Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

United States Delegation Minutes¹

secret
Plenary Minutes 3

Bermuda, December 6, 1953.

President Eisenhower opened the meeting by expressing his gratification at the good news concerning the improvement in M. Laniel’s condition. Prime Minister Churchill associated himself with this expression of the President. M. Bidault expressed his thanks in the name of the French Delegation.

The President then said that the meeting on the previous day had concluded after M. Bidault had made a presentation on the EDC. He had indicated at that time that he wished to talk further with Prime Minister Laniel and that today he would have additional comments on this subject. The President said that before asking M. Bidault to make this additional statement, there were a few small items of business that might be disposed of quickly prior to hearing M. Bidault. As he understood it, the first item, the note to the Soviets, had been prepared and as far as he knew, no particular action was required by the plenary but he just wanted to make sure of this. The note had been forwarded to Bonn and if the German Chancellor had any comments, they could be taken up by the three Foreign Ministers. The President then said he understood the Foreign Ministers had met and he would ask Mr. Eden if he felt there was anything that should be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Delegation.

Mr. Eden indicated that the action on the note had been completed. It had been forwarded to the Chancellor and they should receive his comments that night or the following day. At a second meeting, the question of future NATO planning had been discussed and there had been general approval for the “long haul concept” whereby all that could be expected in the next few years was the present level of forces plus the German contribution. There had been general agreement on the necessity for maintaining the forward strategy principle. Lord Ismay had made a report on the work of NATO. He had suggested that a review of the position be made and there had been agreement to undertake this. Lord Ismay considered that this was a work which would require three months to perform. Plans could be laid at Paris.²

The President then said that unless there were other items for discussion, he would suggest that M. Bidault might proceed.^*

M. Bidault then said that the President had been kind enough the previous day to ask the French Government what its friends and allies could do to help it to succeed in this common objective of setting up EDC. He would like to talk on the subject with the conviction that it would be understood that there was no degree of lessening effort on the part of the French. The needs of which he would speak were neither original or new. Recent experience in the bitter parliamentary struggle which had just taken place indicated that it was indispensible that these needs be met. The request he was about to make to the U.K. and U.S. were, as he had said, by no means new. He had said that they were indispensable and he would like to explain why. Some progress in this field might put the French in a position where they could satisfy all impatience on this subject, including that of the U.S. and U.K. It seemed to M. Bidault that all should be able to understand the apprehension of a people who were called upon to integrate militarily, committing themselves for generations in the future unless they had the reassurance and confidence of having on the Continent U.S. and British troops standing with them and other Western Europeans and sharing in the defense of the Continent. This was not a case of a nervous public opinion though there might well be nervousness for a matter less important than this. This was a fundamental factor in the view of the fact that they were committing themselves for 50 years and felt they had the right to be encouraged to undertake this great commitment by positive assurances which they needed. Whether authorized or not, some indications which they had had proved deceptive. At the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly, some conclusions had been adopted which had not been confirmed by subsequent realities. These had been seized upon by some sectors of French opinion to prove how real was the lack of security. Here and there, without mentioning any names, some prominent people had suggested that the implementation of the EDC might permit the withdrawal by non-participating countries of some of the troops which they had stationed abroad. Even though there had been no confirmation for this, it had created some discouragement in French opinion and might prejudice the feeling of security. In order to quash rumors so that none could question this must be viewed with the utmost seriousness and balance.

