Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

850.33/10–1652: Telegram

No. 121
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, October 16, 1952—9 p.m.

2357. This is part one of three-part message. Ref Depcirtel 405 Oct 10¹ and Polto 380 Sept 30.²

Subject is relations of CSC, EDC and EPC with Council of Europe.

I suggest that Dept may wish to circulate to missions concerned following analysis and background of Council Europe Assembly opinion on implementation of Eden proposals prepared by staffs of Embassy and SRE. Full text of opinion reported Strasbourg Contel 141 Oct 3.³

1. Essential to understanding of problem posed for CSC by CE Assembly opinion is realization basic difference between Ad Hoc Assembly and CSC Assembly—a difference not fully understood or appreciated even by many officials of govts concerned. The functions of the Ad Hoc Assembly are similar in nature to those of the Consultative Assembly of CE. It is a “study group” set up to make recommendations to the six govts. It has no powers, exercises no sovereignty and was not established by treaty. Accordingly, presence of observers at Ad Hoc Assembly with right of limited participation does not raise any real problems and Section A of opinion seems acceptable to everyone. Nonetheless, some officials still feel that opening Assembly to observers is a bad idea, and that their presence will impede progress towards European federation. Other officials argue presence of observers, paticularly Brit, will make eventual recommendation of Ad Hoc Assembly more acceptable in six CSC nations and will make it impossible for Brit to oppose this movement. Once Brit are entangled, presumably, their support will be committed. It is assumed Brit would not wish United States and Europe to place blame for any failure on them.

2. In contrast with Ad Hoc Assembly, CSC Assembly exercises sovereignty for peoples of six nations under most solemn treaty. CSC Assembly has real powers. CSC High Authority is answerable to CSC Assembly, which can by vote of censure force resignation of High Authority. CSC Assembly has right to debate and to act on all activities of High Authority. Most of these activities directly or indirectly will affect non-member countries.

Presence of observers from non-member countries with right to be heard in Assembly’s debate on activities of High Authority, particularly when motion of censure is in prospect, would constitute conferring influence without responsibility on these observers. Moreover, it would create unbalanced relationship, since there is no proposal for reciprocal arrangements, that is, for CSC Assembly observers to be present at sessions of National Parliaments.

3. CSC High Authority would regard presence of observers with right to speak in CSC Assembly (Section B, para 1(D) item of Opinion) as politically unacceptable and as violation of CSC Treaty. If such arrangements were established, High Authority would combat by challenging it in CSC court. Moreover, legal advisers responsible for CSC Treaty state that CSC Assembly has no power of direct decision in field of external relations and thus cannot negotiate and enter into agreement with CE Assembly (Section B, para 1(D) of Opinion).

4. Spaak, President of CSC Assembly, reported to be in agreement with High Authority that implementation of CE Assembly opinion would violate CSC Treaty. He has, however, informed Monnet that he would prefer High Authority did not make firm statement of its position at this time. He thought he could best handle situation by making it clear through questioning and informal meetings with officers of CSC Assembly and CE Consultative Assembly that suggestion for observers with limited participation is impractical.

Monnet apparently agrees that best policy is to let matters drift. He believes that as community’s institutions begin to exercise their authority it will become clear to all concerned that CSC already has attributes of federal authority and is not merely an inter-governmental institution acting for governments. When this is clear, suggestions for Brit or other participation in governing process without reciprocation will be dropped.

5. Similarly, if proposed discussion between CE Comite of Ministers and Special Council (of Ministers) of CSC (Section B of Opinion, para 1 (E) item) should result in agreement that non-CSC states of CE could be regularly represented by observers at meetings of CSC Ministerial Council, High Authority would regard this agreement as a violation of treaty. This is true no matter what “mutual obligations” were entailed. In fact, any negotiations by Ministerial Council with an outside body, except on commercial policy, could be challenged as ultra vires. On the other hand, mutual and reciprocal arrangements for special and periodic joint consultations outside of Council appear entirely consistent with treaty, and seem to be strongly desired by High Authority and interested officials of six states.

6. Section C of Opinion, embodying draft protocol of CE statute, is confused and confusing text. Its purpose is to make it possible by amending statute, to permit communities to function within framework of CE, and, in particular, to make this possible in case of EDC in spite of present exclusion of “national defense” from area of competence of CE. Nevertheless, by recognizing (para B (ii) of draft protocol) that final say as to presence or absence of observers is up to members of communities, text of protocol robs this section of any force. If C of E protocol were strongly supported, however, it could lead to move for revision of EDC Treaty.

7. Besides advocating common use of certain facilities gradually being put into effect (see below, para 9–a), Section D on relations between secretariats of CSC and CE Assemblies proposes dominant position for latter that hardly appears consistent with its consultative character when compared with sovereign character of former. Presumably this will become a dead letter and relationships will take logical form upon establishment of EPC popularly-elected assembly.

8. Suggestion that Committee of Ministers and Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe be ministerial and parliamentary organs of European communities is also in conflict with present proposals for institutional framework of European Political Community. Leading Council of Europe Deputies working on EPC seem to accept proposition that EPC should be built on institutions of EDC and CSC with addition of executive and directly-elected Lower House and omission Council of Ministers. Any attempt to use CE Ministers or CE Assembly would obstruct development of federal structure.

9. Imperfections and objectionable features this CE Assembly opinion should not obscure fact that cooperation between CSC and CE and between the six and the nine (CE members that are non-members of CSC) is provided for or has already begun, some of it in accordance with text voted in Sept.

a. CSC Assembly will meet in Strasbourg and use CE building and is already making plans for its secretariat to call on services of CE Secretariat.

b. High Authority would welcome appointment to it of delegations from non-members of CSC, as has already taken place in case of United Kingdom.

c. Under terms of CSC Treaty, CSC High Authority and Assembly are to send periodic reports to Consultative Assembly and Comite of Ministers of CE for debate and comment, and CSC member govts are invited to recommend common representation to CSC Assembly and CE Assembly.

d. CSC High Authority has suggested CE Assembly that community as such have some form of special membership in CE institutions.

e. Additional arrangements for periodic consultations between CSC and CE institutions are being discussed in Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Brussels and Paris.

10. Following parts discuss motives of those approving CE Assembly opinion, special role of Brit and problem thereby posed for United States, and recommend tactics for immediate future.

Dunn

1. See footnote 6, Document 118.
2. See footnote 5, ibid.
3. Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the verbatim text of Opinion 3 adopted by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on Sept. 30. (740.00/10–352) See Document 110.