Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Regional Conferences”

No. 304
Minutes of the Chiefs of Mission Meeting at Luxembourg, September 18–19, 1953¹

top secret

[Luxembourg?,] September 30, 1953.

Participants:

• From the Department:

  • Assistant Secretary Merchant
  • Mr. John W. Jones
  • Mr. John Y. Millar

• Embassy London:

  • Ambassador Aldrich

• Embassy Paris:

  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Robert P. Joyce

• Embassy Rome:

  • Ambassador Luce
  • Mr. James B. Engle
  • Mr. John J. Shea

• Embassy Moscow:

  • Ambassador Bohlen

• HICOG, Bonn:

  • Ambassador Conant
  • Mr. Walter C. Dowling

• Embassy, The Hague:

  • Ambassador Chapin
  • Mr. Harold Shullaw

• Embassy Brussels:

  • Ambassador Alger

• Coal and Steel Community:

  • Mr. Bruce
  • Mr. William Tomlinson

• NATO:

  • Ambassador Hughes

• Luxembourg:

  • Minister Buchanan
  • Mr. G. H. Walter Rowe

September 18—Morning Session

Introduction—Mr. Merchant

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting with a review of the important developments of the last six or seven months. Among the most important were the death of Stalin, the Beria case, President Eisenhower’s speech of April 16, the Korean truce and the June 17 episode in Berlin, with its revelation of the degree of unrest and dissatisfaction with Soviet rule. These developments had been followed by the Italian elections, the re-emergence of the Trieste question, the French political crisis, the emergence of the Laniel Government and the major step being contemplated by the U.S. to help the French win the war in Indochina. The tripartite meeting in Washington in July had gone extremely well. The recently concluded meeting of the ANZUS Council in Washington had also gone well and indicated a common determination to combat Communism in the Far East. Developments in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and regarding the Suez base, were encouraging. The most striking event of a favorable nature was the Adenauer victory in the German elections, with its many far-reaching implications.

Mr. Merchant said that the outstanding development on the unfavorable side of the ledger was the Russian possession of the hydrogen bomb. The composition of the new cabinet in Indonesia added to the weak and tense situation in Southeast Asia. The recent disagreement with India over the Korean peace conference had an unfortunate effect on our relations with this important country.

On balance, recent events had been in our favor. If a turning point in the cold war had not yet been reached, at least this was a time of great historic importance, when the United States was faced with great dangers on the one hand and great opportunities on the other, which might be exploited by courage and skill.

The Soviet Union—Ambassador Bohlen

Ambassador Bohlen opened his outline of internal developments since Stalin’s death by observing that many of the policies and institutions of the U.S.S.R. under Stalin’s rule were reflections and instruments of Stalin’s will and whim rather than of the Soviet system per se. After his death, his successors were faced with the necessity of making great readjustments because of the highly personalized rule that he had exerted. Stalin was a sort of paranoiac type who apparently had become increasingly rigid in his thinking in the period before his death, to the point where he opposed almost any change in the Stalinist system or any challenge as to his infallible judgment. Thus his successors not only faced the necessity for change but also had an opportunity to effect changes which they may have believed to be long overdue.

Malenkov seems to have been in control from the time the new regime was announced. He and the group of about ten men who direct the Soviet Union appear to be trying first to re-establish the power and control of the Communist party, which had been curtailed under the personal rule of Stalin. Instead of rule by one man along conspiratorial lines and after the manner of an Oriental despot, they are attempting to rule through the top organization of the Communist party, which is itself above and outside the government. This is the so-called collegial system, as distinct from one-man dictatorship. The new regime is also undertaking to re-establish the control of the secret police by the Communist party.

It seems to be inaccurate to consider that there has been an all-out internecine struggle for power following Stalin’s death. There may have been a certain amount of jockeying for position but it seems that there has been a consolidation of controls and a relatively tranquil transfer of power to a group of men presided over by Malenkov.

The domestic policies of the new regime are well summarized in Malenkov’s speech of August 8. There appears to be a tendency to correct the absurdities and extremisms that developed under Stalin, such as the unbridled license of the secret police over any and all citizens. The impression seems to be building up in the public mind that if a citizen minds his own business he will not be subjected to the arbitrary terroristic practices typical of the Stalin regime. There is a definite campaign to raise the standard of living. The regime promises that there will be an improvement within two or three years and apparently there is widespread acceptance of this idea. Encouragement is now being given to develop the private peasant holdings on the collective farms, with the double objective of increasing agricultural production and improving the peasants’ attitude toward the regime.