M. Bidault then said he would undertake an exposé that would not be new for any of those who had heard him. He indicated that the French had recognized the principle of a forward strategy that is defending Western Europe as far to the East as possible. This was a requirement for the common security of all of the Atlantic nations. In this frame had been set the whole problem of a German contribution and the EDC. This brought the French Foreign Minister to two sets of considerations. The first of these was the question of the Saar.³ A German contribution should favor and not hinder a French reconciliation. It was desired by all sincere forward-looking people despite the difficult circumstances of the past. A reasonable progressive and resolute effort toward the unification of Europe could not be carried through to a conclusion if the Saar question were not settled. Answering his own question, M. Bidault said that integration was not the same as an alliance. Intermingling troops who had fought one another for 150 years was a difficult task even though they might perhaps be facing an imminent common danger. M. Bidault said that he would talk later on the subject of the German Treaty and expressed the opinion that it was indeed difficult to integrate with a country whose Eastern frontiers were not fixed. He himself had not been present when certain Soviet measures were taken which some regarded as final and others as temporary. Integration with a country whose Eastern frontiers were unknown required courage but they were resolutely prepared to face this. If, however, the Western borders were unknown and between the two countries involved there lay a little territory which had nevertheless four times the population of Trieste, he could not foresee which way the balance would go. If this were allowed to become a sort of no man’s land, it could again become the scene of the age old clash between Teuton and Gaul and the enterprise would then indeed be too great for the means at hand. Only at the 14th conference had the problem of the Saar been finally settled in favor of France. M. Bidault paid tribute to the support he had received first from Mr. Byrnes and then from General Marshall. Mr. Bevin had been second to none in his generosity in this matter. Time had passed and the territorial break with the Reich had been made and real local autonomy had been granted. The Saar was in economic union with France and there was no ambiguity on this score. The French Government agreed, however, that the Saar should be a link and not an apple of discord. If free elections had been held and the press of the world had been able to judge how free these were, the Saar Government had received a majority which M. Bidault felt compelled to envy. Following this Chancellor Adenauer had written a letter of sharp criticism. This had been done during a period before the German elections and though the letter had been received two months before the German elections, M. Bidault had waited until after these elections had assured Chancellor Adenauer of a substantial majority, before replying. This was a clear indication that the French had never sought to use the Saar problem to drag their feet or hinder progress but rather saw it as an obstacle which must be overcome. Some reproaches had been directed at agreements concluded between the French and the Saar,⁴ these agreements being in full accord with the powers which the allies had conferred upon France.

These Franco-Saar conventions should encourage hope rather than criticism. They had involved abandonment of powers of a political nature and the return to the Saar of a political autonomy as complete as possible. The Saar later regained control of their mines which had first been managed by the French as reparations—incidentally the only one the French had received worth mentioning. Thus the Saar had been given as much liberty as possible under the precarious statute of the territory and had been treated generously by the French. M. Bidault said that he regretted to say that he understood the very great difficulties of the German Chancellor and did not want to press this matter unduly. He did not feel that his colleagues would expect him to go into the full details of the recent confidential talks he had had with the Germans. But the general impression which he had derived unless it were changed for the better by subsequent events was as follows: They felt there was no urgence to conclude this matter. If in the economic field some progress was possible and considered by the Chancellor, this was so general in nature as to allow him great latitude of interpretation and was so vague as to make it dubious that there was any really new step forward taken.

There had recently cropped up in talks with M. Francois Poncet and in the last one that he himself had had a new idea which had never been mentioned before, namely, that there be a modification in the territory of the Saar and its economy. France was being asked to provide a dowry for unified Europe. That dowry was the Saar. M. Bidault indicated clearly that the French were being asked to contribute French territory to this dowry. How could it be explained to French public opinion that this question of the Saar had been transformed into an even vaster problem. The solution of the Saar problem was its Europeanization. The economy of the Saar was incorporated in that of France. As the unification of Europe proceeded, the bonds with France would slacken.

From the first day the French had put their cards on the table. Throughout this interminable negotiation his predecessor, Mr. Schuman, and he himself had indicated clearly all that they were able to give. He knew that Chancellor Adenauer likewise had difficulties but he wished to draw attention to the very important symbolic value of a fundamentally satisfactory solution of the Saar problem.

He would like to repeat in finishing that the question of integration with a neighboring country may be bold when you do not know where it finishes but requires extraordinary courage when you do not even know where it begins.

M. Bidault then said he would go on to the question of the overall substance for which the French Government was asking. When the plan of a German contribution to the Defense of Europe had been accepted, it was with the understanding that this contribution would be a first step towards a forward strategy which would make possible a defense as far to the East as possible. The rearmament of Germany would in no sense have been accepted unless it assured the defense of Europe, including Germany. It implied support of the Atlantic alliance in all ways. M. Bidault said that he would like to refer to a conference of Foreign Ministers in Washington in 1951 and quoted briefly from decisions reached there. “A governing principle of policy was the inclusion of France in an Atlantic Community in constant development.”⁵ To our eyes and to those of any careful reader, it was clear that a parallelism was maintained between EDC and the Atlantic Community. This was the reason why the French Delegation today felt compelled to make certain remarks on the need to continue progress in the Atlantic alliance in quality and depth even if it was not possible to do so in quantity at the present time. There was need for better coordination and closer unity. All three countries represented there had responsibilities and roles that were not limited to a single continent. Alone of these three, France was asked in the interest of a common strategy to make sacrifice of sovereignty. Alone among the three, she was also invested with direct responsibility in the noble edifice of a European Community. M. Bidault said that he had never felt that Europe should be limited to six powers even though these might be the boldest. He had often said that it should be 14 instead of 6. The Europe that was being made was based on the will of the participants for lack of being able to be based on the limits of freedom, much less the limits of geography. We should take special care not to create a vacuum of difficulties because of insufficient coordination between the Atlantic organization and the European organization. The European organization is within the Atlantic organization and has the purpose of serving it. There were grave perils in poor coordination which might lead to serious difficulties. His country would not wish to run this risk.

