Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

secret

[London,] September 27, 1954.

Place: Residence of the French Ambassador, London

Participants:

• The Secretary
• M. Mendes-France
• Mr. Merchant

The Secretary called at noon today on Premier Mendes-France. The latter greeted the Secretary on the doorstep in the presence of a dozen or more press photographers who appeared out of nowhere.

The Premier escorted the Secretary to the living room and a moment later a dozen or so photographers were ushered in who took five minutes worth of pictures of the Secretary and the. Premier engaged in pleasant conversation. In the presence of the photographers M. Mendes-France asked the Secretary how long he expected the conference to last. The Secretary said that he assumed it would last through this week. The Premier expressed surprise and said that he thought it should do its work in less time than that, reaching agreement on principles which would provide guidance for experts who would assemble immediately following the conference.

After the photographers had been removed from the room with some difficulty and at the cost of an upset vase of flowers, the Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he had seen Mr. Murphy on Saturday before he left and received a report of the talk he had had with the Premier.² M. Mendes-France said that he had been glad to receive Mr. Murphy and was sorry that his visit was so short. He had seen him at the end of a very difficult day in which he had been concentrating on the scandal in the police and the arrest of Dides. He said that there was a very curious situation of espionage and that he didn’t know where it might lead. He would have wished for another week or so of investigation with no publicity because then they might have had a more successful investigation. In a week or so, however, he hopes to have further information. He said that there was no doubt that secret documents were being passed on (he did not say to whom) and said that one curious aspect was that reports of at least two meetings of the National Defense Council had been passed on but that they were extractions of the proceedings and did not contain the most precise or sensitive subject matter discussed at the meetings. In other words they had been screened before transmission. He could not account for this pattern but “policemen are terrible people” and it was a bad situation. There were a number of them who were spending large sums of money on cars, women and gambling who had no private fortunes of their own and relatively small salaries. They were connected with different circles, including political groups. The Premier indicated that he was going to get to the bottom of it but that he was unable to see the full implications as yet.

M. Mendes-France then said that he was glad of this opportunity to talk to the Secretary and that he would like to do so frankly. In order to deal with the future it was necessary to go back to the past. He remembered their July meeting with pleasure and at that time he had felt that there had been a full, friendly and frank exchange of views even though they were dealing with difficult subjects. He reminded the Secretary that at that time he had made two promises, both of which he had fulfilled. The first was that he would hold the Assembly in Paris and secure an answer on EDC one way or the other before the end of August. The second was that since there was at that time no majority in favor of the EDC in the Assembly (a point on which he and the Secretary had had an argument) he would attempt to find some modification which would be acceptable to the other five countries and change 60 or so Deputies’ votes to carry the treaty.

M. Mendes-France then recited at some length his experience at Brussels. He emphasized that when he arrived there he found that the other five were opposed to accepting his changes and that Mr. Bruce had told him at Brussels that the United States Government did not like his protocols either. Despite his best efforts he had been unable to secure from his partners what was necessary for him to obtain passage of EDC in the Assembly.

M. Mendes-France then explained at some length why under the French constitution and in light of the division within his Cabinet he had been unable to put the vote on the basis of an issue of confidence. He said he had fought for its passage and that he had made clear to the Assembly that the early return of sovereignty to Germany and the early rearmament of Germany under some alternative arrangement were inevitable if EDC was rejected. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Deputies sustained his earlier estimate of the situation by rejecting the treaty. He then referred in rather bitter terms to the violence of the reaction against France and against him personally in the American press and in the American Government. He indicated clearly that he felt this was unjust and whereas he disclaimed any personal feeling in the matter it was quite plain that he felt a deep and bitter resentment.

The Premier said that he came to London in the belief that it was essential that the conference succeed. He said that up until the close of his talks with Mr. Eden he had been opposed to German entrance into NATO but that he now saw that all others wished it and consequently France could not hold out. He needed, however, “weapons” to win his fight in the Parliament, which would be extremely difficult at best. The two factors about EDC which accounted for its rejection were (1) its supranational character and (2) the absence of the British. By expanding the Brussels Treaty and bringing Germany and Italy into it, it would be possible to meet these two objections. “I am proposing what is really the EDC but without supranationality and with British membership.” (At no time during the conversation did M. Mendes-France mention specifically the armaments pool.)

On the matter of restoring sovereignty to Germany the Premier said that there would be no difficulty but it was essential that it be done on a trilateral basis and not be worked out on the basis of three separate bilateral arrangements with Germany. The French people, he said, were willing to accept the return of sovereignty to Germany and hence it presented no political problems to him although there were a number of very difficult legal complications. In this matter, however, we would find him completely reasonable and cooperative.

The important thing, however, M. Mendes-France said, was to give such powers to the Brussels Treaty Council and incorporate in the treaty such safeguards as would enable him to tell the French Chamber that the French were protecting against the “inconveniences” flowing from German rearmament.

M. Mendes-France said that he felt it was a mistake for the Secretary to have omitted a visit to Paris last week when he went to Bonn and London. “It had done more harm than good.” However, we had all come to London to make the conference a success and he was looking forward to working cooperatively toward that end.

