Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

ECA–MSA files, lot W–745, “Budget Bureau Presentation 1953”

No. 266
Memorandum by the Deputy Director for Mutual Security (Kenney) to the Director for Mutual Security (Harriman)¹

secret

Washington, September 22, 1952.

Subject:

• Revised Fiscal Year 1954 Program Requirements for Title I (Europe)

1. I refer to our memorandum of September 3, 1952, signed by George W. Lawson, Jr., which forwarded preliminary estimates of FY 1954 requirements for Title I (Europe) Defense Support.²

2. We have now reviewed these estimates and the rationale for assistance to Europe, and have come to certain conclusions which are set forth in two papers attached to this memorandum. Within the framework of these papers, the estimates previously furnished to your office (and summarized in Table 1) are confirmed as representing at this time our best judgment of FY 1954 requirements.

3. The first of these papers (Annex A) discusses the rationale of and administration of U.S. financial aid to the EDC countries and the U.K. in Fiscal Year 1954.

4. It does not deal with programs of special assistance for other purposes in these countries. Specifically, it does not cover: (a) continued aid in connection with the Moody Amendment;³ (b) special assistance in furthering rapid economic development in Southern Italy; (c) special aid for Berlin; (d) technical assistance to increase productivity in Europe; and (e) loans for the development of basic materials in Europe and its overseas territories.

5. Annex A also does not discuss certain special considerations affecting the rationale for FY 1954 U.S. aid to the countries of Southern Europe—Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Spain—which will be the subject of a companion paper. With respect to Spain we are suggesting, pending clarification of military policy objectives and the outcome of current negotiations, that $50 million be included tentatively for economic assistance. The estimates previously included for the other countries are confirmed, as summarized in Table 1.

6. With respect to assistance for Moody Amendment purposes, we have not included any special fund of dollars in the estimate for FY 1954. Our present expectation is that the counterpart funds generated by the $100 million earmarked for these purposes in the FY 1953 program will suffice, together with other potential availabilities of counterpart, to cover the financing in local currency of specific activities to be undertaken this year in Europe under the Moody Amendment. Additional counterpart funds for the same purposes may also be available from (a) an estimated $15 million of counterpart to be generated from technical assistance dollar expenditures; (b) perhaps $10 million of the counterpart to be generated in Austria; and (c) depending on the technique of administering aid, from local currency availabilities in the United Kingdom.

7. The second of the attached papers (Annex B) deals with the development of Basic Materials. It proposes a major undertaking to meet the problem pointed up in the Paley Report (President’s Materials Policy Commission),⁴ in the form of a 4-year program requiring a $1.0 billion public debt authorization for all MSP areas, about $200 million of which would be needed in FY 1954. Such a program will require new legislation and should probably be the subject of a separate Title in the MSP. Pending an Executive Branch determination on this program, $20 million is included under Title 1 to continue in FY 1954 the modest program being undertaken this year under Sec. 514 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. If a general Basic Materials program is set in motion along the lines we have proposed, this item of $20 million should be eliminated from the estimates for FY 1954.

8. In view of the changes in rationale and administration of aid that are proposed in the two Annexes, I recommend that the proposals contained in them (amplified to the necessary extent by further discussion and drafting) be cosidered an integral part of the presentation to the Budget Bureau, and of the President’s program as finally adopted for inclusion in the draft U.S. Budget.

9. In considering these proposals, I know that you will not lose sight of the fact that they refer only to the relatively short-term problem of U.S. assistance to Europe next year. We hope that the very necessary work on the FY 1954 Budget will not preclude giving attention to the more fundamental problems (in the fields of trade policy, financial stabilization, commodity purchasing, and economic development) that will face the next Administration and the new Congress.