He would like to express the idea that while France wishes to build Europe, it does not wish to be engulfed by it and thereby lose its individual personality so that the Continental character of France would no longer be considered except through the European Community, of which France would be a part but not necessarily a spokesman. The position of France on the Standing Group could not be questioned. The creation of the European Defense Community could not separate France and the other territories and countries who were marching with her along the road to progress from the association of the Big Three. This was a first point. M. Bidault said that he could not imagine for a second that because France had entered a European Community it would be a European who would sit in the place he had the honor to occupy. This possibility must be definitely excluded. This was a first danger but there was yet another. If the European Community were set up, the unintegrated powers (U.S.–U.K.) might consider that the problem had been satisfactorily solved and seek to pass to the new community certain political and military responsibilities. However bold one may be one must realize that the consolidation of something like the EDC would require time. Rome had not been built in a day nor had any of our countries. It would take time before integration had captured the heart and soul of its participants.

M. Bidault said that to sum up a real harmonization was necessary between the two organizations, Atlantic and European, that would reinforce the discipline of NATO. France, in this connection, would make certain proposals at the next NATO meeting and would hope that that would not be ill received. It was also necessary to establish on the European continent a certain balance between EDC with German contingents (about which there was still some uneasiness) and the unintegrated Atlantic forces which would guarantee the security of the Continent and the security of the world. M. Bidault said that he had been compelled for serious, even dramatic, reasons to make these comments. There was an overriding problem which contained the key of all solutions and that was the problem of the U.S. and U.K. forces stationed on the European continent. The idea of German rearmament had been acceptable to his people and to others only as a military complement which was indispensable and controlled for the defense of the Continent. It should not have a replacement value. Nothing could be worse than the idea held in some ill-intentioned quarters that the counterweight of the U.S. and U.K. could be lacking and that the rearmament of Germany, instead of adding new divisions, would merely replace the troops of old allies by those of an old enemy, with whom the French wish to be friends but realize this could not be done in a day. Thus, it appeared indispensible that the strength of U.S. and U.K. forces stationed in Europe should represent a definite proportion of total forces and have a definite proportion relationship to the German forces of the couverture.

M. Bidault said that “with you, yes, without you, no” (he later corrected this to read without you it would be difficult). As things stood, the U.S. and U.K. Governments were free at every annual review to bring up the question of the strength that they maintained on the European continent. That is in fact one of the difficulties. The French Government well understands the reluctance of the other governments here represented to take final commitments to maintain certain precise forces on the Continent. He felt there was some misunderstanding. He was not asking for an indefinite or indeterminate commitment for an intangible period. The strength of these U.S. and U.K. forces might be varied in the light of a number of factors. He could see three cases. One a grave emergency occurring outside the European Continent and affecting one of the countries represented at the table at which he was sitting. He emphasized a grave emergency outside Europe. This would not only allow for withdrawal but also would make it possible to seek compensation from other forces which could only be U.S. or U.K. and would later lead to a restoration of those forces. The second case would be if new weapons made possible changes in the overall problem and the third case, if God were willing, a clear definite improvement in the international situation. EDC represented to the French Government an immense change in the course of history which affected France alone of the three nations and should give her the right to be consulted prior to any substantial change in the forces of her great allies stationed on the European continent. Such change might well be the subject of an agreement between the three powers there represented. M. Bidault said that at the risk of being repetitious, he would like to reiterate that this step was a revolution in the history of his nation which he had taught for 15 years. He was entirely ready to accept this extension of history but he felt that the immense resolution required to take this step gave them the right to ask for that which they had required and which would be particularly necessary for Europe during the first period of the new community. Only thus would it be possible to assure confidence for the present and the future. He would further ask and he did not believe that this would be too difficult that the three main Atlantic powers declare that they had no intention of withdrawing from NATO after 20 years as is now possible, for the French would be tied for 50 years. There were still men who were not thinking of tomorrow alone but of the next half century to come. He felt that this was a reasonable request because the French, if not caught, would at least be frozen in Europe which might not take the shape which had been hoped for, and while this was taking place the two great powers, with whom France had been historically associated, might have grown distant. M. Bidault said that in so far as the precise points of assistance in this field would be required, this matter could be taken up by the experts who would apply to it their well-nigh inexhaustible patience.

