EUR files,
lot 59 D 233, “Chiefs of Mission Conference—1953”
No. 306
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State1
top secret
[Washington,] October 1, 1953.
Subject:
- Report of Chief of Missions Meetings in Luxembourg and Vienna2
A meeting of Chiefs of Mission to countries in the Coal and Steel
Community was held at Luxembourg on September 18–19. Mr. Bruce, and Ambassadors Hughes, Aldrich and Bohlen also attended. The main
topic of discussion was the EDC. This
discussion is summarized in the telegram attached as Tab A.3
Psychological warfare was also covered in considerable detail. A
memorandum of the discussion and recommendations is attached as Tab B. A
telegram summarizing the discussion and recommendations regarding United
States foreign trade policy is attached as Tab C.4
After Luxembourg, I went to Vienna and held a meeting on September 22–24
with our Chiefs of Mission in Eastern Europe. Dr. Conant, Cecil
Lyon from Berlin, and Ambassador
Thompson were also present. The principal
conclusions of this meeting are attached as Tab D.
[Page 678]
Summary minutes of both meetings, including the country-by-country
reports, will be available in a day or two if you or General Smith would like to glance through
them.5
I am also attaching a Memorandum to the President for your signature (Tab
E), transmitting the paper on psychological warfare and the principal
conclusions of the Vienna meeting, in case you think he would be
interested in seeing them.
I believe both meetings were very useful for everyone who attended. I
myself returned encouraged with the progress in achievement of our
policies in Europe, optimistic over the prospects for early ratification
of the EDC and impressed by the high
quality and effectiveness of all of our Chiefs of Mission.
[Tab B]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State6
top secret
[Washington, October 1, 1953.]
Concept and Ideas for
Psychological Warfare in Europe Developed by the Chief of
Mission Meeting at Luxemburg on September 18–19, 1953
i. basic considerations
- A.
- Psychological or political warfare is the reflection of policy
and political objectives. It can be a useful handmaiden to
attain and support such objectives. Actions are the best
propaganda, for Washington is under a world microscope and
everything we do or say is subjected to close analysis and world
press coverage. Our position in the world is therefore based on
what we do rather than what we say about ourselves.
- B.
- Western European countries have developed a high degree of
immunity to propaganda from whatever source. United States
information programs should be as quiet and subtle as possible
and the United States label should generally not be
omnipresent.
- C.
- Our psychological warfare effort should never be allowed to
run ahead of carefully considered political objectives as there
is always the danger if this is allowed to happen that
psychological warfare can start to make policy rather than serve
it.
- D.
- Before any psychological warfare operation is undertaken it
should be carefully examined to determine whether it is
calculated to serve both short term and long term political
objectives. Political warfare operations should be kept under
day-to-day review with the view to assuring that they are in
timing and purpose linked with political policy.
- E.
- “Propaganda begins at home”, i.e. the American domestic scene
and our actions on the world scene are the basis of our
psychological warfare effort abroad. Our country is open for the
world to observe. The best persons to present our case abroad to
their respective countries of origin are those who visit us and
observe our institutions and our national character. The
Cultural Exchange Program should be increased and visa
procedures liberalised in order particularly to permit
intellectuals and publicists to visit the United States and to
return and inform their own people what they have
observed.
- F.
- President Eisenhower’s world prestige is enormous and his
April 16 speech as a basic statement of American policy was
carried in all newspapers of any consequence throughout the
world. His address had a reassuring and salutary effect. The
President’s great prestige should be availed of in carefully
considered pronouncements on American foreign policy
objectives.
ii. western europe
- A.
- Western European countries are generally distrustful of what
they consider to be American policy objectives vis-à-vis Eastern
Europe. Pronouncements by important Americans officials about
the “liberation” of Eastern Europe causes fear and anxiety in
Western European capitals. It is generally believed that
American impatience and implacable hostility to Communism might
result in hasty and ill-considered action and… might set up a
chain reaction leading to military conflict, which Western
Europe desires to avoid under almost any circumstances.