Malenkov himself seems to be primarily an administrator, with first-rate executive ability and a good deal of common sense. He does not seem to be the type that is motivated basically by ideological considerations; rather, his attitude seems to be to get things done and to make the system operate.

Within the context of the totalitarian police state, which has complete control over every person and institution in the U.S.S.R., there seems to be a trend toward making the government more efficient and business-like. There is no relinquishment of controls but there does seem to be an attempt to get back to what might be called Soviet normalcy: that is, to the conditions that existed under Lenin as distinct from the Fuhrer character of the U.S.S.R. under Stalin. While there is always the possibility of a surprise development in the U.S.S.R since complete control is exercised by about ten men, there seems to be no present likelihood of a military coup d’état.

Turning to Soviet foreign policy, internal factors have always seemed to count heavily as determinants of Soviet foreign policy. The fundamental objective is always the protection and promotion of Soviet interests and only secondarily the fulfillment of ideological goals. A basic determinant is the decision taken in 1928 to industrialize the U.S.S.R., a backward agricultural country, and do it with their own resources. The magnitude and pace of this effort help to explain why, in Soviet eyes, it was necessary to resort to the terroristic methods of extreme police state rule.

The present foreign policy objective is to achieve a relaxation of the tensions which might lead from the cold war into a general war, without giving up any of the areas in which Communist regimes have been installed or making any other major concessions. Manifestations of this policy are to be seen in the tidying up of diplomatic relations with a number of countries, such as Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. In Europe, Germany is clearly the predominant issue. After the June 17 demonstrations the Soviet rulers appear to have made the fundamental decision of supporting the East German puppet government at all costs. This means that there is no prospect of Russian agreement to the unification of Germany, since unification would mean selling the East German Government down the river. The overtones of this decision, with respect to the satellites, have been to attempt to remove some of the causes of public disaffection toward the Soviet-controlled governments by slowing down the industrialization programs and by emphasizing measures which will lead to a higher standard of living. Possibly the new regime hesitated to jeopardize the Soviet position in the satellites by subjecting them to the strains of the forced-draft industrialization which Stalin had achieved in the U.S.S.R. at such terrible human cost.

The policy toward North Korea seems to be the same as toward East Germany—the Soviets have no intention of relinquishing their control. The Soviet Government is obviously very careful about relations with China and treats China more as an equal than any of the Western [Eastern] satellites. There is little change in Soviet policy toward non-Soviet states.

From the basis of the foregoing analysis, it seemed likely that the Russians would send a blurred reply to the Western invitation to a four-power meeting on October 15. Their note would probably accept the principle of a conference but then go on to allege that they had not received adequate replies to their two previous notes, and would thus, in fact, turn down the invitation. The Soviet rulers probably accept, at least for the time being, the concept that if they hold on to Eastern Germany, Western Germany will be incorporated into the Western defense organization. After the events of June 17 they will probably not try again to re-create a full-blown Communist system in East Germany since it must have been patently obvious to them how far they had failed in gaining the allegiance of the people. Instead, they might try to play for time and set up a modified system, perhaps with socialized industries, which could withstand an election. In one sense the prospects for a unified Germany were reduced by the events of June 17 since the Soviets adopted a policy of greater intransigence as a consequence of the demonstrations. One incidental consequence of the hardening of the division between East and West Germany will be greatly increased tension over Berlin, the meeting point of the two areas. A clash between the armed forces here could occur at almost any time, with most serious consequences.

While the Soviets would probably not be willing to give up any of their puppets, in negotiating a relaxation of tension, they might be willing to negotiate on the basis of delineating spheres of influence. Incidentally, since Austria does not have a puppet government it follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Soviets might be willing to negotiate on Austria, but it was very clear that they have tied any discussions on Austria to discussions on Germany. They would never undertake serious negotiations on disarmament because they would not permit inspection in the Soviet empire.