As far as the U.K. was concerned, M. Bidault expressed his satisfaction with the Convention of association⁶ as prepared up to now but he felt that it was a framework which would have to be completed by commitments on the equilibrium of forces and the permanence of the forward strategy. He likewise felt that the military protocol⁷ now before the Interim Committee could stand improvement but he would not go into such details at this point. He said that if the others would put themselves in the place of France, they would realize that this was [illegible] the result of an analysis of the situation. He apologized for taking so much of his colleagues time but said that the gravity and urgency of the problem made it necessary. M. Bidault said that there were two perfect answers to this question. One would be a total Atlantic community but he realized this was not feasible for a long time. Another would be full participation by the U.K. but he understood that this could not be hoped for. Therefore, he was obliged to seek some replacement for which he needed their help. France was being asked to furnish the keystone of a vast structure of military defense that required overriding an historic national tradition. The inclusion in this of German divisions was in itself an explosive factor because of the partition of that country. He believed it would only be possible to enter EDC with the knowledge that the British and Americans would stand as comrades along side of them. If this were not possible, the French people might draw back from the abyss, which was wide indeed, rather than listen to the voice which M. Bidault and his colleagues had been sounding to the French people in the past and would continue to do so, the voice of courage and solidarity. He feared that if this were not heard, his fellow-countrymen would harken to the memory of past sufferings and the bitterness of abandonment rather than heed this voice of courage and solidarity.

The President said he would like to make a brief statement and then he would ask the Secretary of State to explain our reactions. Secretary Dulles said that he felt that a presentation as full and careful as that which M. Bidault had made deserved a great deal more consideration than it could possibly receive around that table. He knew he was speaking for the President in saying that M. Bidault’s exposé would receive this consideration. He felt sure that all those present were agreed on two things. First, that the U.S. would be the last to want to see a federation of Continental Europe if it meant the disappearance of France as a great power, not only in the material sense but because of the contributions of the spirit, intellect and vigor which had enriched the whole world and his own country ever since that nation’s birth. None in France need fear that France would disappear, for she was far too precious. Secondly, the remarks of M. Bidault emphasized the grave decision which confronts the continental nations. Their gravity was fully appreciated by our own opinion. They were not steps which would lead to a disassociation of the U.S. from Europe but rather insure the continuity of this association. It would be regrettable indeed if he had to feel that the future of Europe would only be a more violent repetition of the past. A prudent man would wish to disassociate himself from such an unhappy future. Because we believed that those steps being envisaged by France and the establishment of the EDC would end this past history and permit a continuing association of the U.S. with France and other countries of Western Europe from which our own people had drawn their origin, because of this we want to see the kind of Europe with which we can associate ourselves without mortal danger to ourselves. This is the reason for our eagerness to see this step taken. The Secretary said he had no doubt that it would be made apparent to the French Government and people that their hopes and ours lay in the same direction.

Sir Winston Churchill then said that he had thought they were really going to talk about the EDC with the thought of the salvation of the French. He did not feel we should be mixed up with a few fields in the Saar valley. We should maintain a sense of proportion. Yesterday the President in the course of the discussion on this subject had used most serious language which we should bear in mind. EDC had been a French proposal and her allies and friends had been doing all they could to help her out. This project had delayed for more than three years the formation of a German army, without which there could be no safety for anyone in Europe. A critical point had been reached where EDC would either be ratified by France or not. He hoped that the French would consider what the consequences might be before they made a final decision. He had hoped that if the French were unwilling or unable because of parliamentary difficulties to ratify EDC, Germany would be brought in by a rearrangement or broadening of the NATO organization. He was not at all sure from what he had heard the President say that this might appear to be a good plan to the United States. It might be that EDC would be cast aside improvidently at this vital and perilous moment and that the NATO organization might not be reorganized in order to achieve the purpose of EDC. He hoped that before the French Parliament would take a final decision they would see the dark possibilities ahead if the U.S. would withdraw from its policy of direct aid and giving to Europe. It was certain that British troops could not stay any longer than the Americans (as long, no longer). If U.S. troops were withdrawn from France, it would expose Britain to mortal danger. No other country was doing in peace time what they were. They had two year military service and not a single brigade in the U.K. With the development of aircraft in a few months, they might be faced with a heavy paratroop attack in the U.K. If the U.S. were unable to continue their effort, if the EDC were rejected, the British would then have to do their utmost to fight to the death in their own island and this they would not hesitate to do to the best of their ability.