Table 1

Breakdown of Proposed U.S. Financial Aid to Europe (other than Offshore Procurement) in FY 1954

United Kingdom			400
	EDC Countries—Total		460
	Defense Production	350
	Southern Italy	35
	Berlin	75
Southern Europe—Total			224
	Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia	139
	Austria	35
Spain		50
Technical Assistance			24.5
Basic Materials			20
			1,128.5

Table 2

FY 1954 Estimates Compared with FY 1952 (Actual) and FY 1953 (Estimated) Obligations

	(In million dollars)
	FY 1952	FY 1953*	FY 1954
Country Aid	1,429.1	1,248.1*	1,034.0
Technical Assistance	14.9	18.0	24.5
Basic Materials	8.2	19.3†	20.0‡
Assistance to Spain	35.5§	║	50.0
	1,487.7	1,285.4	1,128.5

Annex “A”

Paper Prepared in the Mutual Security Agency⁵

Fiscal Year 1954 Title I Defense Support Program: Rationale and Administration of Aid to Major European Countries in Fiscal Year 1954

1. The estimates submitted on September 3 for the FY 1954 defense support requirements of the major European countries are subject to even more than the normal qualifications and caveats, since they depend on a number of assumptions about a) fundamental NATO decisions that are not yet made and cannot be pinned down before the Annual Review,⁶ and b) the size and character of other closely related aspects of the Mutual Security Program, notably offshore procurement. Nevertheless, these estimates appear to be as valid and accurate as any that could be made at this time, and they should be maintained for purposes of present budget planning. They do, however, raise certain issues of policy affecting the whole Mutual Security Program in Europe. These issues have been fore-shadowed to some extent in the Congressional Presentation and in our operational planning for FY 1953, but their implications have not yet been fully reflected in U.S. Government thinking and plans. The purpose of this memorandum is to attempt to clarify these issues and to point up decisions that must be made in the near future to settle them.

2. FY 1954 should be regarded by the Executive Branch, and presented to Congress, as a year of transition—partly because Europe itself is in a state of transition, after having largely adapted itself to the impact of the Korean war and the need for rearmament and reached a new plateau in defense and economic activity; and partly because a new U.S. Administration and Congress will have to review and rethink many of the major elements of American policy. FY 1954 will therefore be a period in which we will be working with European officials towards the development of longer range solutions to the basic problem of the European economy and its relationship to the U.S. Considerable time will be necessary both for formulating such solutions within the Executive Branch and for discussing them with European governments, prior to their submission to Congress in final form. It will certainly not be possible to present to Congress early in the year a complete program reflecting a “new look”; the Presentation for FY 1954, therefore, is likely to be developed primarily about the well-established goals of our policy in Europe—defense, economic growth and integration—with certain new emphasis.

3. The MSA projections for FY 1954 indicate (a) that the U.K. will still have a very substantial dollar deficit even on the basis of quite optimistic assumptions with respect to the British trade position and their receipts from U.S. military and OSP payments; (b) that the deficits of the Southern European countries and Austria will be substantially lower than those now projected for FY 1953, on the assumption that continued progress will be made in achieving internal stabilization; but (c) that the large U.S. military expenditures and OSP payments projected for the three major EDC countries should eliminate any substantial dollar deficit for those countries, and are likely, in fact, to result in a considerable increase in the reserves of Germany and Italy. To be sure, as was indicated in the September 3 submission, a number of the assumptions on which these estimates were based are quite uncertain, and a change in expectations about the level of European defense expenditures, the amount and timing of OSP payments, the starting date and extent of “pay-as-you-go” in Germany, etc., might well alter the situation quite drastically.

4. Nevertheless, so far as can be projected at this time, the need for U.S. assistance to the defense effort of the EDC group of countries does not stem primarily from their inability to finance essential dollar imports. It is clear, however, particularly in the case of France, that the internal resources that can be mobilized for defense by these countries without external assistance will not be sufficient to sustain a defense program of the size that is necessary to carry out our political and security objectives in Europe (plus the French military effort in Indochina). It will probably be necessary, therefore, to provide from the outside some of the means of mobilizing these resources, without necessarily limiting such provision to dollars that will be currently used to buy commodities or services in the dollar area. This is not a wholly new problem. We are providing more assistance this year to France certainly, and to Germany and Italy probably, than is strictly required on balance-of-payments grounds, with the probable result that their reserves will increase. Some basis was established also in the Congressional Presentation last spring for the need to supplement European resources in a broader sense than merely helping to cover a dollar deficit. But the justification was still built primarily on a balance-of-payments foundation, and this “pitch” will presumably have to be changed quite explicitly, with all the risks that such a change entails, in presenting an aid program for the EDC countries for FY 1954.