It seems that the only situation in which they might now start a general war would be if they believed that an attack upon them was imminent. The very considerable sacrifices that they must be bearing in order to carry out the development of unconventional weapons is probably not to be interpreted so much a reflection of offensive intentions as in terms of a deterrent concept and a feeling that they must keep up with the other side. Reports from travelers within the U.S.S.R. indicate that the fear of war is very strong and very widespread. It is difficult to judge the extent to which the Soviet rulers may have accepted their own propaganda clichés about the threat of aggression and capitalist encirclement. The Soviet rulers have been misled before by their own propaganda in the cases of South Korea and Finland, where they apparently believed that instead of resisting Communist invasion the inhabitants would welcome the Communists as liberators. It is interesting, however, that they do generally subordinate their own propaganda actions to support of their policy objectives, and rarely act for propaganda reasons to the prejudice of their policy.

In answer to a question about Soviet relations with Yugoslavia, Mr. Bohlen said that it was unlikely that Tito would rejoin the Soviet system now since both sides know too much about the other. The more cordial diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the satellites and the appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia are more likely evidence that the Soviets have accepted the Yugoslav break and wish to normalize relations on this basis, rather than an indication that Tito is coming back to the Soviet fold.

Turning to the Beria affair, Mr. Bohlen thought it was unlikely that Beria had seriously considered that he could replace Stalin, since he was a Georgian, a policeman and apparently did not have the driving force to carry him through. As the chief of the Security Forces he may have very well objected to the softer policies following Stalin’s death. This may have been his undoing. It seems likely also that a contributing element to his downfall might have been the June 17 demonstrations, because he was responsible for security in the satellites. At any rate his elimination has not led to a big purge as might have been expected under Stalin.

In summary Mr. Bohlen believed that the present Soviet Government is faced with tremendous difficulties and contradictions. One of the possible developments is that the relative relaxation toward the peasants may jeopardize control over them. At any rate the basic contradictions and artificialities of the Soviet system may be making themselves felt and thus giving rise in turn to dangers and opportunities which make the present phase an important one.

Germany—Dr. Conant

Dr. Conant thought that German ratification of the EDC and the contractual agreements is almost a foregone conclusion. The impression is that after the Adenauer victory the courts will not make any difficulties on constitutional grounds. Far from being puffed up or arrogant as some reports picture him, Adenauer is extremely conscious of the responsibilities of his great victory. If events turn out favorably in the next few months he seems to be aware that he may go down in history as a great German statesman and, at 77 years old, he realizes he does not have much time. If the EDC does come into effect new leaders may develop within Adenauer’s own party who can take over from him at some future time. It is interesting in this connection that with an absolute majority in Parliament the CDU could choose a new Chancellor without holding a general election. If the EDC fails to go through it seems likely now that extremists from the opposition parties would gain control of the German Government.

A curious aspect of the German election campaign was that Adenauer virtually ran on an American ticket. He campaigned with the aid of a moving picture of his trip to the U.S., which presented him as being intimately identified with America. His explanation is that it was good politics because the Germans are thoroughly convinced that their future lies with the U.S., and this tended to show that he could deal effectively with the Americans and had succeeded in raising Germany to the level of an equal.

In addition to being reasonable and in a very strong position, Adenauer is anxious to end the occupation status. The only presently available way out, as agreed upon by West Germany and the Allied occupying powers, is through the ratification of the contractuals and the EDC. If this transition from the occupation status can not be realized some other device would have to be negotiated, but that would be so difficult now as to be a most undesirable alternative. In the meantime, before EDC ratification has been completed, the U.S. High Commissioner particularly is in an increasingly difficult position. The longer that ratification is postponed the more difficult our position will be and the greater the strain on U.S.-German relations. It is to be noted that the German desire to end the occupation status gives Adenauer a real interest in the early ratification of EDC.

Adenauer’s views about the agenda for a four-power meeting differ in one important respect from those of the United States. Adenauer feels very strongly that the discussions should be narrowed to the preparations for the election of an all-German Government: that a discussion of a peace treaty could not take place without German participation and hence must not take place until after an all-German Government had been elected. Adenauer would have all Germany behind him on this issue. He was afraid that if any discussion of a peace treaty took place at the four-power meeting some commitments would be bound to result, or at least the Soviets might allege that some commitments had been arrived at. Possibly we might be able to work this out with Adenauer by drawing a distinction between discussing specific provisions of a peace treaty and merely discussing a declaration of principles for a treaty.