He begged and implored his French friends not to let a few fields in the Saar valley come between the life and death of the flaming spirit of France and the break up of the great structure on which so many hopes had been founded.

For his own part he was unable to propose any additional assistance which Britain might render. If necessary, Mr. Eden could explain how great were the measures that they had taken and how close would be our association with EDC if it went through. If EDC were rejected and NATO put aside as not being feasible, something in the nature of peripheral defense might replace what had been worked out. This would indeed be a frightful disaster for Europe could be quickly undermined and suborned by the Russian Communist advance and then, if a general war followed, it was very likely that they would never succeed in reviving the civilization and culture of Western Europe and of France. Sir Winston could not understand how anything could arise when this matter had been brought so far and had indeed been invented by the French themselves. He hoped and trusted that the French nation in Parliament would face facts before making their decision. For his part, he would feel compelled to put these facts before the world before catastrophe occurred. This would indeed be a most terrible situation, worse than any he had seen ten years before if EDC were indeed to be cast aside and if it could not be replaced by some modified form of NATO, that would solve the problem. He felt it necessary that these terrible facts be faced rather than linger upon the Saar valley. He stressed the importance of preventing another World War, the preliminary of which would probably extinguish the culture, civilization and freedom of Western Europe. He could not understand how the seriousness of this was not realized. Sir Winston said he knew that M. Bidault had done everything that he could and it was not to convince him that he spoke. He knew that M. Bidault was prepared to risk not only his career but his life in order that this might turn out in the right way. He urged that the awful peril be not underrated. He pointed out that Germany would be totally disarmed at the mercy of Russia at any moment and that the British themselves might expect to be shattered but thank God they still had the channel which had stood them in such good stead. M. Bidault interrupted to say that France did not. All the more reason, said the Prime Minister, why France should support EDC which might well become for France what the channel was for the U.K. He knew that there was no fault on M. Bidault’s part but if the French Parliament rejected EDC, he would view the future more somberly than at any time in World War II. He earnestly hoped this would not happen. EDC should be first and last but if that failed, he would beg the President and his associates to consider some way of achieving the same result through changes in NATO. If this fails the British would stay only so long as the United States.

President Eisenhower then said he had a few remarks to make and then would propose a schedule for the following day. In the first place, this was not intended to be a debate about EDC. It was assumed that all those present believed implicitly in it and supported it with their full heart and soul. M. Bidault had made his presentation in reply to an invitation from the President to speak on French problems directly relating to EDC and such other ones as were related to it. What he had said would help us to consider the problem from the U.S. point of view. He felt bound to say that he agreed with the Prime Minister on the seriousness of the consequences of rejection in the United States. He would like to recall at this table that he had been sent to Europe in December, 1950, when work on the EDC had begun. The concept had been given to him by the Standing Group of the NATO organization and on his own responsibility he had asked for U.S. troops to be sent over to instill confidence and help get the matter under way. He trusted that no one believed that the U.S. was a fair weather friend that would run out when difficulties began. He knew that a thing like this took time but he could not but agree with Sir Winston as to the consequences of failure. The President did not see that we would refuse to consider any other solution but as he had said the previous day, he felt that an alternative based on a German national army came so far behind the EDC conception that it was not worthy of serious consideration. During his own recent experience in Europe, he had found both French and Germans opposed to the solution. They were the heart and core of European defense and if they were opposed, he did not see how it could be brought about.

The President said that he himself harbored no pessimism. A man who had been a soldier for a long time must necessarily be an optimist. He felt that this must be done and that the whole atmosphere must clear up. Strength would flow with no danger to France or Western Europe and guarantees would be given by honest governments and by allies on the ground. He would not talk of pessimism. He was certain France could do this. All other questions would be studied and he would like to renew the assurances that the Secretary of State had given that they would be commented upon. He emphasized that none must think that there could be a failure of EDC.