- B.
- How hot should be the cold war? Western Europeans will go
along with keeping the Eastern European pot lukewarm or even
simmering but they fear that American political warfare is
inclined to keep the pot at a constant boiling point.
- C.
- The United States should coordinate its psychological warfare
operations (i.e. its policies) more closely with its Western
European allies both to reassure them and to insure their
support and participation. American unilateralism in this field
is dangerous and
[Page 680]
serves devisive forces within the Western alliance, which in
turn serves the Kremlin’s objective to
break the Western Alliance. (The East Berlin riots of June 17
and American psychological warfare operations related thereto
caused serious difficulties with our principal allies who also
have responsibilities and vital interests involved. It would
have been better to have consulted with them with a view to
enlisting their support and cooperation.) Our psychological
operations at times serve to increase fears on the part of our
allies that we were prepared to break in the windows; to bring
the pot to a boiling-over condition, the grave consequences of
which we have perhaps not weighed and carefully considered.7
. . . . . . .
iii. eastern europe
- A.
- Our psychological warfare operations directed against Eastern
Europe should never be allowed to run ahead of our political and
military policies. One basic long term objective of American
policy is to work toward the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from
the eastern zone of Germany and from the Eastern European
satellites.…
- B.
- The Russians will probably eventually consider it in their
interests to withdraw their military forces from Eastern Europe
satellites. There is little we can do by political warfare
operations to advance the date of such withdrawal. Stirring up
resistance elements or incitements to revolt might have the long
range effect of retarding a Soviet military withdrawal. Our
operations in this field should be very carefully studied with
the view to insuring that they forward rather than retard this
objective.
- C.
-
The spirit of resistance in Eastern Europe will not die
out. Our psychological warfare effort should be tailored to
assist in keeping this spirit in existence but should never
incite to rebellion or revolts which could only have the
effect of destroying the healthiest and best resistance
elements within the satellite countries. Psychological
warfare plans and programs should be constantly checked for
their efficacy and desirability by the American diplomatic
missions within the target countries.
. . . . . . .
- F.
- Our information and propaganda output should cease referring
to the Russian “peace offensive”. Even if this phrase is used
[Page 681]
within quotation
marks, these quotation marks have a tendency to disappear. The
end result tends to be that the Kremlin is
identified in many minds somehow with peace. The obverse of this
coin is that the West not being identified with peace is somehow
identified with war, an important Soviet objective.
- G.
- We have apparently given the impression that we are afraid to
sit down and meet with the Russians. Actually, the principal
meetings between the Russians and the Western allies have
resulted in propaganda victories for our side and we should
abandon any general reluctance to confer and exploit our
position where strong, as is the case regarding Germany. The
view was expressed that the Kremlin does
not want such a meeting which would certainly bring out further
for the world to see Russia’s inflexibility and its
disinclination to abate world tension, except on the
Kremlin’s terms.
iv. “resistance”
Resistance elements, historically, have proved effective only on the
eve of liberation by military force, i.e. the F.F.I. in France just
before and after the Normandy landings. During the occupation of
France thousands of persons who attempted active resistance were
shot, deported or imprisoned. The resistance elements who survived
were the quiet organizers and the pamphleteers.
. . . . . . .
[Tab D]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State8
top secret
[Washington,] September 29,
1953.
Principal Conclusions
Chief of Mission Meeting in
Vienna
September 22–24, 1953
The following conclusions and estimates were arrived at in the full
realization of the dangers of attempting to predict future
developments, particularly where the Soviet Union is concerned:
- (1)
- There has been no change in the essential character and
structure of the Soviet system, but there have been possibly
far-reaching changes in the USSR and its satellites (except
Poland) in economic policies, and some relaxation of
pressures on the individual.
[Page 682]
There is evident no willingness to
concede on important points to achieve a negotiated
settlement with the free world; but there are signs that
some easing of international tensions is sought by the
Soviet leaders for domestic reasons if such a relaxation can
be achieved at the cost of only minor concessions. The
Soviet rulers are dismantling the
Stalin one-man despotism and
reestablishing the supreme role of the Communist Party. They
appear to be moving in the direction of a Leninist-style
dictatorship.