5. The clearest and most effective way of expressing and justifying U.S. defense support for this group of countries (and probably for the U.K. as well) in FY 1954 is in terms of expanding their production for defense. There seems to be general agreement within the U.S. Government and among our NATO partners that it is most desirable, if not essential, to develop a substantially expanded program of defense production in Europe, for the purpose not only of helping to provide equipment for the current European force build-up, but also of providing an adequate industrial base for their mobilization and maintainance over the longer term.

6. As yet is is not possible to estimate definitely the size or composition of the European defense production program that needs to be undertaken to meet these purposes, although the repeated crisis over the French matériel program, the NATO aircraft study, and other fragmentary surveys have provided some indications. It should be one of the major tasks of the Annual Review to define general production targets and priorities in Europe, properly associated with the force goals and maintenance requirements which are developed over the next three months.

7. Pending completion of the necessary studies and decisions MSA has assumed, for purposes of the September 3 submission, that about $1150 million of externally financed contracts will be required for an adequate defense production program in the EDC countries. Of this amount it is assumed that about $800 million for these countries (out of $1 billion assumed for all Title I countries) will be included as projected OSP in the Defense Department’s submission for the military aid budget. The remainder, $350 million, is shown in the MSA estimates as an EDC defense production fund. Although it is not and should not be earmarked for France this $350 million corresponds conceptually to the amounts of budgetary support (defense support plus “Lisbon OSP”⁷) provided to France in FYs 1952 and 1953—$500 million and (probably) $500–650 million, respectively; in principle, this would permit expenditures for purposes now included in the French defense budget to be continued at about the same level as is projected for FY 1953. Both the assumed $800 million and the $350 million shown in the MSA submission represent obligations, not necessarily payments. (On the assumption that the dollar needs of these countries will be adequately covered by normal receipts plus U.S. military expenditures plus payments on OSP obligations of prior years—as is forecast in the MSA projections—there would presumably be no need, in most cases, to accelerate dollar payments beyond the schedule corresponding to deliveries or local currency expenditures. This procedure would help to obviate any sharp, temporary increase in the reserves of the countries concerned.)

8. The development of the FY 1954 program for the EDC countries on this basis actually involves less of a change than may appear. Under the present program the bulk of the external financial contribution provided through the U.S. aid to the European countries’ defense effort serves in practice to provide them with additional military matériel. This is true (a) because the procurement of equipment has tended to be the marginal item in each country’s defense budget (to an extent which in France has raised serious political problems) and (b) because procurement of matériel is politically a more attractive object of U.S. expenditure from the standpoint of both the U.S. and the European countries concerned.

9. Such U.S. assistance to increase the amount of military matériel in the hands of our European associates takes two general forms:

(a) delivery to Europe of military end-items produced in the U.S., and

(b) assistance to the European countries by buying for them, or enabling them to buy for themselves, military end-items produced in Europe.

The dividing line between these two types of help has been confused by the fact that a part of category (b) called “offshore procurement” has been presented and to some extent administered as if it were part of the U.S. end-item program, while the other part called “defense support” has been presented as designed essentially to cover a dollar deficit. In actual fact, however, the OSP program in Europe has increasingly been divorced from considerations and procedures that apply to the delivery of end-items from the U.S. Most of the OSP money has been earmarked either to provide support to the military equipment budgets of certain European countries to enable them to meet their NATO commitments (e.g., the “Lisbon type” procurement in France), or to finance contracts negotiated with and through European governments supplementing their budgeted procurement (e.g., the purchase of Centurion tanks in the U.K., the whole aircraft program, and the “Pleven” procurement in France). Either way such OSP serves both to increase the production of military matériel in Europe and to supplement the financial resources (both dollars and local currency) available for European defense efforts; and either way its effect is now substantially the same as that of defense support.

10. The development and presentation of the FY 1954 defense support program in the terms outlined in paragraphs 5–7 above should help to make possible more rational analysis and programming for defense production in Europe. However, this is only one part, and the smallest part, of the total picture, and it is important that the others—the European governments’ own defense investment and procurement programs and the supplementary production financed by the U.S. through OSP—be tied into a coordinated whole. The conception of OSP as an insecure appendage to the program of end-item deliveries from the U.S., which persists in budget planning and presentation despite its substantial abandonment in practice, is a major obstacle to such comprehensive planning. Ideally, there should be a single European Defense Production Fund, including both elements of the U.S. financial contribution for this purpose.