The President then said that there were quite a number of subjects to be taken up the following day. Trade with Russia was quite a technical problem and he would suggest that it be handled by the Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State. In as much as the Far East and Middle East remained to be discussed, he felt the Big Three might meet from 11 to 12:30, the Foreign Ministers at 3 and then another plenary meeting at 5 for the Communiqué, and thus the final part of the Conference could be ended unless someone had anything else he wished to bring up at 5 O’clock. It was probable that this time table would not permit as exhaustive a study of all subjects as might be desirable. Mr. Churchill then said he entirely accepted the President’s wishes about the meeting and that on the following morning they could discuss Korea, China, Indochina and the problems of the other side of the world. Then the Communiqué could be taken up in the afternoon. The President then mentioned that for the evening communiqué of the day, it might be announced that he had accepted the invitation to address the U.N. on the 8th. M. Bidault then said that he had one or two difficulties. He thanked the other members for the attention they had given his long EDC exposé. He was not sure that this subject had been exhausted and might not be taken up again. The second difficulty was purely procedural. He and his colleagues constantly referred to European security assurances in their notes to the Soviets but never talked about them themselves. President Eisenhower then said that these subjects could easily be continued at the NATO meetings and M. Bidault replied that if it was difficult to discuss them among three partners, it was infinitely more so to discuss them among 14. But he did not wish to discuss this matter further. He only trusted that, even if his arguments were dismissed, his conclusions be studied. Mr. Churchill then said that the Locarno security idea might be discussed if our friends would agree and he would also ask the President and Mr. Dulles if the Egyptian matter might be discussed separately. Herein the interests of the U.K. were entirely in accord with those of France. In comparison with the terrible matters they had been discussing, this might seem like a small matter but they had 80 thousand men in this area who might come into action next week or soon thereafter if attacked. He was not asking for physical help in favoring a solution but he felt it would be helpful if the Middle East thought that the U.S. and U.K. were thinking in the same way, seeking no advantage of imperial power but finding a way to discharge their duty to NATO and to the civilization of the world. Mr. Churchill then mentioned the question of trade with Russia. Mr. Eden then said that the only reason why the Prime Minister raised this topic was that it concerned the Minister of Trade almost more than the Foreign Minister and that it might be discussed at the NATO Conference in as much as their own agenda was so crowded at both meetings. M. Bidault said he had no objection to what the Foreign Secretary had proposed. He was not clear about Egypt but felt that the Prime Minister was asking for conversations with the President and these would be so interesting that even a Frenchman might like to listen in silence. M. Bidault said that one thing that bothered him was that there were so many things on the agenda for the following day that he feared many things would be passed over quickly. Only one subject, EDC, had been discussed fully. He would hope they would be able to fill out the communiqué on subjects of the long agenda, of which he had not been the author.

The President then said that he had not brought up the subject of Egypt but had acquiesced in its conclusion. He felt the Prime Minister was trying to save time. He himself would be willing to have a night meeting on the following day but he was bound by his commitment to the United Nations on the 8th. The President then concluded by suggesting that in as much as there were many subjects to be discussed, that a plenary meeting be held the following day at 10:30 instead of 11 and that they then discuss the Far East, Middle East and the security assurances. The Foreign Ministers could meet at 3 and another plenary could take place at 5.

The President then adjourned the meeting.

1. The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 18 from Bermuda, Dec. 7. This telegram was repeated to London. Paris, Moscow, and Bonn. For President Eisenhower’s account of the meeting, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 244–245.
2. For records of the Foreign Ministers discussions with Lord Ismay, see FM MIN 3, p. 1787, and the telegraphic summary by the U.S. Delegation, p. 1788.
3. An informal translation of the brief from which M. Bidault spoke is attached as Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. The five-page translation of Bidault’s speech, attached to the source text as Tab A, is not printed.]
3. Documentation on the status of the Saar is included in volume vii .
4. For documentation on the Franco-Saar Agreements, concluded at Paris, Mar. 3, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, pp. 927 ff.
5. Documentation on the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, Sept. 10–14, 1951 is presented in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.
6. Presumably Bidault is referring to the treaty between the United Kingdom and the European Defense Community, signed at Paris, May 27, 1952. For documentation relating to the treaty, see pp. 571 ff.
7. For documentation on the proposed French protocols to the EDC Treaty, see pp. 688 ff.