- (2)
- The United States should maintain existing policies of
building its defensive strength, maintaining cohesion with
its allies, and refusing to compromise on principles. We
should push ahead on EDC and
should cast aside any fear of negotiating with the USSR. In
fact we should recognize our own strength and seek
opportunities for conference when it will serve our
aims.
- (3)
- Long-term Soviet policy regarding Germany is possibly
uncertain or undecided, but for the immediate future the
USSR is giving full support to its puppets in East Germany,
making unification impossible and attendance at a conference
embarrassing to them. They will probably refuse to come to
Lugano, but will stall in the reply to our note in an
attempt to cause confusion.
- (4)
- Berlin is the outstanding danger point, where a chain
reaction leading unintentionally to conflict could arise at
any time. It is also a showcase for the West behind the Iron
Curtain, and as long as it continues to be a western island
the Soviets will probably not be able to completely
satellitize Eastern Germany.
- (5)
- Apart from Eastern Germany, there has been little evidence
of incipient revolt or active unrest in the satellites. The
idea of freedom and hope of ultimate liberation remains, but
the hold of the police and presence of the Red Army make
revolt at present an impossibility.
- (6)
- We should avoid actions which might incite revolt under
existing conditions behind the Iron Curtain and enable the
Soviet and satellite leaders to deflect on us the blame for
their own crimes and errors. The pressure of events and the
shortcomings of the Communist system will contribute to the
disintegration of the Soviet Empire more inexorably than we
can through psychological warfare activities which are
essentially uncontrollable and whose results may too often
prove the opposite to those intended.
- (7)
- An upset of the regime in Albania, even if it were so
rapid as to forestall Soviet reaction, would, under existing
relationships in the area, clearly complicate the situation
in the Adriatic, even though a turnover would be a permanent
loss to Soviet prestige. However, we should be alert to find
suitable opportunities to discuss Albania with our allies
and Yugoslavia.
- (8)
- The return of Yugoslavia to the Soviet orbit is highly
unlikely. The recent normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav
relations is rather an indication that USSR recognizes that
Yugoslavia is irretrievably in the other camp.
- (9)
- The events of June 16–17 in East Berlin confirmed as a
fact the bankruptcy of the puppet regimes. The Red Army
action revealed the impossibility of a successful revolt in
a satellite as long as the Soviet Army is present and
reliable.
- (10)
- It is necessary to clarify US policy more precisely with
respect to the individual satellite countries. We tend to
fall into the error of treating them all alike.
- (11)
- Opinion was divided regarding the advisability of renewing
relations with Bulgaria, but it was agreed that the timing
of such an action was important in order to avoid a
misunderstanding regarding its significance.
- (12)
- The new policy on East-West trade (NSC 152/29) was generally approved.
- (13)
- It is impossible to predict the ultimate result of
developments within the Soviet orbit, but the general trend
seems favorable to the interests of the free world.
[Tab E]
Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President10
top secret
[Washington, October 1, 1953.]
Subject: Conclusions of United States Chiefs of
Mission Regarding Psychological Warfare and Eastern Europe
Assistant Secretary Merchant met in Luxembourg on September 18–19, 1953,
with our Chiefs of Mission to the countries in the Coal and Steel
Community, as well as David
Bruce, and Ambassadors Hughes, Aldrich and Bohlen. I think you will be
interested in the attached summary of the discussion and
recommendations of this group regarding psychological warfare.
Mr. Merchant then met
in Vienna on September 22–24 with our Chiefs of Mission in Eastern
Europe, well as Dr. Conant and Ambassador Thompson.
I think the attached conclusions of this meeting will also be of
interest.
The discussion at the Vienna meeting throws some interesting light on
conditions behind the Iron Curtain as observed by our own
[Page 684]
people. Some of the
conclusions likewise have a direct bearing on our conduct of
psychological warfare.
