Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

611.41/3–553

No. 379
United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden at the Department of State, March 5, 1953, 10:15 a.m.¹

secret
UKPT MIN–1

March 5, 1953, 10:15 a.m.

Participants:

• U.S

  • Secretary Dulles
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. Allison
  • Mr. Bonbright
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. O’Connor
  • Mr. Beale

• U.K.

  • Foreign Secretary Eden
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Sir Christopher Steel
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Tomlinson
  • Mr. Henderson

[Here follows a list of the subjects discussed.]

European Defense Community

Foreign Secretary Eden said that they had sent the French a note in reply to their proposals concerning association with the European Defense Community.² He thought they had done what they could to meet the French. They had said that they would consult with the EDC before withdrawing British troops. They could not, however, meet the French request not to move British troops from the Continent. He noted that the press had gone badly in connection with the exchange.

Secretary Dulles said that Ambassador Bonnet had called, as result of a telephone message from Paris, to express the great concern felt by his Government over the British reply to the French proposals. The Secretary said that he had a word or two to say on tactics in connection with ratification of the EDC Treaty. He felt that we were not going to get anywhere until we have brought about ratification of the Treaty by countries other than France. It is at that point that we should marshal our forces. In his opinion to placate the French by dibs and dabs would fritter away our influence. He said that the way to get ratification through is to get other countries to ratify and thereby focus a sense of responsibility on France. The Secretary said that he himself could not get excited about meeting the French position today because they will want us to give more and still more.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed absolutely with Secretary Dulles’ statement of the situation. He said that the British were sorry they had had to do what they did.

Secretary Dulles said that he anticipated that the French, when they come to Washington,³ will want to talk about the Tripartite Declaration, Indochina and North Africa. He felt that it would be best if we were to bring everything into play when the French are standing alone. It was his understanding, subject to check, that there were no serious obstacles to prior action by the other five EDC countries except possibly the protocols. He recalled that during his trip to Europe⁴ he had told those other countries that the best thing to do is to get the Treaty ratified and then tackle the protocols.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that the French are being a bit difficult about this whole problem. He said that the matter concerns not only the French but other countries and yet the French were insisting that the other countries should not be told about the British position.

Secretary Dulles said that we should forget about the French for the next thirty days and concentrate on pushing through ratification of the Treaty. He felt confident that French ratification could be achieved as a result of the cumulative pressures we can exert on the French. He pointed out that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. He noted that whereas Mayer in his opinion was honestly trying to put the thing through, Bidault presented a more complicated problem and no one could know quite where he stood.

Foreign Secretary Eden repeated that he agreed with Secretary Dulles on tactics.

Secretary Dulles said that the next thing to consider was what could be done.

Mr. Matthews said that the Italians were ready to go forward with ratification and that the Dutch were also ready. He noted that Mr. Adenauer had indicated the possibility of German ratification by March 19. He said that the Belgians appeared to be the most sticky on the problem and that Van Zeeland had said he wanted to wait until the French ratification.

Secretary Dulles said that the Belgian situation seemed to reflect more Van Zeeland’s own view than the view of his Government. He noted that the opposition was carrying the ball on ratification and that the domestic political situation created difficulties. He felt as a result of his conversations that the Prime Minister’s views on ratification were more forthright than those of Van Zeeland.⁵

Mr. Matthews noted that Van Zeeland will be in Washington during the week of March 17.⁶

Secretary Dulles said that the matter could be discussed with him at that time. He said that our Ambassadors in the EDC countries should be told we have a common view in this matter.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed. He felt that Adenauer is fully aware of the importance attached to early ratification but there was certainly no harm in repeating the position to him.

Secretary Dulles said that it should be understood that the U.S. and U.K. would take corresponding action, not concerted action.

Foreign Secretary Eden replied in the affirmative. He then noted that the French socialists had told the British Ambassador in Paris that what they wanted was an extension of the NATO period to 50 years. He said that he did not know how difficult that question was for the United States.