While the German people hope for the establishment of a unified Germany they realize that it is impossible for Western Germany to negotiate successfully with the U.S.S.R. under present conditions: first Germany must become strong. The German people are really not anticipating that unification will be achieved by a year from now, much as they hope for it. Thus it is not a problem which must be resolved in a matter of months but it is a question of years.

France—Ambassador Dillon

Ambassador Dillon began by saying that important developments had also been taking place in France in the past few months. The month-long governmental crisis in the early summer had been a cause of serious concern to the French public. They felt ashamed and deeply disturbed. Out of the crisis France finally got a government which is in a stronger position than any other since the Liberation. The Laniel Government is attempting to increase stability and fight Communism by raising the standard of living and thereby to rebuild the faith and strength of France. It is tackling the economic and social problems which have been the underlying difficulties: for instance it is trying to balance the budget, loosen up credit and undertake a home-building program.

The prospect of the successful outcome of the war in Indochina, due in large part to greater U.S. support, and our support in the recent Moroccan crisis has led to a noticeable improvement in U.S.France relations. U.S. prestige in France has also been raised by the growing impression that the Soviets are not willing to negotiate, thus vindicating the U.S. posture toward the U.S.S.R.

The French seem to realize that the Adenauer victory means that the Germans voted in favor of EDC, with which the Chancellor is so closely identified, and that therefore it is clearly up to France to make the next move on EDC. The improved prospects for the Indochina war and the enhanced possibilities that French troops can be returned to Europe have improved the French outlook on EDC ratification, as did the U.K. position of support for EDC which was revealed in Washington in the July Tripartite Ministers’ talks. The possibility of a four-power meeting is no longer a cause for delaying action on ratification. Bidault has stated privately that he is going to devote all his energies to achieving ratification by the end of the year and Laniel has also indicated that he is going to work vigorously for ratification. Bidault has also said privately that he and Adenauer get along very well and if they sit down together they can work out a solution on the Saar. In summary, France seems to be over the hump of inaction and is about to start moving on ratification.

Afternoon Session

Italy—Ambassador Luce

Ambassador Luce began by analyzing the Italian election and explaining how the Pella Government came into office. Pella has said privately that he is in agreement with about 80% of De Gasperi’s domestic policies and an even greater proportion of his foreign policies. Nevertheless, he has emphasized that continued cooperation with the NATO effort depends upon more consultation on subjects of concern to Italy than has been the case in the past. The Italians are very sensitive on this point at present.

Trieste is the overriding issue for the Italian public at the present time and is one subject upon which all Italians can agree. If Pella does not get a reasonable solution on Trieste he will probably either resign or will not obtain a vote of confidence for his government. Parliament is re-convening on September 22 and it is expected that the subject of Trieste will come up shortly thereafter. If the Pella Government falls it is likely to be replaced eventually by a pro-Communist government under Nenni. This is the immediate danger of the present situation. A Nenni Government would obviously have the most serious implications for the future of NATO, besides eliminating any possibility of a U.S. military facilities program in Italy. On the other hand, if a satisfactory solution for Trieste can be worked out the prestige of the present government will be increased and it is possible that Italian ratification of EDC can be accelerated.

Until the Trieste question is resolved, and resolved satisfactorily from the Italian point of view, action on EDC ratification is stalled. Further progress on negotiations for U.S. military facilities is very likely also dependent on the Trieste issue.

While the Italian people are no longer as conscious of the Soviet threat as they have been, they are basically pro-West and will take every opportunity afforded to them to act with the West.

It would be a great help if the barriers to Italian trade with the United States could be reduced since increased foreign trade with the dollar area is essential for the Italian economy. Since there is not much expectation that we will accept any more Italian immigrants than is presently contemplated, the best we could do on this score would be to help Italy find places for immigrants in other parts of the world. Finally, Italy will probably require some economic assistance for a long time to come, perhaps longer than any other country in Europe.

Netherlands—Ambassador Chapin

Ambassador Chapin said that the Netherlands has made a remarkable economic recovery and that there are no economic problems of serious concern to us. They are concerned about the financial aspects of maintaining the military equipment that is being furnished to them. We are no longer blamed for the loss of Indonesia but there is serious concern in the Netherlands about the new government there and about the future of Netherlands investments. One unfavorable factor is a fairly widespread feeling that the Soviet threat has diminished.

