Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

396.1/12–653

Telegraphic Summary, by the United States Delegation¹

top secret

Bermuda, December 6, 1953.

Second part Foreign Ministers first meeting² December 6 a.m. follows.

Subject: NATO: (first portion this meeting reported in Secto 13 [15] dealt with reply to Soviets³)

After Eden welcomed Ismay, latter made clear only here as observer and any opinions he might express completely personal. Ismay said obviously he could not commit any of NATO countries but pointed out these would be very grateful for whatever he could tell them.

Secretary suggested understanding be reached among Foreign Ministers which phases Bermuda deliberations important to other NATO countries which Ismay should report on. Secretary stressed intimate character conference and desire avoid undue publicity and press leaks.

Initiating discussion of NATO topic, Eden stated organization at stage when tactics and objectives had to be viewed on “long haul” basis. First priority is maintenance strength and unity NATO so as to deter Russians over long period tension. Now seems attainment original force targets of less immediate urgency even though these remain optimum military objectives. UK suggests four basic plans:

1. Maintain present forces in being which together with West atomic power should provide effective deterrent against Soviet attack. These forces must be within our economic and financial means.

2. Quality these forces must be improved as rapidly as financially possible.

3. These forces must be supplemented soonest with German contribution.

4. We must maintain our lead in new weapons and research. Above plans should be basis of 1954 Annual Review, purposes of which should be:

a. Indicate how we can maintain present forces without economic damage;

b. How we can improve quality and balance of these forces so as to increase their deterrent value.

UK seeking reach broad general agreement with US and France at Bermuda to assist in reaching common agreement next NAC.

Bidault first made procedural suggestion that during Council meetings Foreign and Defense Ministers should meet separately in small committees better adapted for frank, confidential and effective preparatory work. Decisions of course would continue to be taken in plenary sessions. Bidault stressed that plenaries now attended by such vast numbers that debates were academic in view reluctance delegates to exchange clear and forthright views before such throng. Not wedded to his suggestion and would welcome any formula which would succeed in removing academic character of plenaries.

Turning to substance, French Foreign Minister said NATO faced with situation in which it cannot develop its strength quantitatively soon even though SG and all military authorities find present levels inadequate. We must, therefore, find ways and means improve our forward strategy as otherwise dangerous morale and political situation could develop if military posture remains unsatisfactory indefinitely. Bidault recommended following measures:

1. Coordination of NATO and other plans and forces since relationship and solidarity between all theaters obvious. This amply demonstrated by Indochina.

2. Coordination and standardization equipment should be developed as constantly urged by French delegation. Must eliminate costly overlapping and duplication.

3. France has certain suggestions for increasing efficacy of military forces and, perhaps, for modifying their structure. Not appropriate, however, for discussion Bermuda. However, while quantitative improvement forces as defined by NATO not now possible, greater attention should be given to reserve formations which could eventually supplement first line units. NATO should think more of possible eventual period after D plus 30.

4. NATO strategy must take into account use new weapons. Plenary decisions now made in total ignorance character, availability and quantities of new weapons. This constitutes great strategic disadvantage and unnecessary handicap for West planning.

Bidault concluded NATO must maintain forward impulse in development its strength even though effort in terms dollars or manpower cannot be increased now.

Secretary accepted long haul concept for US which agreed with analysis heads of Government at Bermuda.

While all long for basic change in Soviet intentions this is only a hope, not an expectation. It would be fatal to let our guard down, as Churchill said. NATO got under way in emergency crisis atmosphere. Now we must determine a pace which can be sustained over considerable period of time.

Secretary warned, however, long haul must not mean static or “plateau” concept; instead we should constantly review and allow for variations of potentialities member countries.

Re mention by Eden and Bidault concerning development NATO strategy on basis of deterrent power atomic weapons in background, Secretary recognized strategic air and air base complex constituted essential element of global strategy of which NATO is part. However, we must recognize day when strategic air and atom bomb were virtually sufficient deterrents in themselves is perhaps disappearing. Indeed, our intelligence concerning Soviets indicates that while US has considerable advance, Soviets also progressing. US Government now thinks new concept may have to be considered according to which atomic and new weapons would be “meshed in” with conventional armaments. US anxious NATO forces not be obliged fight with obsolete equipment. President now hopes Congress will liberalize very stringent laws now in effect concerning atomic energy information and he expects ask Congress modify this legislation so as to permit fuller exchanges intelligence re new weapons with our allies.

Secretary concurred with Eden’s mention essential need for German contribution for implementing NATO forward strategy. Likewise, he fully agreed with Eden’s view concerning importance maintaining scientific lead over Soviets; also agreed importance avoiding duplication efforts.

Re Bidault’s procedural suggestion, US sympathizes with his view. Secretary intends suggest next NAC that twice a year Foreign Ministers meet among themselves immediately prior to plenary sessions. In addition to valuable exchange views concerning degree Soviet threat and other factors, Foreign Ministers could develop guidance on a six-to-six-months basis. This guidance would deal with political prospects, increase or decrease tension, etc. Secretary thought this would also be useful in order increase nonmilitary character NATO. While he did not suggest any further complication in already complicated international organizations, he thought we should try to put more political flesh on NATO bones, and he pointed to fact world history complete with collapse of military organizations.

In concluding, Secretary stressed whatever he had said in course NATO discussion was predicated on assumption EDC comes into being and warned that effect Richards amendment would be felt beginning January 1954.

Foreign Ministers will meet again at 4 this afternoon.

1. The telegraphic summary printed here was transmitted in Secto 16 from Bermuda, Dec. 6 (11 p.m.). It was sent in two sections and repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn. No minutes have been found for this part of the third Foreign Ministers meeting in the Department of State files.
2. For a record of the second Foreign Ministers meeting on Dec. 6, see the telegraphic summary of the Fourth Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, p. 1791.
3. Secto 15 is not printed, but see FM MIN 3, supra. For the text of the tripartite reply, see p. 1837; further documentation on the reply to the Soviet note is presented in volume vii .