraging,” possibly because British, in particular Churchill, had expected some indication of changed Soviet policy in reponse to Churchill’s speech.⁵ He was however, in complete agreement and is so reporting to London that this is a definite attempt to divide US from UK and was convinced of importance of concerted reaction thereto if any official comment is to be made.

In comparison with editorial on President’s speech, this text, although still mild in tone, is crisper and does not bear the evidence of group drafting of policy. It therefore may reflect increasing control of Molotov over conduct Soviet affairs.⁶

Bohlen

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. Under reference here is a full page editorial in Pravda, May 24, 1953, on the international situation. The editorial stated, among other things, that the decision to hold a three-power meeting at Bermuda, which had been announced on May 21, was a retreat from Churchill’s proposals on May 11.
3. Not printed; it reported the substance of the Pravda editorial. (961.61/5–2453)
4. Under reference here is Stalin’s article, “The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR”, published in Bol’shevik, Sept. 15, 1952.
5. Regarding the May 11 speech, see Document 409.
6. On May 29 Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office agreed that the most striking feature of the Pravda editorial was its obvious attempt to play up to Churchill, exploit the differences among the Western allies, and entice the British away from the United States. The Foreign Office also stated that the Soviet Union had made no other reply to Churchill’s speech. (Telegram 6318 from London; 611.41/5–2953)