11. Adoption of the general rationale outlined above would have several important implications:

(a) It suggests a substantial change in the conception, though not necessarily in the actual effect, of the present OSP program. Such a change would clearly require major policy and administrative decisions on the part of the U.S. Government.

(b) It would largely eliminate, for the countries in question, the device of economic aid administered along the lines developed during the Marshall Plan. This device has become less and less effective as a means of exerting leverage on European policy decisions, and its popularity has dwindled in Congress and to a lesser extent with European opinion as well.

(c) The U.S. Government would cease to control in detail the dollars programmed for these countries; programming attention would be focussed on the expenditure of local currency, which has become in fact the more important aspect of the two.

(d) The need for U.S. financing would be presented in its proper perspective as a defense production requirement. To be effective, however, such a presentation would have to be based on much firmer information and plans than are available at present. It would seem to be necessary to define, with necessary supporting data, the kind of “equipment balance sheet” that was talked about before the FY 1953 Presentation, but could not be developed for lack of the necessary specific information about the prospects for either U.S. end-item deliveries or European production. Specifically, such a “balance sheet” would be derived from:

(i) the force plan as it comes out of the NATO Annual Review;

(ii) the amount and timing of equipment deliveries needed for this force plan, and the continuing requirements for maintenance and replacement;

(iii) the amounts of equipment already on hand and on order in both Europe and the U.S. against these requirements;

(iv) the equipment projected to be procured by countries out of their own defense budgets, taking account of capabilities and the cost of other elements of their defense programs;

(v) the additional amounts of equipment which can and should be produced in Europe but need to be financed by the U.S.; and

(vi) the residual requirements to be met from additional appropriations under the U.S. end-item program.

12. The funds made available to finance such a production program might be expended under any of the several techniques that are now authorized in the MSP legislation:

(a) Procurement by the U.S. Government, contracting directly with private manufacturers in Europe.

(b) Contracts between the U.S. Government and a European government, whereby the U.S. finances the production of equipment to which the U.S. then takes title, preparatory to giving it to the NATO government (e.g., the Centurion tank).

(c) Agreement between the U.S. and a NATO government to provide dollars equivalent to the local currency cost of items which are to be procured through that country’s own military establishment and are included in its budget. (This is substantially the “Lisbon type” OSP in France.)

(d) Agreement between the U.S. and the EDC to transfer local currencies purchased by the U.S. Government to help finance procurement by an EDC Central Procurement Agency.

The essential thing is that the procurement so financed be closely related to and essential for a rational European defense production program; and secondarily that the resulting dollar payments be distributed and timed so as to be of maximum value in meeting the dollar needs of the several countries concerned.

13. The discussion above has been concerned largely with the EDC group of countries because they (especially France) present the clearest case of the need to supplement local resources, apart from immediate dollar balance-of-payments considerations, to bring about a defense program adequate for NATO security requirements. In the case of the U.K., the factor that limits the defense program (and limits the general growth of the British economy as well) is the chronic inability of the U.K. and its Sterling Area to earn enough dollars to pay for needed current dollar imports. Thus, a standard “balance-of-payments” justification exists, and the proposed assistance for the U.K. could be presented with a rationale very similar to that used by MSA in justifying defense support for the U.K. in FY 1953.

14. There may, however, be certain advantages in attributing the U.K. assistance as well to the defense production segment of the total U.K. defense effort. The need for a rationally conceived defense production program is as clear in the U.K. as it is on the Continent, and the considerations outlined in the previous paragraphs apply in greater or less degree to all the NATO countries. Probably, therefore, the kind of program proposed should be formulated, justified to Congress and administered on a NATO-wide basis.

15. For certain countries, of course, assistance will continue to be required, on a modest scale, for purposes that cannot and should not be distorted by considering them as part of a European defense production program. These include:

(a) Requirements for defense support and economic development in Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Spain; these requirements appear to be associated with balance-of-payments difficulties and thus present no new problems of justification.

