Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

ECA–MSA files, lot W–745, “Congressional Testimony”

No. 256
Memorandum Prepared in the Mutual Security Agency¹

secret

March 26, 1952

Highlights of Congressional Testimony by General Alfred M. Gruenther Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 26, 1952²

afternoon session

1. General

The Committee members echoed the sentiments of Representative Ribicoff when he stated that General Gruenther was the best witness that he had ever listened to before the Committee. The General was applauded at the end of his testimony.

2. Germany

Representative Ribicoff wondered whether a unified Germany might not upset the power balance in Europe. He pointed out if Schumacher were to be elected, which might be the case in a unified election, the likelihood of a neutral Germany would adversely influence the prospects for the Western Europe allies. General Gruenther agreed that there was such a danger, but questioned whether we had any alternative. Germany cannot be kept divided indefinitely. There are also risks to the Russians in a free election and he doubted whether they would be prepared to accept one.

3. UK and NATO

Representative Smith was confused on the relationship of the British forces to the European Army³ and the NATO Army. General Gruenther explained that Britain was participating fully in NATO although not in the EDF. He felt personally that the British might have been more skillful in their response to the invitation to join the EDF; however, their cooperation in NATO “couldn’t be better.” He agreed with Chairman Richards that Britain had always been cooperative in providing airfields for the infrastructure program. He then added a note of moderation on the attitude which we should adopt in our dealings with the European governments. He did not feel that prodding would be in our interests. We had assumed the role of world leaders and had to act accordingly, in a cooperative spirit.

4. French Communism

Chairman Richards asked whether the French Communist party was a danger to our security. General Gruenther replied that French Communists were not a problem in the Army. They generally lost the influence of their family background when they joined the armed forces. In addition, an effort was made to keep them from sensitive positions. He was more concerned about the de Gaullists’ position on the NATO program.

5. Offshore Procurement

Representative Bolton wanted to know whether the offshore procurement program was worthwhile. General Gruenther replied that strengthening the European economy is an inseparable part of the military program. Some equipment can be produced more cheaply in Europe than in the United States. Representative Bolton asked whether country offshore procurement figures would be presented to the Committee and was informed that they would. Later in the testimony, Representative Fulton and others said that they would want to know why, when tanks were in short supply, there was idle capacity for tank production in Europe which was not being used.

6. Spain

Representative Bolton wanted to know why we could not support Don Juan rather than Franco in Spain. General Gruenther said it was his impression that support for any group other than Franco’s party would be very difficult to achieve.

7. Grand US Strategy

Representative Javits asked General Gruenther for a public statement on US global strategy to use in connection with the presentation of the Mutual Security Program on the Floor of the House. It was agreed that such a statement would not be appropriate for security reasons.

8. Cutting the Program

Chairman Richards asked the perennial question of how a $1 billion cut in the program could be carried out. General Gruenther said that he did not know enough about the specific contents of the bill and urged the Committee to ask other witnesses instead. He doubted whether Congress had the wisdom to judge by itself how a cut in aid should be apportioned. They might discover, upon examining the defense support program, that they would prefer to cut end items and leave at least a certain sum for defense support. If he were a Congressman he would want to know about the transferability of funds and specific items would be utilized. He agreed with Mrs. Bolton that Mr. Harriman was best qualified to apply a cut in the program.

Representative Vorys observed that, according to General Gruenther, none of the $3 billion of end items requested in the 1953 program would be delivered prior to June 1, 1953. He concluded that we were therefore a year ahead of the Europeans. He objected to the fact that Pentagon figures were always provisional and the stuff in the program never was delivered. He felt perhaps that Congress should make its funds provisional also. He quoted Secretary Lovett to the effect that there had been no integrated NATO plan before April 1, 1951, the date that SHAPE headquarters was established. General Gruenther said that the effect of the position outlined by Representative Vorys would be bad in Europe and even worse in the US. He emphasized that this program is buying our own security as well as that of Europe. Our objective is to achieve an equilibrium in Europe as quickly as possible. Representative Vorys’ proposal would delay the program and should not be accepted by the United States. There was, of course, a great deal of military planning of an integrated character prior to the establishment of SHAPE. It is true that the 1953 forces are provisional but this is in the nature of the program. Present estimates are the best which can be made. Unfortunately equipment cannot be delivered by the waving of a wand and it is necessary to program and obligate funds well in advance of the need for delivery.

Representative Ribicoff wanted to know who should advise Congress about cutting the program. There was considerable discussion within the Committee on the subject, and expression of dissatisfaction with the evidence received so far. Chairman Richards again stated his conviction that Congress would be bound to cut the program. General Gruenther stated that in his view the program should not be cut, but that, if it were cut, Congress should study carefully what the effect would be and make sure that there would be adequate flexibility. He was not personally familiar with the detailed effects of a cut in the defense support program. Representative Ribicoff asked that the answer be provided by lower echelon personnel in the Government, the people with eyeshades who actually did the work.

Representative Javits wanted General Gruenther to state officially his approval of the money values in the program. General Gruenther said he was not competent to do so. SHAPE’s responsibility ended upon providing the Defense Department with a list of units which had to be supplied; the Pentagon generally cut back the equipment required for these organizations. Representative Javits then asked General Gruenther to state whether the items in the program were adequate to meet the force targets. Colonel Thielen indicated that the Defense Department would testify on the subject at greater length.

1. The drafting officer was not identified in the source text.
2. A note on the source text reads: “This testimony was given in Executive Session, and contained some highly classified information. Only a limited number of copies of this document have been prepared. Please restrict its distribution to the addressees indicated below.” Those on the list at the end of the source text were Kenney, Wood, FitzGerald, Cleveland, Gordon, Stettner, Hulley, Lippincott, Baum, and Porter.
3. Reference is to the European Defense Force to be established under the proposed European Defense Community; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.