Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

120.4341/6–1154

No. 310
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Washington, June 11, 1954.

Subject:

• Ambassadors Meeting, London, June 8 [9]–10.²

I had a full day and a half’s discussion with Dillon, Bruce and Tomlinson, Conant and Dowling, Martin representing Hughes, Aldrich, Butterworth and Gordon, on the present situation with respect to Germany, France and EDC, and plans for the next few months. In addition I had an hour and a half’s conversation with Aldrich and Butterworth on a variety of subjects, an evening with Thompson on Trieste, and two conferences with Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, about which I shall report separately.³

At the meetings of Ambassadors we endeavored first to reach an accurate and up to the minute appraisal of the situations in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I think this was very valuable and will give us the most solid basis of fact which we could obtain for plans for the immediate future.

In a word, the situation in Germany is that the point has been reached when Adenauer must be able to show results from his all-out gamble on the EDC, European integration, pro-Western policy. If the French parliament ratifies, his position will be stronger than ever; if the period of uncertainty is continued during the next six weeks, he can hold the situation provided certain time-gaining moves are made; if the French parliament adjourns without having ratified or with an adverse vote, the situation will be critical.

France is absorbed in the Indo-China situation. If the Delta is lost or the Indo-China settlement is unfavorable, there will be a tendency to blame her allies, the UK even more than the US, for not coming to the rescue. If in addition we diminish the French position in Europe, the emotional reaction might lead to a fellow-traveller Government. Talk about new Governments centers around Bidault as Prime Minister with a Foreign Minister who is cool to EDC or Schumann as Prime Minister on a straight basis of postponing EDC. Thus, if left to themselves, the drift might be toward postponing action until Parliament adjourns. Much depends on the attitude of the MRP. Under these circumstances it was agreed that it is all the more necessary to put the EDC issue up to the new Government and try to force a decision before adjournment of Parliament in August.

The British are extremely pessimistic about the situation in France and the chances of EDC. They also think that it is imperative to save Adenauer’s position by moving ahead in Germany. Kirkpatrick would build up the German border police to 100,000 with tanks and planes. Conant is opposed to this. On all counts they would welcome concerting with us in moves to bring the EDC issue to a decision in France and to do what is necessary in Germany.

The Ambassadors reported that the “agonizing reappraisal” had not in general been taken seriously. In reporting the situation in the United States, I indicated that there should be no underestimation of the suddenness and unanimity with which a fluid public opinion—especially after an adverse turn in Indo-China—might crystallize into an attitude unfavorable to those nations who are hedging their cooperation, or as in the case of France, exercising a veto over progress with respect to Germany.

In view of the importance of the integration policy, it was agreed that every effort should be bent to bring the EDC issue to a head in France before Parliament adjourns, and to take whatever action was feasible to hold the situation in Germany. Bruce presented a plan—the “Spaak Plan” with certain modifications—for the first objective, and Conant a plan for the second.

The elements of Spaak’s plan, as modified, are:

(1) A letter from President Eisenhower to Coty stating our continued interest in EDC and expectation that any new Government will act on it before Parliament adjourns.

(2) A meeting called by the Benelux countries, toward the end of June or first of July, under Article 132 of the EDC Treaty, attended by the four countries which have ratified, plus the U.S. and U.K. The purpose of this meeting would be to discuss the situation occasioned by the delay in ratification, without reference to alternatives, and to issue an appeal to the French and Italian Governments. Mention might be included that if no progress had been made before adjournment of the French Parliament, a second meeting would be called to consider what should be done. As a first major international conference attended by Germany but not by France, it was believed that it would not be without effect upon the French.

(3) If this move brought no results, a second meeting, to which France might be invited, would be called immediately after the French Parliament adjourned or shortly before, in which each country might make proposals, not excluding restoration of German sovereignty. Since the political question of Germany’s status is inseparable from that of rearmament, a request would also be made for an NAC meeting in September to consider this aspect. The question of alternatives to EDC would not be gone into by either of these six-power meetings.

(4) The conditions of the Spaak Plan were: (a) that there should be firm US–UK agreement thereto first; (b) that it should not be identified as a “Spaak” plan, although he would undertake the necessary prompting and coordinating action; (c) that he would personally approach Eden and Adenauer, as well as Bidault and the Benelux ministers, before public steps were taken.

The elements of Conant’s plan are:

(1) For the High Commision in Bonn, by repealing occupation restrictions, literally to legislate themselves out of existence, thereby in substance putting the Contractual relationships into effect. There are a number of fields where this could be done, while retaining security powers and the shell of occupation control, and without doing violence to the basic tripartite agreements on Germany.

(2) The US and UK should first reach agreement, then seek to obtain the agreement of the French Government to general instructions from Governments authorizing them to proceed in this sense. A couple of months would be required in Bonn for the necessary High Commission action and collateral executive agreements with the Germans.

(3) Conant acknowledges that the difference would be more “optical” than real, but would accomplish the limited objectives of taking care of Adenauer for the next couple of months while keeping the French and Germans “within speaking distance”.

The Ambassadors agreed that the “Spaak” plan, with any necessary modifications, might be most effective and should be tried. There was no objection to exploration with the British of Conant’s proposals and any others which might be suitable for the German situation, with a view to an approach to the French as soon as it became apparent that the French Parliament might adjourn without action. No conflict was perceived between Bruce’s and Conant’s plans, nor to putting Conant’s proposals into effect by unilateral action (two to one vote) in Germany, to the extent this is possible, if the French withhold agreement.

1. Drafted by Kidd. A notation on the source text reads as follows: “See saw”.
2. The summary minutes of this meeting, which total 48 pages, are in file 740.5/6–954 and CFM files, lot M–88, “London Ambassadors Meeting—June 1954”.
3. No record of these meetings was found in Department of State files.