(b) Special development programs, notably support for more rapid development in Southern Italy.

(c) Support for the Berlin investment program.

(d) Economic assistance to Austria.

(e) Technical assistance to increase productivity and related purposes.

(f) Loans for the development of basic materials (and collateral services like power and transportation), especially in the overseas territories.

All these requirements are separately shown in the MSA program submission for FY 1954.

16. In conclusion, one point that is implicit in what is said above should be explicitly emphasized: Any substantial financial help to the European countries must be programmed and administered in the context of the U.S. concern with, and views about, these countries’ entire economy. However, the primary purposes of such aid are formulated and justified—whether in terms of defense production, or other defense expenditures, or balance-of-payments deficit, or a development program, or a combination of several of these elements—the U.S. Government must take account of economic considerations broader than these purposes alone; we must be concerned to some extent with the country’s entire economy, with all the resources at its command and the ways in which they are used. Whatever the specific purposes to which U.S. aid is attributed, it should be regarded as a marginal contribution to these total resources, the justification for which depends in the last analysis on a U.S. Government judgment that the recipient country does not have sufficient total resources to accomplish ends that are agreed to be important from the standpoint of U.S. interests. Moreover, the U.S. is concerned to establish, as soon and as far as possible, conditions under which the aid-receiving country will be able to get along, and to accomplish the agreed objectives, without extraordinary assistance or with much smaller amounts. Unless the U.S. Government is in a position to assure itself that not only the marginal amount financed by the U.S. but the country’s own resources as well are used with reasonable effectiveness, both the justification for aid and the prospect of its becoming unnecessary are undermined.

17. Hence, although the emphasis in this memorandum has been placed on the need to develop and carry out an effective defense production program in Europe—which in itself, of course, would have wide repercussions on, and require attention to, the entire economy—it is important that the broader and longer range economic interests of the U.S. be given adequate consideration in the conception and administration of the Mutual Security Program for the coming year. This is all the more essential in light of the point made earlier, that FY 1954 should be a year of transition—as clearly oriented and consistently directed as possible—toward a more normal continuing relationship with our European associates.

Annex “B”

Washington, September 16, 1952.

Paper Prepared in the Mutual Security Agency⁸

Proposed Materials Development Program for Fiscal Year 1954

All the experience of the United States to date and specifically the experience of the ECA/MSA leads to the conclusion that the discovery of new sources and the expanded production of raw materials are essential to permit the normal expansion of industrial production in the United States and the rest of the free world. Studies of this problem by the Executive Branch of the Government, which have culminated in the recent report of the President’s Materials Policy Commission, clearly indicate that such increased production is necessary not only as an emergency measure but also to meet our increasing requirements in the medium and long term. These studies further indicate that the best possibility for securing needed increase in production lies in the development of the underdeveloped areas of the world. We are already carrying out programs for the expansion of materials production in these areas under the authority of Section 514 of the MS Act of 1951, as amended, as a part of a general program for the development of these areas.

At the same time, general surveys (such as those by Messrs. Gray, Rockefeller and Draper) of the dollar-gap and other economic problems of the countries now receiving aid from the United States as part of our Mutual Security Program have made it increasingly clear that the long-range solution of those problems lies in increased trade and investment rather than in indefinite prolongation of grant-aid programs. The furnishing of funds by the United States Government to help finance the development of underdeveloped areas to promote increased production of basic materials can be one effective instrument in the new approach to this problem. Such investment will make available to the underdeveloped areas dollars that may in turn be earned by the Western European countries and Japan, and thus help the latter to finance part of their necessary dollar imports; at the same time these investments will help to create the means for their repayment in materials needed by the United States in future years and for future dollar and other foreign exchange earnings from the sale of additional materials.

It is clear, however, that the development of materials in underdeveloped areas depends, in the first instance, upon mapping, exploration and the development of basic power and transportation facilities. In many countries it will also require health measures and the expansion of agricultural production, and it should be accompanied by a balanced expansion of other types of economic activity, including the establishment of adequate facilities for training local workers and professional and administrative personnel. Thus, a basic materials program must be regarded and administered as a part of a program for general economic development.

Moreover, it is the declared policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions. A well-conceived plan for financing basic materials development can and must contribute to this objective.

