Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 351
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) of a Meeting of Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden at the Department of State, January 10, 1952¹

secret
TCT CONV–4—Part II²

January 10, 1952

Present:

• U.S.

  • Secretary Acheson
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. Perkins
  • Mr. Allison
  • Ambassador Gifford

• U.K.

  • Secretary Eden
  • Sir Oliver Franks
  • Mr. Tomlinson
  • Mr. Shuckburgh

Japan’s Relations with China

The Secretary opened the discussion by referring to a previous brief mention of the matter between the President and Mr. Churchill and the fact that the matter had been referred to Mr. Eden and the Secretary for further discussion and decision.³ Mr. Dulles was then requested to state his understanding of the situation. He spent some time going over the complete history of the problem of Japan’s relations with China, beginning with the statement Prime Minister Yoshida had made on May 19, 1951, that the Japanese Government under no circumstances desired signature by the Chinese Communist regime to the peace treaty with Japan and that basically the Japanese Government wishes to make peace with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that in all his actions he had been motivated by the desire to keep US–UK policy as close together as possible and at the same time bring about an early ratification of the Japanese peace treaty by the United States Senate. He emphasized that he had resisted attempts by members of the Senate to take the stand that Japan should at once conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China and was hopeful that the action he had taken and which he would explain would result in the Senate’s early ratification of the treaty without attaching reservations concerning the necessity of Japan’s concluding a treaty with Nationalist China. Mr. Dulles had consistently borne in mind the agreement with the former Labor Government that Japan should have free choice as to what was in its best interests, that nothing should be done which would compel Japan to make a treaty with Nationalist China which would recognize Nationalist China as at present able to speak for all of Mainland China, and that any treaty which might be negotiated between Japan and Nationalist China should not be finally consummated until after the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. He added that at no time had it been his understanding of the Dulles–Morrison agreement⁴ that it would prevent Japan from taking action which it deemed in its own interest, and he pointed out how the facts of United States–Japan relationships were such that it was unthinkable, for the next several years at least, that Japan would pursue a policy in the Far East which was counter to that of the United States.

Mr. Dulles referred to the fact that he had now received a direct communication from Mr. Yoshida, stating the intentions of the Japanese Government, and that it would probably be necessary to make this known during the course of the Senate’s consideration of the peace treaty with Japan.⁵ Mr. Dulles concluded by stating that in his opinion the action which the United States had taken was the absolute minimum necessary to achieve the desired results in the United States Senate and at the same time retain the spirit and in fact the letter of the Dulles–Morrison agreement. He expressed the hope that the United Kingdom would be able to go along with this contemplated action.

Mr. Eden expressed appreciation for the detailed account given by Mr. Dulles and said that he fully appreciated the factors which influenced United States wishes in this matter. He could only repeat what he had said before, namely that his Government would have much preferred that any expression of intention by the Japanese with respect to their future action could have been withheld until after the actual coming into force of the treaty of peace, but that if, for what seemed to the United States good and sufficient reason, this was not possible, he did not believe that his Government would wish to make any great issue over the matter. He reiterated the well known UK view that nothing should be done which would give the Japanese opportunity in the future to say that whatever action they might take toward China was forced upon them and not the result of their own free will. In this connection Mr. Dulles pointed out that final action by Japan, including ratification of any treaty or agreement with Nationalist China by the Japanese Diet, would not take place until after the multilateral peace treaty had become operative, and hence would be the free and voluntary act of the Japanese people.

Secretary Acheson said that he wished to supplement Mr. Dulles’ remarks by pointing out that the Japanese would have great difficulty in working out with the Government on Formosa the type of limited agreement contemplated, and that the Chinese Nationalists had certain strong cards in their hands. They might well induce certain of their friends in the Senate to advocate a postponement of ratification proceedings until the Senate could have an opportunity to study in detail any proposed agreement between Japan and Formosa to see whether or not it met all Chinese desires. This would be bad enough, but there was a second course of action which might be even more distressing, namely that the Senate would attach to the ratification a reservation to the effect that the treaty would not become operative until Japan had concluded an agreement with Formosa. This not only would be bad for the United States, but would confront all the other signatories to the treaty with a very difficult problem. The Secretary then went on to say that it was most desirable to have Sir Esler Dening, British Ambassador in Japan, informed of the results of our talk so that if he were approached by the Japanese he could make clear that if they desired to go ahead with beginning negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist Government they would not incur the displeasure of the British Government. Mr. Eden thought this raised rather difficult problems and might seem to necessitate his Government’s completely reversing its previous stand and that this would be most embarrassing. Considerable discussion then took place among those present over possible wording of a message to Dening which would not do violence to the previous British position and yet would indicate to the Japanese that if they took action which they desired to do in their own interest the British Government would interpose no objection. It was finally left that the British side would endeavor to draft an appropriate instruction to Dening and would consult later with the United States side on this matter.

In conclusion, Mr. Eden agreed on the fundamental necessity of Japan’s foreign policy being in harmony with that of the United States, and he suggested that such differences as exist between the United States and the United Kingdom relate primarily to the matter of timing of Japan’s announcement regarding its policy. Mr. Eden stated specifically that this was not in his mind a major issue and that it should not cause any real difficulty either between the United States and the United Kingdom or the United Kingdom and Japan.

1. The source text, which is dated Jan. 18, does not indicate when or where this conversation took place, but according to Acheson’s book, Present at the Creation, p. 604, the meeting took place Jan. 10.
2. Part I is printed supra; Part III is Document 355.
3. See Document 329.
4. For documentation on the Dulles–Morrison agreement, made in June 1951, relating to Japan’s future relations with China, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 1039 ff.
5. For the text of Prime Minister Yoshida’s letter to Dulles, Dec. 24, 1951, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 759.