Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 184

United States Delegation Minutes¹

secret
Plenary Minutes 2

Bermuda, December 5, 1953.

President Eisenhower opened the proceedings by saying that he regretted to have to tell the others that M. Laniel was suffering from a slight fever and had been ordered by the doctor to remain quiet temporarily. He expressed his hope for a speedy return of the French Premier to health and voiced his request that no mention be made of his illness outside of the room where the conference was being held. Prime Minister Churchill associated himself in the name of the British delegation with the regrets the President expressed at M. Laniel’s absence. M. Bidault then thanked the President and Sir Winston for the kind wishes they had expressed for M. Laniel’s speedy recovery. He said that the French delegate was very grateful and agreed that there should be no mention of this temporary indisposition of the Premier. He hoped that he would soon be able to join the Conference again.

Sir Winston Churchill then said that he had been rather disconcerted to hear that the press had had a full account of what had happened the previous day. They had been able to reprint whole passages that had been spoken around the table. A local paper had given a fair and tactful account of what had transpired, but nevertheless it was evident that they had received improper knowledge. For his part Sir Winston was quite willing to debate in public but he felt that it should be definitely decided whether these discussions were to be held in public or in private. He felt it was a very serious matter if people were talking of confidential matters to the press. While there was an American newspaper strike, the United Kingdom was not similarly favored. One way or the other, it was evident that secret information had leaked out and he felt that there should be nothing other than those matters contained in the communiqué, or if it was felt desirable to hold a press conference, that would be something else. He had felt bound to bring to the Chairman’s notice the fact that people on his staff had talked to reporters who had an extraordinary amount of accurate information.

The President said that this was serious but that the best thing that could be done would be for the Heads of Delegations to instruct each individual on the delegation concerning the seriousness of any violation of security. The President then proposed that action be taken immediately to set up a communiqué drafting group. The Foreign Ministers could designate members of their delegation and they could begin drafting the communiqué as soon as the plenary session was concluded. This would lessen the pressure on any individual to give out information. He would propose that this be adopted immediately. M. Bidault said he had never seen a conference where this sort of thing had not happened but this in no way lessens his agreement with the President and Prime Minister. He fully approved the President’s proposal and designated Mr. Seydoux as the French member. Secretary Dulles then designated Mr. Bowie if the President agreed, which he did. Mr. Eden then designated Sir David Allen as the British member.

President Eisenhower then asked Mr. Eden, as the Foreign Secretary of the host nation, to bring him up-to-date on what had happened in the earlier meeting of the Foreign Ministers.² Mr. Eden said they had considered the Soviet note and a draft of a reply thereto. Since the morning meeting the experts had been at work on the text and considerable progress had been made. The text was available but he had not personally read it. If agreeable the draft might be read in draft form. He felt it was desirable to get to general conclusions as soon as possible. The Foreign Secretary said that there were two points that were outstanding upon which the Foreign Ministers desired to draw the attention of the Chiefs of Delegation. These were firstly the question of place. All had agreed there were certain disadvantages inherent in Berlin. It was a place of great touchiness in the international situation and they would prefer a neutral location such as Switzerland. It had been felt that they might authorize the Ambassadors to raise this question with Molotov and indicate they felt a neutral location would be more desirable. They did not consider, however, that this point should be allowed to delay matters if the Russians insisted on Berlin. The Ambassadors should be authorized to agree to a Berlin meeting but if meetings were held there, they must be held in the Allied Control Commission building. Wandering around Berlin would be highly undesirable. It was a point on which Chancellor Adenauer felt very strongly. The second point was the question of timing. All were agreed that the sooner the conference were held the better, so that if it appeared that no progress was being made this would not delay other steps such as EDC and other plans for Europe. Secretary Dulles had reminded the Foreign Ministers that the aid program would go before Congress in the early spring. All had agreed that a date as early as possible in January would be desirable. Our French friends had a new President who would assume office about the 17th or 18th of January and the question of the authority of a new government from the new President had not made it possible to reach a conclusion on this point. M. Bidault was to see Premier Laniel on this subject and discuss it with him. There was one additional point and that was the question of declaration. We should not allow things to drag on interminably thereby delaying our plans for Europe. The question of saying anything concerning an end date for the Conference to the Russians had been considered and on balance, it was found desirable not to take it up with them. The Foreign Ministers had felt they might agree on a figure of approximately three weeks among themselves. If no progress was being made, they could consult among themselves as to what action they felt should be taken. If, on the other hand, progress were being made, then the situation would be quite different.

