Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum for the President which he has already
received outlining a program to meet the present European crisis.2 At Tab B is a paper which spells out this
program in greater detail. At Tab C is a proposed NATO resolution to be approved by a
special Council meeting in October.3 At Tab D is a proposal for restoring German
sovereignty.
In connection with these papers, I should like to call your attention
particularly to the following points:
Tab B
top secret
[Washington, September 10, 1954.]
Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of
European Regional Affairs (Moore)
U.S. Position on Alternative to EDC
The major objectives of US security policy toward Western Europe have
been:
- 1.
- To associate Germany with the West.
- 2.
- To foster further progress toward European integration,
particularly France-German reconciliation.
- 3.
- To obtain a German contribution to Western defense.
- 4.
- To restore sovereignty to Germany and end discrimination
against her.
French rejection of EDC has blocked
that road to attainment of these objectives. If the Europeans can
lay out and follow an alternate route promptly and with
determination, we should support them because of our vital interest
in a strong Europe. The essential elements of an alternative program
would be the following:
1. German Membership in NATO
Germany should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty by
agreement among all the signatories in accordance with Article 10.
In accepting this invitation, Germany would submit a formal reply
emphasizing the defensive character of the forces she expects to
contribute and undertaking to follow in her initial contribution the
size and composition of forces specified in the EDC Special Military Agreement (this
excludes submarines and strategic bombers). She would also undertake
to produce equipment needed for the common defense. She would state,
however, that she would not produce atomic and thermo-nuclear
weapons, military aircraft, etc. (other items in Annex II of Article
107 of EDC Treaty) because of her
exposed strategic position except as agreed by NATO.
Parallel with this step, NATO should
reach agreement on a program for more effective military
integration. In accepting membership in
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NATO, Germany would, of course, be
bound by these agreements. This program would have as its objective
strengthening the military effectiveness of the forces committed to
NATO. It would as a by-product
limit autonomy of any forces committed to NATO in Europe which would include all German forces as
provided below. It would thus have the advantages of being desirable
in its own right and nondiscriminatory vis-à-vis Germany. The
following points should be covered:
- (a)
- Further integration and internationalization of
command.
- (b)
- Strengthening of SACEUR’s control over deployment of forces
committed to him so that they will be deployed in accordance
with NATO plans and can be
moved within his area only as a result of his decision.
SACEUR would be
subject to appropriate political guidance in the exercise of
these powers.
- (c)
- Strengthening of Annual Review including formal NAC agreement that changes in
previously approved force goals and force commitments to
NATO should be made
only in accordance with the Annual Review process.
- (d)
- Agreement on integration of supply and logistics including
proposal for international depots (Bogart Plan).
- (e)
- Invitation to all NATO
members willing to participate but aimed primarily at the
Six to form an “Arms Production Pool” going as far as
possible in the direction of the EDC provisions. (The US should be ready to
indicate a preference for channeling its aid to the Six
through such a body rather than directly.)
This program could be agreed and implemented without any modification
of the Treaty. It would not, however, be effective unless
supplemented by agreement on a new protocol committing signatories
not to maintain forces other than those committed to NATO Commanders except for certain
specified purposes. Since these would include the right to maintain
forces needed to fulfill defense responsibilities in areas other
than Europe or outside the NATO
area, it should be possible to obtain Senate approval. At the same
time this protocol should improve the chances of French and British
approval by limiting German forces to those assigned to NATO.
Every effort should be made to reach agreement on this program first
with the British and Germans and then with the other EDC countries and Canada in time for a
meeting of the North Atlantic Council prior to October 15. At this
meeting the Council would approve in principle German membership in
NATO. It would also approve a
resolution covering very broadly the program outlined above and
instruct the Permanent Representatives, working with the military
bodies, to draw up detailed documents carrying out the program for
approval by the Council at its December meeting. The objective would
be to agree in December on a complete program, made as impressive
and attractive as possible, for use in securing parliamentary
approval of those portions of it for which this is necessary.
[Page 1166]
2. Restoration of German
Sovereignty
See attached Tab B [D].
