The depth of the convictions expressed in the memorandum lead me to hope
that they can have their two cents’ worth of influence on the thinking
of those, whether permanent or newcomers, who will be developing the new
Administration’s thinking on these matters while it is in its present
formative stage. However, I gladly leave to your own good sense to do
whatever, if anything, you think best in this regard.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Minister in France (Achilles)
confidential
[Paris,] November 28, 1952.
Evaluation of Our Policy Toward
Europe as of December 1952
1. Have we been right in
concentrating our major anti-Soviet effort in Europe?
Yes. It has been as necessary in peace as it was in the war to
concentrate our strength first to hold the vital bastion of Western
Europe. However, we are approaching the point where Western Europe
and the Atlantic area will be relatively secure and we can already
begin to divert some of our effort from the European theater to
buttress other vulnerable points.
2. Have we been preparing
ourselves against the wrong kind of war?
There is no simple answer. The present “war” is psychological and the
chances are it will stay that way, but it has been essential to
recreate strength to withstand encroachment and intimidation by the
threat of force, in Ernest Bevin’s words: “to
mobilize such material and spiritual strength as will inspire
confidence and energy within and respect elsewhere.” We have now
developed sufficient momentum behind the defense effort, however, to
turn our attention increasingly to the economic, political,
psychological and moral fronts. It is essential that we do so.
3. Do we really want Europe to
unite?
The progress toward unity in Europe during the last five years shows
a rapidly growing realization that wholly unregulated national
sovereignties are inadequate to deal with today’s problems and that
new patterns of international or supranational organizations are
necessary. It is easy for any American politician to urge European
unity, but if unity is good for them, it should also be good for us.
A Europe united outside the framework of the Atlantic Community
would not be in our interest; there is too great danger that it
would be neutralist or unable to withstand Soviet pressure or both.
A Europe united within a developing Atlantic unity may or may not be
in our national interest; it can be most helpful psychologically and
experimentally, as the Brussels Treaty was in preparation for NATO, but as Atlantic unity develops,
we may find a six-nation knot within it an unnecessary and possibly
harmful complication. The basic question for America, however, is
what is in our interest to do in developing Atlantic unity.
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4. Is NATO working?
Undoubtedly. Senator Vandenberg was right when he said that the mere
existence of the North Atlantic Treaty would be far more important
than anything done under it. It has made unmistakably clear the
basic link between the U.S. and Europe. It has fulfilled most of
Bevin’s vision of “inspiring confidence and
energy within and respect elsewhere”. Confidence has certainly grown
but unfortunately it has been accompanied by more complacency than
energy. This is a primary cause of current NATO troubles. On the other hand, there can be no doubt
of the respect it has inspired in Moscow. Both the tactical
“moderation” shown in the last year in the
Kremlin’s European policies and actions and
the major emphasis Moscow now places on separating our allies from
us is clear evidence of the success of our Atlantic policy.
5. What are the causes of NATO’s strength?
First it is essentially realistic. It correctly reflects the basic
community of heritage, of spirit and of interest of a limited number
of nations. Secondly, it is inherently practical. It has fumbled and
experimented and reorganized, but it has nevertheless concentrated
on getting specific governmental agreement on concrete measures
which were urgently necessary. It has avoided the dispersion, the
debate, the technical detail and the “do-goodism” which have
vitiated the efforts of so many international organizations. The
combination of realistic basis and practical approach give it a
strength and vitality possessed by no other international
organization.
6. What are the weaknesses of
NATO?
Its basic weakness is that it is not good enough. It must steadily
develop or it will inevitably retrogress, if not fall apart. It has,
perhaps of necessity, concentrated too much on purely military
matters. Senator Vandenberg used to reiterate that if NATO were to succeed it must be far
more than a military alliance, that if it were no more than that, it
would be at the mercy of any reasonably plausible effort by the
Soviet Government to appear peacefully inclined. It has failed to
realize in practice the inspiration which the Secretary and various
other Foreign Ministers envisaged for it at the time of signing, or
to capture popular imagination and hopes to the extent that either
the U.N. or the idea of “European
Union” have done. Several governments, including our own, have been
reluctant to give their representatives enough authority to take
decisions within broad instructions. This has led to
over-preoccupation with the negotiation of details rather than of
major issues.
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7. What does NATO need most?
