Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.00/8–1053: Telegram

No. 176
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, August 10, 1953—4 p.m.

Coled 44. Restrict distribution to Chief of Mission. Re Coled 43, August 9.²

1. Ministers’³ review of international situation was highlighted by Bidault’s comments on Russian reply to three-power proposals on Germany.⁴ Bidault apparently spoke in very scornful terms of those who hope for positive results from four-power talks with Russians. He insisted Russians have not changed their attitude and that reply in fact constitutes a rejection of three-power proposal for conference on Germany. Bidault, in commenting adversely on Russian reply, used many of the arguments used by Chancellor himself. According to Blankenhorn, Chancellor was very pleased with Bidault’s statements, particularly Bidault’s insistence that Western powers should continue to disclose Russian insincerity in further exchange of notes during coming months and to emphasize necessity of bringing about a solution for Germany within framework of European policy.

2. Chancellor’s recent statements on using EDC as starting point for a European security system was not discussed. However, according to Blankenhorn, this suggestion of Chancellor’s plus exchange of notes between three powers and Russians on Germany have created very favorable impression in Germany and have given Western powers the initiative vis-à-vis Russians. He expected that Chancellor would wish to develop this suggestion further.

3. There is general agreement that conference and communiqué have been a considerable propaganda success for Chancellor. German delegation is presenting conference as clear reaffirmation of common European policy of six ministers fully consistent with recent Washington declaration of three powers, and as contradiction of Russian attitude toward settlement of German problem. Torchlight demonstration by German Youth Movement, who demanded and received speeches from each of Foreign Ministers before dispersion, particularly useful public relations-wise. Germans are also using Bidault’s highly critical analysis of Russian note as symbolic of Franco-German unity of views. Chancellor apparently plans publicize Bidault’s lunch with him in Bonn today to contribute to this same end.

4. On substance of political community, conference was faced with nearly disastrous French position. Most of discussion held in drafting committee on communiqué. Hallstein proposed very positive communiqué which is being forwarded in separate cable.⁵ French representatives rejected proposed draft outright and until four o’clock in the morning opposed firmly every positive suggestion made by Germans and other delegations. As expected French took position reported in Coled 42, August 6,⁶. opposing any reference to a “European executive” or to “supranational functions” and insisting on emphasizing role of Council of Ministers in European institutions. French representatives stated they could agree to directly elected parliament and on having “the special authorities” of the coal and steel commmunity and the defense community report to this parliament. This was adequate in their view and no new executive structure was necessary. It was only after other five countries insisted on referring failure to agree on communiqué back to ministers that French representatives, apparently realizing they could not saddle French Government with responsibility for failure of conference, agreed to make any concessions. Resulting communiqué, cabled in Coled 43, was then forwarded to Ministers on August 8 for their consideration. Efforts were made to strengthen it in a number of respects but Bidault refused to budge from compromise accepted by the French representatives the previous evening.

5. The “good” Europeans are disturbed about communiqué, particularly, phrase “the community of sovereign states;” Blankenhorn also recognizes that, if European movement lost its supranational character, EDC could not be used by Chancellor as policy which grants generous peace with equality for Germany and simultaneously provides adequate guarantees against revival of German militarism.

7. [sic] Taviani apparently an excellent chairman. He was not at all embarrassed by fact he did not represent real government. On several occasions he stated in strongest terms that a substantial majority existed in Italian Parliament for EDC. and for European policy and that this European policy was a factor for unity in Italian politics and not a factor for disunity. However, Italian representatives in drafting communiqué were less firm than Taviani. They seem to be concerned about fear of creating that strong an impression of a Rome–Bonn axis on European questions against French. Italian Foreign Office may be uneasy about Bidault’s remark to Ambassador Quaroni a week or two ago that “there seemed to be a direct telephone line from Bonn to Rome”.

8. Van Zeeland was quite helpful. He made a strong statement about need to speed ratification of EDC and to push ahead on European policy, including political community. He did not actively support French in pressing for an active role for Council of Ministers and seemed willing to accept a supranational executive. He will, however, probably continue to stress requirement of unanimity in decisions by Council of Ministers on a number of questions. Dutch, who did not play an active role in conference, did insist on incorporating their two main preoccupations into communiqué: First, a statement of need for further economic integration; and second, limiting to “in principle” the Ministers agreement on directly elected parliament. According to Van Starkenbourgh, the words “in principle” mean direct elections are not necessarily immediate.

9. Chancellor proposed to conference that countries having observers at EDC conference should also have observers at conference for political community. Bidault began speech which would clearly have led into proposal that observers be invited from all Council of Europe countries. Chancellor and Taviani forestalled this proposal by once again deferring question to be settled through diplomatic channels or by deputies. Members of both German and Italian delegations believe French may try either to make suggestion of observers so ridiculous that none will attend, or to exclude US as non-European state. They expressed view US should make it very clear it wishes observe at these conferences. Blankenhorn in particular stressed that conference could not succeed unless we were present. He commented that French could not persist in their consistently obstructive attitude in presence of US and UK observers.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
2. Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the full text in translation of the agreed communiqué issued by the six Foreign Ministers on Aug. 8. (740.00/8–953) For the text of the communiqué, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 223–224.
3. The Foreign Ministers of the six Schuman Plan countries met in Baden-Baden on Aug. 8.
4. For documentation concerning the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union leading to the Berlin Conference, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 169.
5. This is a reference to telegram Coled 45 from Paris, Aug. 10, which transmitted a portion of a draft communiqué proposed by Hallstein. (740.00/8–1053)
6. Not printed; it reported French opposition to certain principles in the draft communiqué. It also noted that the French Cabinet had expressed firm support for the policy of European integration, but that Bidault had retained complete liberty of action which made everyone uncertain as to what he would do during the conference. (740.5/8–653)