The Secretary replied to the Premier (who had spoken without interruption for an hour) at some length. He recalled the long and affectionate relationship between the two countries extending back to the revolution. He reminded the French Premier that since the war it had been the United States who had supported the French materially, monetarily and diplomatically at conferences. He recited a number of post-war incidents when the United States had championed French interests. He said that the defeat of EDC had been a great blow to the American people who had felt, particularly as delay followed on delay, that it had become the symbol not only of the consistency of France but of the entire concept of a European community which the American people were convinced must be developed if we were to avoid a repetition of the history of two world wars starting in Europe.

The Secretary said that we came here with no plan of our own but only the desire to be helpful. We felt that, even though there was indeed no good alternative to the EDC, nevertheless we could find a solution. A solution, however, he felt must meet three criteria. First, it must result in the prompt restoration of sovereignty to Germany; second, it must permit German participation in its own defense and in support of NATO’s forward stategy (the Secretary at this point said that notwithstanding the statements of some military men, the President and he had always felt that the supranational aspect of EDC was far, far more important than twelve German divisions. He said that we had no intention of rushing into a massive rearmament of Germany but we did feel that German participation and collective defense was essential); thirdly, the Secretary said that in any solution it was important that it be made clear that the idea of ultimate unity on the continent was not dead. He said that if the American people felt the rejection of EDC meant the rejection of the European movement toward unity then there was a very real chance that the American people would be disillusioned and would withdraw to their own continent feeling another world war would ultimately start in Europe and that we had no wish to be involved in it.

The Secretary then said that there had been press stories to the effect that he and Mendes-France did not get along. He said it was a curious irony that he, who of all American Secretaries of State probably knew France better and loved France better than any other, was regarded by the French with more hostility than any other Secretary (M. Mendes-France protested this statement vehemently). The Secretary said that he had the highest regard for Mendes-France, that he felt their talk in July had established a relationship in which they could work with frankness and intimacy for the same aims. He said he still felt that way but that even if he didn’t he had learned years ago the foolishness of attempting to deal on governmental matters with anyone other than the chosen head of the government. He described Woodrow Wilson’s failure in his effort to go to the people over the heads of Clemenceau and other European leaders at the time of Versailles. He said no one had the influence to achieve results by this measure. (The Premier interjected that President Eisenhower had enormous influence with the people of Europe.) The Secretary assured Mendes-France that he was looking forward to working with him on a basis of close and intimate association at this conference.

In connection with the omission of Paris from his last trip to Europe, the Secretary pointed out that he had made a number of trips in the last year and a half to Paris without necessarily going to many other capitals. He also pointed out that he had had urgent messages from Adenauer of the latter’s desire to see him and similarly had an urgent suggestion from Mr. Eden that he come to London directly from the Manila Conference. He had had no such intimation from Mendes-France of a desire that he come to Paris at that time. He had hoped between Manila and the United Nations to take a week’s vacation but he had reluctantly sacrificed four days of it in order to meet the requests he had had from Adenauer and Eden. There had been no intended slight of France and he was surprised that this interpretation had been placed by some upon his itinerary.

By this time it was nearly 1:30 and as the Secretary rose to leave he asked Mendes-France what he would think of having Eden serve as Permanent Chairman of the Conference. He said he had given thought to other possibilities but that this seemed the best. The Premier indicated full agreement. The Premier then said that Eden had mentioned to him this morning a plan to base the discussion on an extraction of the common points conned from the French, UK and German memoranda. He felt this was unsatisfactory from his point of view and he suggested that they might open the conference by permitting him to expand and discuss in more detail his proposal. The Secretary said that that was a possibility, particularly if thereafter the British and the Germans were given a chance to expand their proposals, following which an agenda might be developed which would draw on the common points of all three memoranda, making clear, however, that each Minister reserved his position on any particular point until the outcome of the discussion of all was seen.

Either at this point or earlier Mendes-France assured the Secretary again that if the London conference arrived at an acceptable agreement he would put it to the French Parliament immediately with the full authority of his government behind it. “This time the French Parliament will be the first to act and not the last.”

As they walked to the door Mendes-France said that he needed the Secretary’s help at this conference. The Secretary said of course he would help him. Mendes-France however went on to say that he had to judge what was possible of passage in the French Assembly. He said there was no point in reaching an agreement which would fail to secure Parliamentary approval by the countries concerned. That would be meaningless. Therefore he knew the Secretary would understand that there would be certain points to which he had to stick.

The Premier then saw the Secretary to his car. The parting was cordial and friendly.³

1. The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Special 2.
2. For a summary of Murphy’s meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.

3. In a separate memorandum of conversation by Merchant, which was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 26 of Sept. 27, Merchant made the following observations:

   “At the outset of M. Mendes-France’s talk with the Secretary he seemed tense but as the conversation ran on he became increasingly relaxed. His color was worse than I have ever seen it before and he seemed to me a man suffering from deep fatigue. There was no doubt that he felt or feels a deep resentment over the reaction of the American press against France and particularly against himself as a result of the rejection of EDC. It was equally obvious that he resented the omission of Paris from the itinerary of the Secretary’s trip to Europe last week.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363)