3. European Integration
Every effort should be made to restore impetus to the movement for
European unity. We should continue to support the European Coal and
Steel Community and to encourage any other practical steps for
economic integration. An effort should be made to move toward a
European political community either by reviving the Charter drawn up
by the Schuman Plan
Assembly last year, or by calling a directly elected European
Assembly, in accordance with the Declaration of May 1954, and
assigning it the responsibility for drawing up a Charter. France, of
course, would be expected to participate in these endeavors. At the
NATO Council meeting in early
October a strong resolution along these lines should be approved by
the Ministers. We should also support a European solution for the
Saar along the lines agreed between Adenauer and the preceding
French Government.4
4. German Rearmament outside
NATO
If the above fails to obtain French concurrence in German membership
in NATO, and in the German defense
contribution, we should be prepared to adopt a new position, the
essential feature of which should be that it would make it possible
to circumvent a French veto. We should work out the substance of
this position in advance with the British, but should not discuss it
with the French or other powers unless it becomes necessary because
of French obstructionism on NATO
membership and the defense problem. The French should be informed
that the door is always open to French concurrence in the German
NATO membership solution or to
a revival of EDC. However, it is
necessary in the meantime to work out a program for dealing
urgently, although less satisfactorily, with the German problem.
The first step in this program would be a joint US-UK request to
their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff to review together the
strategy for Western defense on the assumption that French
cooperation will not be forthcoming. Although a final US position
should await the results of this study, we should indicate to the
British that we are thinking along the lines of two main steps:
- (a)
- Draw up a defense pact among the US, UK and Germany on a
basis analogous to the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav pact. This
pact would be valid only until a change of circumstances
makes possible German admission to NATO or a revival of EDC.
- (b)
- Prompt institution of the “interim measures” program for
actually getting under way the preliminary training of
German forces.
[Page 1167]
This program should be implemented with the primary objective of
putting political pressure on the French since it is highly
unsatisfactory from the standpoint of obtaining the objectives
listed at the beginning of this paper.
Tab D
secret
[Washington, September 10, 1954.]
Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of German
Political Affairs (Kidd)
German Sovereignty
A. German Position
With the rejection of the EDC by the
French Assembly, Chancellor Adenauer has given notice that the Germans are no
longer interested in the qualified sovereignty they were to have
obtained through the Contractual Agreements. In a statement issued
on September 1st the Federal Government declared its goal to be
“Restoration of sovereignty.” The Government gave point to this by
adding “Participation in the defense of Western Europe without
discrimination” and “juridical regulations, reached by agreement,
concerning the stay in West Germany of troops from other countries.”
Amplifying these points in a radio statement on September 4th, the
Chancellor said:
“I want to emphasize this: It goes without saying that in the
negotiations on the Federal Republic’s sovereignty the
obligation of the three Occupation Powers, laid down in the
Bonn Conventions, must be maintained to bring about, jointly
with the Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany in
peace and her integration in the west.…5 I
should like to stress the sentence in the statement made by
Secretary of State Dulles in which he said that it was
impossible in the long run to withhold from the Federal
Republic the right to individual and collective defence. It
appears to me that this sentence correctly expresses the
cardinal issue of the whole matter.”6
In conversation with Ambassador Conant on September 8th [7th], the Chancellor stated that he believed sovereignty could
be restored by declaration of the Three Powers lifting the
occupation powers. Berlin would remain an exception. He envisaged
something like the NATO status of
forces agreement instead of the Forces Convention. The latter was
the only thing that would require Bundestag action.7
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What the Germans find most unacceptable in the Contractuals are:
- (a)
- Stationing of troops as a reserved (occupation) power
rather than on the basis of agreement (Article 2, Convention
on Relations).
- (b)
- The reserved power to protect the security of our troops
(Article 2) coupled with the emergency clause (Article 5) of
the Convention on Relations. Few legal questions were more
heatedly discussed in the Weimar and Hitler periods than the
emergency clause, Article 48, of the Weimar Constitution,
and the thesis of a Nazi jurist that “sovereignty lies in
the power to declare an emergency.”