The Dutch are proud of their record on European integration, although they are frankly more interested in NATO than EDC. While ratification by the first Chamber is considered to be automatic, the timing may be affected by the actions of the other countries since the Dutch do not want to get too far out in front.

Belgium—Ambassador Alger

Ambassador Alger said that there is no question but that EDC will be ratified at the next session of Parliament, probably before Christmas. Belgium seems to have fewer problems than other European countries.

United Kingdom—Ambassador Aldrich

Ambassador Aldrich said that Churchill’s health had much improved and that he would probably be able to carry through the winter. However, if he were unable to do so Eden would almost certainly succeed him. Churchill is at the height of his popularity. On the other hand, Aneurin Bevan had lost a great deal of ground politically and the Labor Party seemed to be backing away from the policy of nationalizing industry.

Churchill had been giving a lot of thought to the question of reassuring the U.S.S.R. about a re-militarized Germany, although it was pretty difficult for American officals to share his concern. Churchill had now come around completely in favor of EDC. Lord Salisbury had said privately that he, Salisbury, had such confidence in Mr. Bruce that he would be willing to follow his advice as passed to him by Ambassador Aldrich with respect to U.K. tactics to promote ratification.

Ambassador Aldrich thought that the British were in agreement with us on UN matters, including the question of Red China. Their trade problems are showing great improvement. Finally, the atmosphere with respect to the United States is improving. One element in this improvement is that Salisbury finds himself in agreement with the United States about 95% of the time.

Estimates Regarding FY 1955 Foreign Aid—Mr. Merchant

Mr. Merchant gave a brief outline of tentative thinking within the Department regarding mutual security aid in FY ’55. He estimated that the total amount to be requested might run between 4 and 5 billion dollars. About 2.5 to 3 billion dollars might be requested for Title I military end-items, with heavy emphasis on the German program. Of this amount, off-shore procurement in the Title I area could account for about 500 million dollars. There might be a “kitty” of around 300 million dollars for Title I to provide for what is now described as economic aid or defense support for West Berlin, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Italy. This would be in the nature of a special program rather than economic aid as such. Possibly this assistance could be effected by an extension of the common-use concept, or by distribution of agricultural surpluses. It is possible that the entire Mutal Security Program will be included in the Defense Department budget rather than requiring separate legislation. It is expected that FOA missions abroad will be closed upon the termination of economic aid programs in individual countries.

Defense support for France and Indochina might be handled separately from the rest of the MSP funds on the basis that they are to be used to clean up the war in Indochina.

In the general discussion that followed, it was agreed that if foreign aid were included in the Defense Department budget, contracts for off-shore procurement should be placed on the basis of what items could be bought most advantageously in any given country.

NATO: Annual Review and Developments in the Council—Ambassador Hughes

Ambassador Hughes said that the NATO International Staff believes, and he agrees, that the Annual Review will be ready in time to permit a NATO Ministers Meeting in early December.³

The atmosphere in the Council has improved considerably in the last few months. Lord Ismay has revised his earlier intention to resign as Secretary-General and now intends to stay on, subject only to the question of his health. In the first few months that Mr. Hughes was at NATO there was a tendency in the Council to distort developments to indicate that the U.S. had lost interest in NATO. The smaller countries tended to believe that the U.S., UK., and France were making decisions beforehand and not consulting the other members on important subjects. This has been remedied a good deal in recent months. It is important, however, to make an effort to furnish material for discussion in the Council. The Council itself has shown a development in the direction of going beyond consideration of strictly military matters to economic and political aspects of NATO. It is in our interest to stimulate this tendency, since among other advantages we gain an additional channel for persuading other governments of our views if we can sell them to their NATO representatives.

1. In addition to the accounts of the morning and afternoon sessions of Sept. 18 presented here, the minutes of the Luxembourg meeting included three attachments. The first was telegram Colux 3 from Luxembourg, Sept. 20, which dealt with the U.S. attitude toward the establishment of the EDC; for text, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 808. The second was a memorandum on psychological warfare in Europe which was the subject of discussion at the morning session of Sept. 19. The text of this memorandum, is scheduled for publication in volume viii. The third attachment was telegram Colux 4 from Luxembourg, Sept. 19, not printed, which discussed the desire of the Western European countries to increase East-West trade.
3. For documentation concerning the NAC Ministerial meeting, Dec. 14–16, 1953, in Paris, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 454 ff.