President Eisenhower said that in view of this he wondered if M. Bidault could give them any indication as to a possible date. M. Bidault said that he did not wish to hide his great embarrassment as this was a matter of assuming a very great responsibility but having said that he had talked to M. Laniel after dinner and had also discussed this matter with other members of the French Delegation and it had been finally agreed that, as there were difficulties everywhere, the earliest possible date would be preferred. He had had no success earlier in the morning when he had suggested the end of December and, therefore, he felt that the first days of January would be most desirable. If the conference were to start before the date of the French Presidential election, it would be well to have it started well in advance. President Eisenhower then said that he felt bound to approve every decision that had been reached, including the conclusion just set forth by M. Bidault. He realized the difficulties which the leaders had to face and was most appreciative of the consideration which M. Bidault had shown for Prime Minister Churchill and himself. The President felt that any attempt to face an earlier date would run into the problem of holidays and much ground might be lost there. The President then asked the British delegation how they felt on this matter. Mr. Eden said he felt that it would not be possible to hold the meeting on January 4. His feeling was that this date was too early as a great deal of preparatory work had to be done and it was most important that we know our own minds when going to a conference of this nature. Furthermore the NATO conference closely followed the Bermuda Conference and very little time was left before Christmas. Likewise, there had been a strong German appeal that this be held the end of January or beginning of February as they were anxious to be consulted and to know what was going on.

President Eisenhower at this point said that he would like to state that we had had definite word from the German Chancellor that, after hearing arguments for and against, Dr. Adenauer had sent word on the previous day that he had completely changed his mind and felt that the earlier the conference were held the better. The President said he would like to observe that there were a number of conflicting considerations, some of them urgent and some requiring more perfection and preparation. In the case of the French Assembly, more political preparation would be required in view of the forthcoming Presidential election. He felt that on the question of timing there was a certain urgency that made him willing to take a chance to go to such a conference not as completely prepared as might be desired. It was probable that once the meeting started, there would be a certain amount of foot-dragging on the other side and some work could be done even after the meeting had started. He would like to see the January 4 date fixed for this meeting. To go beyond that would be to confront M. Bidault with an entirely new problem. The President went on to say that every time there was any kind of a change, this really represented a new problem. It had been once believed that the conference could be held November 7 and he did not feel that the problem had changed so greatly that what would be needed on January 4 would not be vastly different from that which had been prepared for November 7. Mr. Eden said that he did not wish to dally on this subject and felt that it was best to get on with it. On balance he was worried about being unprepared and not having an agreed plan. One new issue had been introduced and that was the question of security. The Russians had mentioned that in their reply. No joint plan had been prepared as to what to say on this subject and it was quite an important one. President Eisenhower said that he wondered if it would not be possible to adjourn decision on the question of date and the Foreign Ministers who were meeting on the note could present such specific considerations for or against this date. If this were accepted, the meeting could be referred to the Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State.

The President felt that the first item on the agenda³ had been pretty well covered, namely, the world situation. The second item on the agenda was being discussed by the Foreign Ministers. The third item, EDC, had been earmarked for discussion by the Chiefs of Delegation. Personally, he had had the honor of having part of the French delegation to lunch and they had talked exhaustively on the subject of EDC and both the French and Americans were quite familiar with one another’s views.⁴ One or two points, however, had been raised and M. Bidault might like to make some mention of them, such as the British connection with EDC, and he might wish to indicate in what way he felt the others might help. M. Bidault then said that he was not attempting to evade this question but naturally he found himself in a difficult position where he had to undertake M. Laniel’s tasks as well as his own and he was merely a shadow. He was a little confused as to the changing of the sequence of the matters on the agenda and he did not think that the first subject had been exhausted but if it was the desire of his colleagues to go ahead, he was prepared to enter upon this grave discussion of this immense and most complex subject and to talk on it today and tomorrow, both morning and night. President Eisenhower said he regretted that he did not realize that M. Bidault might have something further to say on the first question on the agenda. He had asked Mr. Dulles whether he had anything to say and as the Secretary did not wish to speak, he felt this subject had been fully discussed. Secretary Dulles then said that in all fairness, he had indicated at the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers that he might be prepared to speak further on Item 1, with particular reference to the Far East. Having reflected upon the matter, he felt it was difficult to discuss Far Eastern aspects without getting into the 4th point on the agenda, namely, Korea, Indochina and Far Eastern questions. Unless it was desired to telescope the 4th item into the first item, he would prefer to wait until the 4th item came up. M. Bidault then said that if there were no more general discussion, he was prepared to discuss in particular this main fundamental and almost overriding point. President Eisenhower then asked if M. Bidault preferred to discuss NATO or EDC. M. Bidault said he had been confused by the mixing of the date with the substance of the question. The matter of the date having been moved back the basis of the question came forward. He did not know whether it was right or not not to make a decision on the date. It was an attempt to reconcile Latin logic with Anglo-Saxon logic. President Eisenhower said that if he understood M. Bidault correctly, the latter felt the date of the meeting should be fixed. M. Bidault replied in the affirmative. President Eisenhowever said that the British delegation had wished to have private discussions on this, particularly the Foreign Secretary with his associates and it had been felt that this part of the decision might be left in suspense and that one might proceed from there. M. Bidault agreed that this matter of date might be discussed later. He would like to add that his main difficulty, which he must admit quite frankly, was the non-diplomatic indisposition of Prime Minister Laniel. After all he had to bear the supreme parliamentary responsibility. Mr. Bidault hoped that he would be up the following day but was willing to proceed at that time.