An adequate program for basic materials development should be conceived of as a continuing activity. The objective should be to help stimulate a normal flow of investment from areas where capital accumulates to underdeveloped areas which need to use additional capital. To achieve this objective, relatively larger amounts of government investment and of economic and technical assistance will be called for in the early years of such a program than are available now. Such financing would be an addition to the maximum anticipated investment available from private sources, the foreign Governments, and the IBRD. It is clear also that an adequate basic materials program requires a broader legislative authority than exists at the present. Such a program will require the provision of funds available for commitment over a four-year period, in the neighborhood of $1 billion, for use on a loan basis. The effective use of these loan funds would be dependent upon the continuation and strengthening of current technical assistance and economic grant aid programs now being carried on in underdeveloped areas under the Mutual Security Program.

Specifically we propose that Congress should be requested to authorize a program made up of the following components:

(1) That the Director for Mutual Security be authorized by Congress to utilize $1 billion, raised by a public debt transaction and available on loan terms as described in Section 111(c)(2) of the ECA Act of 1948, these funds to be available for commitment through June 30, 1957, for the making of loans to foreign Governments or to individuals or private organizations to expand basic materials production abroad, primarily in underdeveloped areas now included in the Mutual Security Program.

(2) That Section 514, which at present authorizes MSA financing of expansion of materials requirements of countries other than the United States, be expanded to include United States requirements as well, since materials development financed by the United States in any overseas area should be regarded as an integrated program by the United States Government.

(3) That the wording of Section 519(b), permitting the use of MSA funds to cover local currency expenditures for strategic materials projects where the materials are required by the United States, be modified to make it clear that such authority applies also with respect to MSA funds used to promote production of materials required by countries receiving aid from the United States.

(4) That Section 519(b) also be modified to apply to funds made available to MSA for this materials program without specifying a limitation on the amount available to purchase local currency. (To the extent that 10% counterpart funds are available to the United States for this program, such funds would of course be used rather than dollars for this purpose.)

The aim of this proposed program would be to develop projects necessary for the expanded production of materials required by the United States and the rest of the free world and to participate in the financing necessary to carry out these projects. It would make provision for requirements in fields that are not covered by DMPA, and if DMPA is not continued beyond June 30, 1953, this program could include those foreign development functions now covered by DMPA. This program for financing materials development would be closely correlated with other U.S. aid programs and interested U.S. Government agencies, the IBRD, and private investors. To the extent that these organizations and/or private investors are willing and able to finance projects developed in the course of this program, they will be encouraged to do so. In some cases it may be desirable to work out arrangements for joint financing of particular projects. In similar manner, programs for economic and technical assistance should be utilized to buttress and prepare the way for programs for balanced development to be financed with loan funds.

The above proposal assumes that we can persuade Congress to authorize this basic materials program in addition to our foreign aid program. If at the time the proposal is due to be made it appears that there is considerable doubt on this score, it will be necessary to re-examine rather carefully the relative merits of the two programs and consider the possibility of reducing perhaps substantially the figures herein proposed.

Other reservations in regard to the proposal will be treated in a supplemental memorandum now in preparation.

1. Drafted by Harlan Cleveland.
2. Not found in Department of State or Mutual Security Agency files.
3. See footnote 4, Document 263.
4. Reference is to the President’s Materials Policy Commission. William S. Paley, chairman, created Jan. 19, 1951. The Commission submitted a 5-volume report in June 1952, which was published that year by the Government Printing Office. President Truman acknowledged receipt of the report in a letter to Paley, June 23, 1952. Regarding the Materials Policy Commission, see the editorial note, vol. i, Part 2, p. 857.
5. Includes carry-over of $2.7 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Includes carry-over of $2.7 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Includes carry-over of $0.3 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. For Title I areas only. Does not include estimated $10.0 million for Far East. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Represents obligations for $62.5 million fund for loan to Spain. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Distribution undetermined of $125 million available for economic and military assistance. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. The drafting officer has not been identified.
6. For documentation on the NATO Annual Reviews for 1952 and 1953, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 292 ff.
7. For documentation regarding discussions of the offshore procurement program at Lisbon in February 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
8. The drafting officer has not been identified.