611.41/3–653
No. 388
United States Delegation Minutes
of a Meeting of Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign
Secretary Eden at
the Department of the Treasury, March 6, 1953, 5
p.m.
WET MIN–4
Participants:
-
U.S.
- Secretary Dulles
- Secretary Humphrey
- Mr. Douglas
- Mr. Stassen
- Mr. Burgess
- Mr. Bissell
- Mr. Overby
- Mr. Linder
- Mr. Gordon
- Mr. Corbett
- Mr. Locker
- Dr. Hauge
- Mr. Leddy—Rapporteur
-
U.K.
- Foreign Secretary Eden
- Chancellor of Exchequer Butler
- Ambassador Makins
- Sir Leslie Rowan
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Sir Edwin Plowden
- Sir Frank Lee
- Sir Edmund Hall-Patch
- Mr. D. H. F. Rickett
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. R. W. B. Clarke
- Mr. M. Stevenson
- Mr. D. Allen
- Mr. Shuckburgh
- Mr. W. Armstrong
Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler: At the request of the Foreign Secretary the Chancellor read aloud a U.K. draft of a communiqué which might be issued at the close of the discussions. A copy of the text is attached.
[Page 954]Secretary of State Dulles: The Secretary thought that this was a good start and that the general tone of the British draft was in accord with our own thinking on the matter. He said that it might be wise to appoint a subcommittee to work on this, which might take into account some of the ideas that the U.S. had had with respect to a statement. He thought that we would like to connect up the communiqué with some of the things that had been mentioned in the President’s State of the Union message indicating the lines on which we would be working.1 He recalled that the President’s message had suggested that if other countries would take certain necessary steps aimed at creating dependable currencies and enlarging their trade with each other, this would invite action by the U.S. He thought that these talks fitted into this pattern very well. There were a few specific points in the British draft of the communiqué which troubled him somewhat. He felt that the phrase “agreed to cooperate, etc.” was perhaps too explicit and might carry with it the connotation of a commitment. The phrase “good creditor” was a kind of slogan which carried different meanings to different people. It might be better to describe the policies themselves. With respect to the reference in the British draft to the U.K. defense effort he felt that we ought not to single this out from the combined defense effort of the NATO. He was not quite sure what was meant by the reference to “all governments concerned”. In order to get clarification on this and other points he thought there was need for a small drafting committee which could use these suggestions as well as those indicated in the President’s message. He said that the U.S. side had every desire to have these discussions conclude on a hopeful note. He reported that he and his associates had told the President that the U.S. representatives had a feeling of genuine encouragement from the initiative which had been taken by the U.K. We had been impressed by the Chancellor’s statement of the measures that have already been taken by the U.K. We felt that they were working on the right lines and we recognized that we also had measures that will have to be taken.
He recalled the statement made earlier by Secretary Humphrey to the effect that his (Mr. Humphrey’s) job was harder than Mr. Butler’s. So, he said, there was a very definite feeling in our ranks, which had been expressed to the President, that not only had the U.K. put forward a constructive idea but had also done much to put reality into it. What remains to be done may well be less than we had expected when the British first arrived and the gap that exists is probably one which can be closed. We have confidence in [Page 955] the U.K. and we want to do all that we can to preserve the momentum of this effort which it would be disastrous to allow to expire.
There was then some discussion of the desirability of linking together the communiqué on economic matters and on political subjects.2 It was agreed that it would be unwise to do this since the political discussions had resulted in certain commitments, whereas we wanted to make it perfectly clear that no commitments had been entered into or had been originally intended in connection with the economic discussions. This purpose could be better served by having separate communiqués.
Foreign Secretary Eden: The Foreign Secretary asked whether Secretary Dulles could say anything more about his talks with the President.
Secretary of State Dulles: The Secretary thought that he would not be able to add very much to what he had already said. He and his associates had reported their view that while the time was not yet opportune to put a detailed plan into effect we had been encouraged by the U.K. initiative. We strongly felt that a momentum had been established which should be kept going and that we must make a contribution to this result. He said that this was one of those times when we must either go forward or be pushed backward. We can’t stand still. The President had responded heartily to this. In the discussions with the President it was felt that these talks and their result fitted comfortably within the President’s Message on the State of the Union.
Mr. Douglas: At the Secretary’s request Mr. Douglas then read to the meeting a U.S. draft of a possible communiqué. The text of this is not reproduced in these minutes, since this basic text was substantially reflected in the communiqué finally agreed upon.3 It was agreed that a small working group consisting of the Chancellor, Sir Leslie Rowan, Mr. Douglas and Mr. Burgess, together with a few advisers, would meet to reach agreement on the text of the communiqué, using the U.S. draft as a basis.
- For the text of President Eisenhower’s State of the Union message, delivered Feb. 2, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 12–34.↩
- For text of the communiqué on the political talks, see Document 383.↩
- For the text of the final communiqué, see Document 391.↩