President Eisenhower then inquired whether Mr. Bidault would not prefer to discuss the next item on the agenda, namely, trade with U.S.S.R. He recognized that the discussion of EDC would be a great deal more difficult for M. Bidault as the head of his government was not there. He again inquired if M. Bidault would prefer to discuss trade. M. Bidault expressed his gratitude to the President for his charitable effort to help him and his delegation in their difficulties. He could only accept this generous offer if it were acceptable to the other delegations. President Eisenhower said that he was quite agreeable and it presented no specific difficulty for him. Sir Winston Churchill said that he felt EDC would be a good subject. President Eisenhower then said he understood M. Bidault’s difficulties and would not press for discussion of this subject. He did not see any direct connection between trade and EDC and if it were easier for M. Bidault, he would be quite prepared to discuss the trade question first. M. Bidault then smiled and said if all agreed, we could start on the discussion of EDC. The President and Sir Winston signified their agreement.

Sir Winston Churchill said that he felt that the discussion should be simplified by looking at what was wanted, what was the hope of EDC.⁵ It was to form a fighting front with an Army. There was nothing to prevent such a front from being formed under a unified command with whatever resources could be gathered at present. Such a front did actually exist at present. When he had been active in starting this idea in Europe of an EDC or European army, he had thought of it in terms of a grand alliance with all nations standing in line together under a unified command. All sorts of questions arose in connection with an army of a federation of Europe. Three years had been lost on complicated details and the only thing that had come out of it was the EDC Treaty. He felt that this Treaty was a great improvement of earlier editions. It included the division idea. He had felt that the previous idea of making an army in a few years of people talking different languages, armed with different weapons, was indeed forlorn. Even companies and battalions would have been of different nationalities. There could be no doubt that the division is the minimum that is workable. He would, therefore, refrain from making the criticisms he used to make when he had been independent. Personally, he preferred a national presentation of armies bound by a grand alliance. The present army would be the best that could be obtained with a unified command. We would be prepared to take our part with our troops on line in sections chosen for occupation. Immense sections would be undefended except by flank attacks. We would be prepared to take our part and submit to the Supreme Commander.

Sir Winston Churchill could not see why anything further than that was required nor could he see any reason for further proposals. He would do all he could for the defense of the West. British troops could be ordered to any part of the front. If a war were to break out and one who did not know were looking at the forces of the West in action, he could not tell whether they were operating as EDC or as a grand alliance. The troops could be moved about at will. He felt that an immense amount of mutual energy had been expended in raising new and complicated problems. Three years had been completely wasted in getting what was absolutely necessary, a good strong German army. We ought to have had it three years ago. Under EDC, this could be done with the consent of the German Government with safeguards against nationalistic excesses. It contained great advantages. It should not be let slip away but we might have to return to the plan of a grand alliance under NATO. We must have a German army. There was no use of talking of the defense of Europe against Russia without Germany. It was not possible to allow this immense no man’s land of Germany to remain utterly undefended. The Germans wanted to defend it and they ought to have effective means of defense. If this contribution were made within the framework of EDC, it would be the most satisfactory solution in the view of our French friends. We could not go on for three more years without a German army. We must have this German army; even with it the front would still be thinly held. But it would be a deterrent to the Soviets and he would beg his French friends to do their utmost. He well appreciated the efforts M. Bidault had made to make this possible. But if it were impossible to put EDC into operation in the next few weeks, eight or ten; if not, then he would be bound to say that he would propose to make a new version of NATO achieving the same hope as EDC, with controls over the German army by the NATO organization so as to make it quite clear that this army could not be used against France or to precipitate war to regain the Eastern lost territories, which are far more prominent in the German mind than the old stories of the Alsace-Lorraine which are now in the German mind “vieux jeu” compared to the Eastern and Western Neisse. Therefore, Sir Winston earnestly hoped that his French friends would realize that unless the EDC, that they had shaped so carefully, could come in at once, we ought to establish an arrangement under NATO that would give us at once 12 German divisions, all battle-worthy. Otherwise, we could not undertake this burden as it would present us with an insoluble problem. And we must do this or admit complete failure.

