Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Aldrich
- Mr. Merchant
- Sir. Butterworth
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Eden and Mr. Caccia
Subject:
- Dinner last night1 at the Ambassador’s House
After general discussion during first half of dinner, the discussion turned to business and was continued until about an hour after dinner.
Mendes-France’s Intentions.
Mr. Eden said that he was still unclear about the real intentions of Mendes-France. He was aware of the various rumors and hypotheses [Page 1276] but felt that we must proceed for the purpose of this Conference on the assumption that Mendes-France wanted to work out an acceptable solution which he could get through his Parliament. If we act on that basis, then if these are not his purposes, that should become apparent in the course of the Conference and we should then have to decide what to do.
He felt that if the efforts to reach an acceptable solution did not succeed here then the U.S. and Britain would probably have to act without France on a program regarding Germany.
British Participation in Brussels.
Mr. Eden said that he had concluded that the time had come for Britain to go further in its association with the defense of the Continent. He felt that Britain should be prepared to assign specific forces to the Continent which would be subject to the control of the majority vote of the Brussels Conference. This would constitute a kind of an acceptance by Britain of the supranatural [sic] principle and would contribute to the movement toward European unity.
Mr. Eden felt that this should help Mendes-France with his Parliament but he stressed that it would be important to Adenauer and that this was one of the reasons for his willingness to take the step.
Mr. Eden stated that he had talked about this somewhat with the Prime Minister but that it was not yet a Cabinet decision. He emphasized that he had spoken about it only to us and it was important that it be held closely for use by the British when it might do the most good.
The Secretary said that he thought this would be most helpful for Mendes-France in meeting his preoccupation for closer British association and for Adenauer in his desire for his continued movement toward European unity.
Arms Pool.
The question of our attitude to the Arms Pool was discussed. All agreed that the proposals put forward by Mendes-France seemed to include features which could hardly be accepted by Adenauer or by the other countries. After discussion of the possible advantages of a genuine system of common procurement, Mr. Eden expressed the view that this might have real advantages both political and economic. It was generally agreed that it would be undesirable and unwise merely to take a negative attitude towards Mendes-France’s proposals. If this were done it would enable him to return to France and to present the position that his efforts to obtain satisfactory safeguards by this means had merely been arbitrarily rejected by the others. To prevent this, it was thought desirable that a project for a bona fide Arms Pool [Page 1277] should be developed and presented, if possible, by one of the Benelux countries. Mr. Dulles, who was seeing Benelux late on Monday afternoon, agreed to broach the subject with them and see whether they would be interested in putting forward some positive proposal which would be more acceptable both to the Germans and themselves than the present French proposal.
Arrangements.
The Secretary suggested that it would be best to have a permanent chairman rather than to rotate and proposed that Mr. Eden act in that capacity. Mr. Eden was inclined to agree that a permanent chairman would be better but was not particularly anxious to serve because he would not wish to be foreclosed from presenting the British view. After reviewing the other possibility it was concluded that Mr. Eden should serve with the understanding that he would not be prevented from taking an active part in the discussion at the Conference. Mr. Dulles agreed also to suggest this to Mendes-France and the Benelux representatives when he saw them.
It was agreed that in the first day or two it would be desirable to avoid airing the respective positions in the press, especially the French and the German positions, which were likely to be negotiating positions. Any detailed reporting at the start would make it harder to make compromises to accommodate the differing points of view. The best answer seemed to be to have short formal statements from each of the Nine at the start of the Conference which could be released to the papers on the first day.
It was also agreed in the early stages it would be desirable to have a Four-Power Meeting to deal with German sovereignty and to request the High Commissioners to continue their work with the Germans on the revision of the contractuals with a view to reporting any major issues to the Conference before it adjourns, if possible.
U.S.British unity.
Mr. Dulles said that he felt that the U.S. should not take the initiative in the early stages of the meeting in putting forward any proposals. His attitude would be that the U.S. was there as a friend and counselor and was deeply interested in the results but looked to the Europeans to put forward proposals. We would probably be consulted by others and would express our views to them but would try to avoid getting out in front. Mr. Eden agreed that this was the wise approach.
Mr. Eden said that he felt that the success of the Conference depended absolutely on joint US–UK cooperation. He thought that at some point we would have to “heave” a solution through.
The Secretary said he was very glad that we were so close together in our thinking on the problems.
[Page 1278]Southeast Asia.
In the course of the discussion at the table, Mr. Eden expressed his belief that it was vital that Laos and Cambodia be preserved from Communist control. At one point he seemed to say that he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was hopeless, but later expressed the view that it was important, if possible, to preserve Cochin China.
In pursuing the question of U.S. training missions for Cambodia, Mr. Merchant pressed Mr. Caccia as to why there should be any objection to this in view of the terms of the armistice agreement. Mr. Caccia’s somewhat evasive answers tended to confirm the suspicions that the British had given side assurances to the Chinese Communists regarding the U.S. training missions in Laos and Cambodia.
Mr. Eden said that he had sent a long cable to Nehru explaining the Southeast Asia Pact with a view to his pending trip to Peiping. He had also cabled him to express his concern about Laos.
- Sunday, Sept. 26.↩