Faith, unity, broadening of horizions and closer links to national
parliaments. To inspire public opinion it needs to inspire faith
that the member governments are going to work progressively toward
realization of the ideal of Atlantic unity, not merely toward
security but toward greater human values. It must, while keeping its
feet firmly on the ground, get its head higher in the air, look
further forward and move faster. It needs to exert every effort to
develop unity of policy and action concretely with respect to
current issues; it has made a good start in this field but much more
needs to be done and can be done relatively easily. It needs to
broaden its activities much further into the political and economic
fields, however difficult the specific problems may be. It needs
much U.S. leadership of the kind that pulls from in front, not the
kind that pushes from the rear. It needs, to insure realism,
effectiveness, and broad support, closer links with the parliaments
of the member countries. As an example, the investigations abroad
during the last two years of NATO
and aid matters by mixed groups composed of representatives of the
Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of
both Houses made a world of difference in Congressional action.
There should be regular study and consideration of annual NATO programs, as soon as they have
been finalized by the Council, by groups of key men responsible in
each NATO parliament for passing
upon and implementing those programs. These groups would sit
together as a NATO parliamentary
body to investigate and exchange views on the adequacy, necessity
and practicability of the program and whether each nation was doing
its full share. The body would, initially at least, have no power as
a body but the influence of the national groups in their own
parliaments should be strong and constructive.
8. How can we best combat Russian
efforts to divide the West?
Primarily by intensifying our efforts to consolidate and deepen
Western, primarily Atlantic, unity. This involves treating our
partners really as partners rather than as satellites. We have been
good about this, and largely successful, in NATO itself, whether in the Council, Deputies, SHAPE or even the Standing Group,
where the problem has been particularly delicate, but we have been
markedly less so in certain aspects of our dealings with our allies
outside NATO channels. It involves
consulting our partners much more and much earlier in the process of
formulating our own policies and a real effort to take their views
and interests into account. It involves patience. It involves paying
much more attention to human values and to the psychological effect
of our actions. We can greatly reduce the numbers of our personnel
abroad, with
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profit not
only to our budget but to our foreign relations as well. Our
influence is inevitably so great that we exert it most effectively
when we act gently, tactfully and subtly, not when we have hordes of
military and civilian officials all over Europe trying at all levels
to tell our friends exactly what to do or think. Finally, we can
devote more effort to taking the psychological offensive, to
stimulating international discussion of questions which will
embarrass and harass the Russians rather than merely waiting to
rebut their efforts to embarrass and harass us.
9. What can NATO do in the economic
field?
The two principal arguments against NATO dealing with economic problems are that (a) some
international agency already exists to deal with every known
economic problem and (b) economic problems are more nearly worldwide
than regional in extent. This is no reason, however, why the NATO nations should not consider any
economic problem from the point of view of our common Atlantic
interests, utilize other agencies, for fact finding or even for
particular operations, and concentrate upon the practical problem of
obtaining agreed governmental action. Their relatively high degree
of community of interest should both encourage and facilitate the
tackling of particularly intransigent economic and financial
problems, notably the dollar gap. On the theory that the smaller the
number of countries involved, the easier it is to reach effective
agreement, the Treaty specifically provides for “economic
collaboration between any or all of them.”
10. Must we continue aid?
We must stop the artificial and mutually unhealthy aid process just
as soon as practicable. Certainly “trade rather than aid” is the
answer. Before we can safely stop the blood transfusions, however,
we must make progress in curing the disease of productive imbalance
between the U.S. and most of the rest of the world. We face a real
problem of timing because the cure is going to be long and difficult
while the donor is getting restive. While a number of countries will
continue to need cash, the practical effects of a wave of confidence
inspired by knowledge that the U.S. was prepared to participate
fully in a major cooperative effort really to cure the imbalance
would be considerable. U.S. tariffs are probably the least important
element, except psychologically, followed in ascending order by
agricultural and similar restrictions, exchange rates, prices,
interchange of know-how and techniques, the climate for investment
and finally productivity. As long as U.S. productivity continues so
far above that of other countries and we continue to develop
substitutes and synthetics for everything we have not got, there
would still be chronic imbalance even in a world completely
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free of tariffs and
exchange restrictions. The only real cure will be the development of
a single economy composed of the U.S. and a progressively larger
number of countries whose economic health (and security) we consider
important to our own. To develop such an economy will require all
the wisdom and imagination we can muster, but one way of working
toward it would be to set it as an announced goal and to undertake a
deliberate and organized attempt to develop with certain European
countries (UK?, Commonwealth?, Scandinavia?, “Schumania”?, all of
NATO?) economic relations at
least as close as those we have with Canada; i.e., which provide a
high degree of interchange of investment, branch factories and
managerial and technical skills, supplemented by the development of
progressively closer consultation on economic, financial and fiscal
policies.