He felt it was very necessary that the Germans should know whether the agreements made with them will be kept. These agreements had been satisfactory to all. He also felt that it was necessary for the Russians to know that these agreements were going to be kept. He had spoken of a “détente” on the previous day but not at the expense of jeopardizing our situation. The United Kingdom would stand in line and obey the Supreme Commander. It would contribute to the utmost and do everything it could to make its contribution strong and effective. If there is anyone who cannot now come in to join the line of battle in preparation for these dangers, let him then stay out. Nothing could affect the dominating fact that British and U.S. troops would stand in line with their French comrades and their comrades of the Benelux and that they could be moved as required. To go on waiting would only weaken us from every point of view. It was wrong to think that we could effectively direct the future of Germany with this question unsettled and the Russians closely interested though without wickedness, in preventing the creation of any German military force. Sir Winston hoped it would be clearly understood that if France could not come to a decision, it would not prevent the formation of a German army as soon as possible incorporated into NATO with all the safeguards that could be arranged. He felt that army would fight loyally and effectively in defense of the West. If there were traitors then those who remained would close lines and stand together. Germany would then become a no man’s line subject to bombing, atomic and otherwise. It should make no difference of strength to EDC if the British were called partners—with EDC but not in it. The greater part of British armed forces were there. Some countries had comfortable armed forces at home. The British had not a single brigade in the United Kingdom. They were doing their utmost. He would not be prepared to advise his fellow countrymen to undertake more. He could not go forward with this if it should cause any delay in the formation of a German army. He was sorry to have to speak in this way and he would not do it if he did not feel that it were in the interest of France, as well as the United Kingdom. For 40 years, he had been intimately associated with the valiant efforts of his French comrades to face these perils. He knew well the fearful losses they had sustained in the first World War and their great efforts in the second World War. He understood the brilliant and valiant efforts of the resistance. Here the Prime Minister’s voice choked and tears came to his eyes. He well knew the gallant part that M. Bidault and Mr. Laniel had played in this resistance and this had won for them the gratitude of the free world. He must beg his French friends to understand that we must go on with EDC, or in NATO, a German army with a minimum of delay. Much preliminary work had been done and in a few years a substantial German contribution could be available. This would tend to check the Russians as it was the thing they feared most.

President Eisenhower said that in the normal course of events M. Bidault would then have the floor but he would like with their permission to say a few words. He was bold enough to feel that he could approach this matter in some sense as an expert. He had given a particularly intensive period of his life to the study of these problems. There were no easy generalized solutions. There was one important item which he felt had not been mentioned and that was the fact that the Germans, under their present leaders, do not want a German national army. He was certain that Chancellor Adenauer had no intention of setting up a mechanism which might be seized by the Hitler youth or some other similar organization and the German people once again be made the instrument of evil forces as in 1939. He could not agree that all this time had been lost. Much had been done. It is true that we should have started three years ago to set up German forces but there were then more difficulties. Not only was there the logical French fear of a resurgence of German militarism but when two nations had been enemies for centuries, to try and make a central core of a great defense force of them was indeed a difficult problem. There were differences of heart and mind as well as those of a technical nature. Much progress had been made. There was no question that M. Bidault completely understood this matter fully. He agreed with the Prime Minister that it was vital to bring in the Germans but this contribution should not be merely as an army but with heart, will and economic ties as well. To integrate them in a federation from which they could not break loose. They must never be in a position where they could blackmail the other powers and say “meet my terms or else.” While the President disagreed with no word that had been said, he felt that to resort to a national army was a second choice so far behind EDC that there could be no comparison. He did not even know if the Germans would agree. The last time he had talked to Chancellor Adenauer, the latter had been unalterably opposed to the idea. EDC must succeed. There could be no second alternative unless one was thinking of a future he could not now foresee. He had not reached these conclusions by standing off and studying the matter in an abstract fashion but rather he had arrived at these conclusions by visiting every capital, talking to statesmen and soldiers, and he found they shared his belief that it could work. If he had not believed this, he would never have assumed the responsibility to command these troops. This we must do. The President then said to M. Bidault that all knew where his heart lay. As he addressed himself to this subject which from the point of view of the United States was always cataclysmic in nature if it were to fail, he asked M. Bidault to tell us what we could do to help, for if it fails the President could not see what direction the U.S. might take. He again asked M. Bidault to see where he felt France’s friends could help her.