Secretary Dulles said that the matter would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate. He said that he would not totally exclude the possibility if it was the thing that would finally bring about ratification. He pointed out that the question was one of who acts first. He said that it would be impossible to put anything through the U.S. Senate before ratification by the French. He stated that the French would have to ratify on the assurance that the U.S. would try to get it done. He noted that fifty years is a long time. He said that he would not say today that it could be done and he emphasized that it would not be desirable to hold out any hopes. On an informal and confidential basis he indicated that the possibility could be explored with Senate leaders if it seemed the critical thing to do. He felt that there would be strong pressure on people to do whatever was possible when the critical juncture was reached. He expressed the opinion that it was foolish to put reliance in fifty-year treaties of alliance, since all such treaties are effective only as they reflect the interests and desires of the countries at the particular time. He noted that it would be a national disaster for both the U.S. and the U.K. if the Continent of Europe were to fall into hostile hands.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he did not think the extension to fifty years was necessary nor could it mean a great deal, but he noted that the French socialists might feel that they needed it.

Secretary Dulles noted that the NATO was not limited to twenty-year life and provided the right of withdrawal.

Sir Roger Makins said that from what Secretary Dulles had said he felt that the problem of extending the NATO commitment to fifty years was a point of less difficulty.

Secretary Dulles said that the point might be covered by an exchange of notes. He felt that it was inconceivable that a situation would arise which would lead the U.S. to want to withdraw from the basis position set forth in the Treaty. He felt that it was premature, however, to think in terms of those things at this stage.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was already tied up with the French in other ways. He said that even if they could do anything more than had already been done it would be most unwise to say so at the present time.

Secretary Dulles said that the French wanted a statement from us concerning meetings of the Three Powers.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he interpreted the French to mean that they wanted a Political Standing Group.

Secretary Dulles said that his understanding was not that the Three Powers would come together as a political standing group but that they would merely talk together when a critical situation arose. It was his understanding that the French wanted to emphasize that if the EDC goes into force the French would not be dropped out of discussions, in effect that the creation of the EDC would not mean their exclusion.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was willing to state that French membership in the EDC would not change ordinary relations. He noted that a formal organization for consultation was another thing and would be very difficult for them to do; the Canadians in particular would not like such an arrangement.

Secretary Dulles said that we could give assurances to the French that entering into the EDC would not push them down but to say that membership in the EDC would push them up was another matter. He was inclined to be somewhat evasive on this point at this stage and was against the establishment of tripartite machinery.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that their proposition was very much [like] that of Secretary Dulles. He said they were all for giving assurances without establishing machinery.

Sir Pierson Dixon expressed the view that the extension of NATO to fifty years would help the French.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that formal extension should not be taken for granted.

Foreign Secretary Eden noted that they had said something on the point in their note to the French and they would stand on that for the time being and would consult with the U.S. regarding any further developments.

Saar

Secretary Dulles said that our position, which had been misrepresented in France and Germany, was that there was no organic relationship between the Saar and EDC. He said that the French were not justified in trying to run out on the EDC because the Saar problem had not been settled. He quoted Mr. Adenauer as having said to him, “I am prepared to resume discussions tomorrow on the Saar.”⁷

Foreign Secretary Eden said that Bidault had told him that he was quite ready to receive British advice and keep the British informed but he would not accept outside intervention. Mr. Eden said that he had told Bidault that it was important to settle the Saar question before the German elections and Bidault had said that the point was much in his mind. Mr. Matthews, in response to a question from Secretary Dulles, replied that we had not had any detailed reports on the the recent talks in Rome.⁸ Foreign Secretary Eden said he thought that we should inquire. Mr. Matthews said he understood that the technical people are meeting on the subject.

Secretary Dulles asked whether we should inquire of Paris and Bonn concerning what is going on about the Saar. Foreign Secretary Eden agreed that this would be desirable and Secretary Dulles instructed that a cable be sent out.

British Arrests of Neo-Nazis in Germany

Foreign Secretary Eden said that Kirkpatrick would see Adenauer shortly and tell him what information the British have on the Neo-Nazis. It was felt that the data in their possession would give grounds for proceedings against the people involved if Adenauer so desired. It was felt that it would be preferable for Adenauer to handle it and it was thought that he would probably want to. He noted that the group had had contacts outside their own country, mostly with Fascists, and that one of the group had had contact East of the Iron Curtain. It was felt that Adenauer would like this evidence. The Foreign Secretary undertook to let us know the position on this matter.

Trieste

Foreign Secretary Eden said that they had not done anything lately on the matter of Trieste except send the U.S. an unhelpful telegram.⁹ He said they were worried because it was felt they could not do enough to help De Gasperi, but what could be done was enough to upset Tito.