- (c)
- Perhaps the “Except by common consent” clause of Article 7
of the Convention on Relations, limiting the Federal
Republic’s treaty-making powers.
- (d)
- Much of the Settlement Convention, as an extension of
occupation requirements in another form.
- (e)
- The Forces Convention, as discriminating in comparison
with the NATO status of
forces agreements.
- (f)
- The Finance Convention, depending upon the modification of
the Forces Convention and the form which the German defense
contribution will now take.8
B. U.S. Position
By the Senate resolution of July 28th [30th]
we have declared ourselves in favor of restoring German
sovereignty.9 In his statement of August 31st the Secretary said:
“Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or
otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her
sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty
to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as
part of a collective international order.”10
There is thus no policy obstacle to recognition of German
sovereignty, by agreement or by executive declaration. To be
entirely effective, however, and to avoid abrogation of the
Occupation Statute by unilateral action, the Federal Republic’s
sovereign status should be recognized in conjunction with the
British and French. There are also certain important collateral
agreements with the Germans which should be made firm, and
accordingly the timing of any formal act of recognition should be
made dependent upon mutually satisfactory conclusion of these
agreements. These include, in addition to arrangements for the
German defense contributions:
- (a)
- Preservation of our rights relating to Berlin (no
difficulty anticipated);
- (b)
- Preservation of our rights relating to unification and
Germany as a whole (no difficulty anticipated);
- (c)
- Satisfactory agreement on stationing of troops (recasting
a reserved right into the form of an agreement);
- (d)
- Provision for security emergencies if not as a reserved
right, at least as a practical arrangement.
- (e)
- Parts of the Settlement Convention which have not been
overtaken by time (e.g. deconcentration) but in fact needed
to be “settled” (e.g. restitution).
- (f)
- The substance of the Forces and Finance Conventions,
modified to provide for the French in addition to the US and
UK. In answer to a German request for a NATO status of forces
agreement, a distinction may be made between the type of
situation for which this was primarily designed (bases) and
the situation in Germany, where sizeable armies in the field
are maintained.
C. Recommended Course of
Action
- (1)
- German sovereignty should be recognized by the US as soon as
the form of the German defense contribution and necessary
collateral agreements have been worked out,
- (2)
- So far as the Germans are concerned, if the NAC invites the Federal Republic to
become in due course a member of NATO (or invites the NATO members to agree to German membership within a
specified time), this will in itself amount to recognition of
Germany’s right to military sovereignty (Wehrhoheit), which will
be a great satisfaction to them. At the same time the Occupation
Statute will remain on the books until the Three Powers take
some further, formal action. The NAC should accordingly invite the Occupying Powers,
or the latter should state their intention, to recognize the
Federal Republic’s sovereignty as soon as suitable arrangements
have been made for German defense participation.
- (3)
- With regard to timing, if a period (e.g. 60 days) is allowed
for working out NATO controls,
conclusion of necessary collateral agreements by the Occupying
Powers, and completion of governmental action by the respective
NATO states to agree to
German membership, the US, UK, and France might time their
formal recognition of sovereignty to coincide with their deposit
of ratifications. The Department has been informed that French
recognition of German sovereignty will probably require Assembly
action, and some of the NATO
members, including the US, have reserved the right to obtain
parliamentary approval of new members in NATO.
- (4)
- With regard to the form, recognition of sovereignty could be
accomplished by either a treaty or executive agreement, or by
declaration of the respective states. It is believed that there
is some advantage in using declarations, so as to avoid the
possibility of further delays through negotiations and
ratifications. Although tripartite agreement is required for
abrogation of the Occupation Statute, the US and UK might be
able to hasten French action if they should announce that so far
as their respective Governments were concerned, recognition
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of the Federal
Republic’s sovereignty would accompany their formal agreement to
German membership in NATO. The
French can of course withhold either consent to NATO membership or recognition of
German sovereignty, but this cuts both ways, since the US and UK
can render the Occupation Statute inoperative in their zones by
recognition of sovereignty.
