Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Incoming Correspondence—1953”

No. 153
The Economic Officer in the Embassy in France (Hillenbrand) to the Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs (Camp)

confidential
personal
official–informal

Paris, February 18, 1953.

Dear Miriam: This is a rather tentative effort to answer the questions raised in your letter of February 9, 1953.¹ For the past several weeks I have been bogged down in NATO Committee work, and have not been able to follow EPC developments closely since the Rome meeting of the Working Group. However, I do not think that my observations are rendered obsolete by anything that the Working Group and Drafting Committee have done recently in Paris. I may add that Stan Cleveland (who has also been very busy lately in connection with the opening of the CSC Common Market) and I hope, during the next few weeks, to be able to concentrate a little bit more on EPC developments leading up to the Ad Hoc Assembly meeting scheduled for Strasbourg early in March.

You will by this time undoubtedly have received the text of the draft treaty transmitted under cover of a recent Embassy despatch.² This will now provide a general framework and numbering series for subsequent modifications. In the sense that some articles have not yet been put into final form, or will undoubtedly be revised further by the Constitutional Committee or the Ad Hoc Assembly, the treaty is still “sketchy”. It seems unlikely at this point that there will actually be any missing articles when the draft is finally handed to the Foreign Ministers; although it is conceivable, of course, that the Ad Hoc Assembly will in the end find itself unable to agree on a certain point and be forced to refer the issue to the Foreign Ministers as unresolved. Needless to say, the leaders in the work of the Constitutional Committee and Ad Hoc Assembly do not intend that anything like this should happen. Whether the governments, when they receive the draft treaty, will find it acceptable or will consider it practicable for submission to parliaments, is another question. There are, I suppose, roughly four broad possible courses of action which the Foreign Ministers might take. They might, and this, of course, is least likely, simply sit down and sign the draft treaty. They might set a date for a diplomatic conference to be preceded by intensive study in the Foreign Offices and discussion on the diplomatic level or through a Committee of government experts. They might not set such a specific date for a conference, but otherwise act as if they mean to push ahead with the treaty by having inter-governmental discussions perhaps through a Committee of government experts. Finally, they might, and this could be tantamount to putting the thing on ice, simply refer the draft treaty to their respective Foreign Offices for study. This question may come up at the February 24 meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Rome; the Italians may suggest study by a Committee of government experts.

It is rather difficult to say how far the governments feel bound by the actions of the Ad Hoc Assembly. This is a matter to which not much thought has been given in the flurry of grinding out the detailed articles of the treaty. As you know, the status of Ad Hoc Assembly is somewhat anomalous. It is sort of a distorted alter ego (with nine additional members) of the CSC Common Assembly, which was invited by the Foreign Ministers on September 10³ to prepare by March 10, 1953, a draft treaty establishing a European Political Community. The CSC Assembly accepted this invitation and proceeded to act thereupon. As far as I can see, there is nothing in the process of establishment of the Ad Hoc Assembly which creates any legal obligation on the part of the Foreign Ministers to accept its work. To what extent there is a moral obligation on their part is another matter.

It does not seem, therefore, that the governments would feel bound not to seek to extend the competency of the Community beyond that agreed by the Ad Hoc Assembly. It is uncertain, as a matter of practice, that there will be much effective pressure in such a direction. The Dutch, of course, have consistently wanted to extend the economic competencies of the Community, and will continue to press for this. The Germans and Italians have generally favored measures tending to increase the supranational character of the Community. However, the political exigencies of getting parliamentary ratification, plus conflicting national viewpoints which operate to cancel each other out, may prevent any substantial enhancement of the Community’s powers by the governments. The danger is that they might insist on watering them down.

The whole business of progress on the EPC is so inextricably bound up with the EDC ratification process, both as cause and effect, that the future of the former depends on what happens to the latter. Although there was an inclination on the part of some German parliamentarians during the last Strasbourg session of the Ad Hoc Assembly to attempt to write the substance of the EDC treaty into the EPC treaty, so that if the former fell by the wayside there would be a second chance to have a European Army, they dropped the idea. Even if they were to revive it in the face of collapsing EDC prospects, I do not think the present drive toward a political community could survive such a collapse. All the steam would be taken out of the advocates of European unification.

On the other hand, of course, progress on the EPC may be a factor in the ratification of the EDC, particularly in view of its probable effect on the French Socialist vote. The problem is to keep the two processes of EDC ratification and EPC treaty-drafting (and after March 10 treaty negotiating) moving along so that they mutually assist rather than hinder each other.