Mr. Bonbright said that the present position was that we were sounding out the Italians to find out if they had any further ideas. He said that while we did not exclude the provisional solution, we considered it doubtful. He noted that according to the British message they now shared our doubts. He pointed out that De Gasperi wanted an outcome by which the Yugoslavs would not take over Zone B (which it would be difficult to guarantee) and there would be no withdrawal of the March 20 declaration.¹⁰

Secretary Dulles said that when he talked with De Gasperi the position was not quite as clear cut in the sense that he did not want to have the declaration withdrawn during his election or the zone annexed. De Gasperi envisaged Zone A and B with minor adjustments but with the timing arranged so that the good news would come out just before the elections and the bad news just after. Apparently De Gasperi wanted the Italians to be able to move into Zone A but wanted assurances we would not revoke the 1948 declaration and would restrain Tito from action in Zone B until the election was over. He pointed out that this depended upon very careful timing.

Mr. Matthews said that De Gasperi had backed away from this since he apparently realized that Tito might not restrain himself.

Secretary Dulles noted that the situation had been as he had described it when he talked with De Gasperi.¹¹

Foreign Secretary Eden said that the Italian suggestion was a very dangerous gamble since there was no way to prevent Tito from annexing Zone B. He felt that it would be difficult to do anything before the elections. He noted that the Italians were not pressing them. He felt that the suggested approach was entirely too subtle and he recommended that we should hold the present situation and keep in touch.

Secretary Dulles said that he felt that the thing was shaping up toward a solution. He noted that precise timing was delicate. He felt that we should get the problem solved in the next six months and that the solution would help to resolve the military situation in the southeast area of Europe.

Sir Roger Makins asked whether the solution would be along lines of zonal boundaries. Foreign Secretary Eden added, “Subject to slight changes.”

Mr. Matthews expressed the opinion that we should not freeze the situation now but should look at it after the Italian elections. Sir Pierson Dixon noted that when there is talk about a provisional solution, the Yugoslavs think that the Italians are trying to improve their position with the view to getting the whole area.

Far East—Control of Trade with Communist China

Foreign Secretary Eden said that the Cabinet had been considering the problem of war materials. He said that a cable had been received from the Prime Minister containing certain suggestions regarding the general position of strategic materials. He pointed out that the British already have a long list of goods that are banned. If the U.S. can show the British that there are goods of strategic importance not included on the lists, then the British are prepared to add those items to the list, but the U.K. will have to ask the U.S. to support the British position in Paris in getting the other COCOM countries to follow the example set by the British.

Mr. Allison said that the U.S. would want to look into the question of additional items and that the problem could discussed by technicians immediately.

Secretary Dulles said that it would be helpful if some statement could be made.

Foreign Secretary Eden replied that there might be some difficulty in making a statement since the existence of the Paris group is not known. With reference to the problem of shipping, he said that it was thought that there were a few cases where strategic cargoes were being carried on British ships among mixed cargoes. It is therefore their intention to institute a system of voyage licensing which would prevent the carrying of strategic commodities. He said that this system presented some technical difficulties. He noted that the lists of goods given to masters must be identifiable and that it was hard to apply the voyage licensing system to small ships, that is ships of less than 1000 tons. He pointed out that the system would require Colonial legislation and the Colonies will be asked to take the necessary steps. With regard to bunkering, he said that there are already some measures in effect and these will be tightened up. He noted that the problem of the denial of bunkers at non-British ports depends on the cooperation of oil companies and local governments. He said that the U.K. was ready to join in making representations to the foreign governments in this question and would take the initiative in making representations to the Commonwealth countries concerned, that is Ceylon and Pakistan. On the subject of stores, he said that it may be possible, through administrative controls, to impose inconveniences on non-British ships calling at British ports. The Foreign Secretary said that since these matters were so detailed a note on the subject would be sent to the Department of State. In connection with the problem of Hong Kong, the Foreign Secretary noted that a principal difficulty was sabotage trade in non-strategic materials. He said that he thought voyage licensing would go a long way towards limiting this trade.

Secretary Dulles noted that the voyage licensing system was not applicable to ships under 1000 tons and he therefore questioned its effectiveness in connection with trade through Hong Kong.

