Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

741.13/12–2851: Telegram

No. 326
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

secret
priority

London, December 28, 1951—7 p.m.

2898. Embtel 2784, Dec 18.¹ Fol are our thoughts on Churchill visit including comments on PM’s list of topics and on paper forwarded with Raynor letter Dec 17 (TCT memo–3a).²

I. General

A. While gen Brit situation is well known, it may be helpful to remind ourselves of some of its basic elements as background for Churchill’s talks. Brit are proud and sturdy people who have worked hard to recover from immense damage of two world wars. A year ago they were convinced they had achieved substantial success and were looking forward to further econ gains and hoped for an easing of internatl tension. This situation has been substantially altered and they have now been plunged back into serious econ difficulties which will affect their attitudes as well as their well being. Although often loathe to admit it, thoughtful Brit realize that they are overextended economically, politically and militarily; they have perhaps been attempting too much and their commitments, which they have inherited from days of their greater strength, are now too great for their resources. They are trying desperately to maintain their position as a first-class power, seat of empire, head of Commonwealth and center of sterling area. They are aware of the thin margin on which they operate, both economically and in internatl political field, which causes them to be extremely sensitive to any hint that our position is not consistent with theirs, especially in areas where they have had primary responsibility. They are perfectly prepared to recognize they occupy a junior position in partnership with US but are convinced they have much to offer in experience, wisdom and positions of influence around the world.

B. There is no doubt that Churchill’s principal objective is to re-emphasize close and intimate relationship between US and UK. Specific topics discussed and possible agrmts or decisions reached are definitely subsidiary in his mind to this principal purpose. Churchill inevitably thinks in terms of close US–UK association during the war, feels Labor Govt was inept in handling its relationships with US and believes US–UK imtimacy can to large degree be re-established. He is supremely confident of his understanding of America, constantly referring to his “American cousins”, and feels he is especially qualified to bring us closer.

C. Churchill feels that danger of war is lessening but will continue during 1952 and 1953 and that rearmament program shld continue. However he seems to share to some extent gen Brit fear that western resources might be too extravagantly devoted to rearmament after 1953, with risk of serious danger to basic west econ structure, ultimately resulting in a relatively weakened position vis-à-vis USSR. Although Churchill has no doubts whatever as to US motives, he probably does feel US inclined to be impetuous and thus unnecessarily increase danger of war.

D. Churchill is definitely aging and is no longer able to retain his full clarity and energy for extended periods. Also he is increasingly living in the past and talking in terms of conditions no longer existing. These developments in his personality mean that he is more difficult to deal with while at same time his advisers have gained in power and stature. In FonAff field for instance Eden is more and more inclined to stand up for his own views. While members of Govt of course continue to defer to Churchill’s idiosyncracies, Eden and Butler in particular are developing real independent stature and influence in party. This will be important in discussion of topics such as Sudan for instance, on which Eden feels strongly (see below under ME).

E. All our Brit contacts emphasize that the agenda is largely Churchill’s personal work and that he is making his own decisions on lines he intends to follow in discussions. He is not only being close-mouthed about his thoughts but has probably not yet made up his mind on many details and is of course notoriously unpredictable. Specific comments which follow are therefore necessarily vague and based almost entirely on speculation and guesswork.

II. Churchill agenda (incorporating comments on TCT paper).³

1. Defense.

A. Organization of West for defense. Under this topic Churchill is expected to bring up TCC report⁴ and will also discuss gen NATO organization, presumably on basis report just completed for him by Gen Ian Jacobs. We so far have no info on content this report.

As mentioned under 3–B below,⁵ Churchill is expected to raise question of broadening end-item criteria either in this connection or under organization on west topic. We may request increased mil aid and stress necessity flexibility location and use Brit forces in terms global requirements containment USSR. He will emphasize relative combat readiness of UK forces and relatively small (7 percent) percentage of mil aid to title I countries going to UK.

Emb believes that this may offer opportunity to obtain an increased Brit contribution to NATO together with an understanding that if hostilities broke out with Sov bloc in some area outside NATO, Brit could shift strength to such area without violating NATO commitments. This wld allow Brit (1) to increase contribution to NATO, (2) to increase Brit eligibility for mil aid and (3) at same time to provide assurance that in event of crisis with Sov bloc, UK wld retain sufficient flexibility to meet threat in any area.

This wld of course represent US recognition parallel US–UK security interests on global basis. Emb has repeatedly recommended such explicit recognition related to concept of type and extent of US mil aid.

B. Eur army. So far as we can learn Churchill will have little new to bring up on this subj. He is somewhat on the spot not so much at home as on the continent over his refusal join EDF. He insists however that he is fully consistent, that this idea of Eur army is a coalition of natl armies, “bundle of staves bound with hoops of steel”. Now that EDC and EDF are developing along different lines his attitude is “we do not merge in Eur army, but we are already joined to it”. EDF will be closely and effectively associated with Brit forces which constitute another element in same defensive system thru their common allegiance to NATO.

C. Atlantic and other commands.

Under this subject Churchill will probably want to obtain agrmt in gen terms on whole nexus of command structure from Norfolk to Persian Gulf. He may well be willing to accept US position on Atlantic command for sake of over-all agrmt, but this is by no means certain. Acceptance by all powers concerned of Brit for MEC commander wld of course be helpful as it wld enable Churchill to present “package deal” to Brit Parl and public.

D. Strategic air plan and use of atomic weapons. Brit have apparently never formally been given our strategic air plan and Churchill will probably ask for it. In addition he hopes to clarify and extend present agrmts on use of atomic weapon. Brit believe that as result Attlee discussions last year and subsequent conversations they have firm commitment that bomb will not be delivered from UK bases without prior consultation; that there is qualified commitment to consult on use in FE; but that no commitment exists re other use.

E. Technical cooperation in atomic energy. While here earlier this month, Arneson had conversations on this topic. There have since been no new developments on basis of which Emb can offer constructive comment. Fact that “use of the atomic weapon” is separately listed in Churchill’s agenda strengthens our previous feeling that PM will discuss atomic energy on its merits and not link it with use of US airfields in UK.

F. Rifle. In recent defense debate Churchill stated that UK has on hand only twenty of new .28 caliber rifle. Production plans of Labor Govt wld have resulted production beginning in 1953 with rate reaching 100,000 per year by end of 1954. UK now has fewer than 2½ million of .303 rifle and requires three to four million. Churchill’s analysis strongly implied recognition that large scale production of new type rifle at this stage not justified in terms of priority production of other items.

He did not however officially announce cessation of plans for production of .28 caliber rifle.

Altho Brit mil and, we understand, Churchill himself, are apparently convinced efficiency and ultimate desirability standardization on .28 caliber or similar type rifle, believe Churchill may be prepared compromise on eventual type. Desire for ultimate agrmt on standardized weapon with advantages of large scale production in North America clearly recognized by PM.

Part II to follow.⁶

Gifford

1. Not printed; it reported that Churchill had been very vague about the substance and procedure for the upcoming talks, but that Embassy officials in London were seeing the close associates of the Prime Minister to get as accurate an impression of his intentions as possible. (741.13/12–1851)
2. Not printed, but see Document 323. The letter from Raynor has not been identified further.
3. For the text of the agenda proposed by Prime Minister Churchill, see Document 324; presumably Gifford is referring to TCT Memo–5, Dec. 26, which contained the text of the proposed agenda. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 160, “Steering Group Memoranda”)
4. For documentation on the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) report, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 203 ff.
5. Item 3 B is in telegram 2903, infra.
6. See telegram 2903, infra.