I think you are right in feeling that we are not in a good position to exercise pressure on the parliamentarians with a view to influencing details of the treaty. As you know, parliamentarians are likely to be highly sensitive to pressures which they feel improper, and in reacting often go to the opposite extreme. Moreover, the general context in which the drafting of the EPC treaty is taking place does not seem favorable to active U.S. intervention. I may add that, as changes have been made in the treaty text, most of them seem to be in the direction of greater clarity and a more real community. A certain amount of give and take among the parliamentarians representing different viewpoints has, of course, been necessary, and no one is completely satisfied by some of the formulations which have been squeezed out after many weary days of discussion and debate. It is, I believe, still too early to say whether some attempt on our part to exercise influence might be advisable after the draft treaty goes to governments.

Although there was a danger in some of the earlier versions of the pertinent articles that the EPC would greatly water down the supranational powers of the CSC and EDC institutions, this appears to have been largely averted in the current formulations. One can argue that some diminution in the capacity of the CSC High Authority to act is inevitable once it becomes part of a greater whole, and this seems to me a logical consequent of the process of integration itself. However, the parliamentarians have been conscious of the need to safeguard the unique positions of the CSC and EDC Executives during the transitional period until they are absorbed into the European Executive.

Some commentators have been worried by what they consider to be the element of instability being built into the treaty by its adoption of a system of executive responsibility to parliament analogous to the French system. The French Socialists are of course pressing for precisely this sort of dependence on the parliament. As you know, the CSC treaty provides that the High Authority can be voted out of office only by a majority of ⅔ of the Common Assembly. Yet the Ad Hoc Assembly approved a formulation which would permit the Executive to be overthrown by a vote of censure carried by a simple majority in both chambers of the European Parliament. Second thoughts on this have led the Working Group to favor a formulation which now permits the overthrow of the Executive by a ⅗; vote of the Chamber of Peoples or by a constructive majority (modeled after the system in the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic) in the Senate. It seems likely that further changes in this article will be made before the draft treaty assumes final form.

As far as the amending procedure is concerned, I do not think it likely that either the parliamentarians or governments will propose that the Community have within it a capacity to extend its areas of competency without the consent of all the member governments. The present formulation provides that:

“Revisions of the provisions of the present Treaty which modify the competence of the Community with regard to the member States or the definition of the individual rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the present Treaty shall be achieved in the following manner:

“The European Executive Council shall adopt a proposed amendment of the Treaty, subject to the unanimous concurrence of the Council of National Ministers.

“The proposal shall be submitted for approval to the Parliament of the Community and to the national Parliaments, which may approve or reject it.

“The amendments shall be promulgated by the European Executive Council.”

Whether member governments will be prepared to agree to suggested amendments made by the Executive Council of the Community will presumably depend on the climate of feeling which develops after the Community comes into existence. If popular support for the Community develops, and what it is doing seems to be a good thing, then the governments will not be able to withhold their consent to those further delegations of powers which seem to follow logically.

By and large, I think it may be said that the parliamentarians, who have given a great deal of their time and energy to the work of the past few months, have done a commendable job given their personal limitations and the many exigencies of the moment. Some of them would like to go farther and faster, but are constrained by what they feel to be the political realities of the moment. There is remarkably little woolly-headed idealism among the members of the Constitutional Committee and even the Ad Hoc Assembly. If one were to try to put a finger on what is lacking, I should say it is the absence of a brilliant, subtle and fertile intelligence to exercise leadership during moments of floundering such as Monnet was able to provide during the drafting of the CSC. The EPC deliberations sometimes have the atmosphere of an afterthought rather than the expression of a forceful idea moving to action. As you know, there exists to date little popular enthusiasm for or interest in the work of the parliamentarians.

We have heard reports that you will be coming this way soon en route to Geneva.⁴ If these are true, we shall look forward to seeing you and perhaps having the opportunity to expand on some of this orally.

Sincerely yours,

Martin J. Hillenbrand

1. Not printed; it requested some personal speculation from Hillenbrand concerning the draft treaty for a European Political Community and the attitude of the United States toward its inception. (Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “EPC—1953”)
2. This is a reference to despatch 1721 from Paris, Dec. 16, 1952, which transmitted the 52-page text of the draft treaty to the Department of State. (740.00/12–1652)
3. For a record of this first session of the Common Assembly, see Document 105.
4. Camp was scheduled to travel to Geneva for the Eighth Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Mar. 3–18.