Mr. Allison added that our real concern is that ships appear to be Communist ships but are under British registry.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that it was his understanding that we would all gain if the ships are under British registry.

Sir Pierson Dixon explained that with the voyage licensing system the British Government would be in a better position to apply the system if ships remained under British registry.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that they would look into the question of the size of the ships if the U.S. was not happy about the exception.

Foreign Secretary Eden noted that the Finnish tanker Wilma had delayed in Singapore, that it has received no bunkers and that the master of the ship was afraid to continue his voyage. He said that the master’s fears were being encouraged.

Foreign Secretary Eden asked that the U.S. help with the Chinese Nationalists. He said that the British wanted the Chinese Nationalists to observe ordinary international rules.

Secretary Dulles said that apparently the voyage licensing system would obviate any necessity for an extra-legal system. He said that it would be helpful if we could get out a statement before the conclusion of Mr. Eden’s visit.

Mr. Allison said that he and Mr. Tomlinson would get together on a statement after the meeting.

Sir Roger Makins said that the U.K. Government would want other countries to institute a voyage licensing system also.

Secretary Dulles said that we will do everything in our power to extend effective controls. He said that we were concerned that pressures would become so great as to require a naval blockade and he thought the British system went a long way to avoid the piling up of such pressures.

Foreign Secretary Eden explained that there was no question of waiting for other countries before instituting the voyage licensing system. He said that they had already stopped transit cargoes, that is they have transshipment control, and they intend to institute the voyage licensing system without waiting. He said that he felt that the Congress does not know that the British are doing things to control shipments that other countries, for example the Dutch are not doing.

Secretary Dulles said that it would be desirable for any statement to recapitulate the things that the British are now doing. He said that he hoped it would be possible to have a statement brought out before he left on Saturday.

Foreign Secretary Eden said he hoped that would be possible.

Stalin

Foreign Secretary Eden showed Mr. Dulles the remarks he proposed to make at the National Press Club concerning Mr. Stalin if a question were asked of him.¹²

Indochina

Foreign Secretary Eden asked whether there was anything Secretary Dulles could tell him about Indochina.

Mr. Matthews said that we were proceeding on Five Power military liaison.

Secretary Dulles said that we were asking our technical people to go to Paris to talk with French technicians so that we would know what the French have in mind in connection with the proposed talks.

Naval Blockade of China

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he was occasionally asked what he thought about a naval blockade of China, and he anticipated being asked that question in Parliament upon his return. He said that in their opinion a naval blockade would be ineffective particularly since it would have to include the Soviet ports in order to be effective. He said that if he were asked any questions about the naval blockade he would say that he had said what had been said before.

It was agreed that a second meeting would be held at 10:15 a.m. on Friday, March 6.¹³

1. The meeting took place in Secretary Dulles’ office. In addition to the subjects discussed in these minutes, the Foreign Ministers also discussed Korea; for a record of this discussion, see UKPT MIN–1 (Special), infra. A summary of the talks on the Far East was sent to London, Paris, and ten Far Eastern posts in circular telegram 933, Mar. 7. (841.00/3–753)
2. For documentation on the British proposals, submitted on Mar. 3, 1953, for association with the European Defense Community (EDC), see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 745 ff.
3. For documentation on Prime Minister Mayer’s visit to Washington, Mar. 26–28, see Part 2, Documents 583 ff.
4. For documentation on Secretary Dulles’ visit to Europe in January and February 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1548 ff.
5. For a record of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Belgian Prime Minister Van Houtte on Feb. 7, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1575.
6. Documentation on Foreign Minister Van Zeeland’s visit to Washington is in files 755.13 and 855.10.
7. For a record of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Chancellor Adenauer on Feb. 5, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1569.
8. Bidault and Adenauer were in Rome Feb. 24 and 25 for meetings on European economic and political integration. Coled 1 from Paris, reporting on the discussion of EDC, is printed in vol. v, Part 1, p. 741; Coleds 2 and 3, reporting on the economic and political conversations, are printed as Documents 155 and 156.
9. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume viii.
10. For documentation on the tripartite declaration on Trieste, Mar. 20, 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 509–520.
11. For a record of Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi, Jan. 31, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1551.
12. No copy of these remarks has been found in Department of State files.
13. For a record of this meeting, see Document 381.