M. Bidault then said that he would like to start by saying to the great war leader with whom he might not always agree, that no mention of difference could ever alter his conviction that no Frenchman could ever forget the part he had played in restoring freedom, liberating territory, returning France to independence and the world to dignity. He would like to recall to Sir Winston that in an earlier ministry along side General De Gaulle, who was not a man given to fullsome praise, that he had said in the recently liberated capital of France that a thousand years would pass before Frenchmen even began to forget what Sir Winston Churchill had done for them. He would like to pay the same tribute to the Commander in Chief of the armies who had allowed the French to put not only his flag but their flag again at their windows.

M. Bidault felt that frankness could only serve their common purpose. He must confess that he and M. Laniel, after the heavy parliamentary battle they had watched, felt themselves somewhat in the position of the parishioner who was reproached for not going to church. They had done what they could and their efforts were not yet over. He had never hidden at meetings during the previous year the will of the government on this matter and the need for discernment on the question of time and means. There had been spread in the press an impression that the government’s determination had weakened in the face of difficulties. He had been blamed for this and quite unjustly. The battle being waged was a perilous one. When the President of the United States had expressed his opinion and understanding of the difficulties as well as his understanding of the resolution and suffering of the French Government under this grievous burden, this had brought M. Bidault to certain conclusions. He well recalled having been an honorable accomplice at Strasbourg of Sir Winston Churchill when the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe had voted for a European army under an appropriate commissioner. A fellow member of the present French Government, Mr. Reynaud, had even suggested that Sir Winston be that High Commissioner. The latter had told M. Bidault at that time he envisaged this as a federation of armies under a single command. On this, there might be different points of view. The EDC was truly a complex matter but he felt impelled to repeat after the President that both France and the German Democrats, and those who govern them with such admirable continuity and predominence of the civil power, would fear a German general staff with the consequent autonomous wehrmacht which could dictate the law as it had on three previous occasions. M. Bidault said he was not speaking with a gay heart. He had been Minister of Defense. To federate an army, like that of his country almost a thousand years old, was not an easy thing. There had been encounters which were marked on the flags of the two countries for centuries. There was no pleasure in integration. The sacrifice was enormous to prevent a German national army. He asked, therefore, that there be no talk of waste before such a deep and grievous enterprise. He did not plead infallibility nor advance the theory of perfection of French policy but his colleagues must understand the moral psychological and national drama of this problem for the countries situated on the western edge of the Continent. A German national army might or might not remember Alsace-Lorraine but it could not fail to remember that the first King of Prussia had been crowned in Koenigsberg, now known as Kaliningrad. This memory could not be rooted out of the proud past of a people. This was the first difficulty. The other was to explain to patriots, among whom he had heard during the war the voice of Mr. Churchill referring to the “hereditary enemy.” Three times in living memory France had been invaded. Three years was perhaps a long time to meditate. It was not long to take such a decision, if in the French Government M. Laniel and M. Bidault himself, who was perhaps of a more adventurous nature and had taught history, understood the dramatic difficulty of such a decision. They belonged to an honest French national government facing criticism from both flanks. If they set forth these difficulties, it was not as a sign of weakened resolution or to cloud the issues but rather to ask those who did not have to make such a decision to realize the width of the abyss France must leap and leap alone. A German contribution is controlled and limited by the Bonn agreements and supplemented by the Paris agreements.⁶ Its one goal is the accepted reconciliation by both countries working together with wisdom and strength to build up a unified European edifice. These were the goals and boldness of enterprise must bear in mind both the element of urgency and the extraordinary novelty of this idea. M. Bidault said he felt impelled to draw the attention of his colleagues to the fact that there was no guarantee against German rearmament in NATO which was on the basis of the general consent of those taking part. Any alternative solution would be extremely difficult to apply if indeed desirable. The very basis of NATO was non-discrimination. There were no limitations on strength, on the financial or economic strength of any country, regardless of the imbalance which might result therefrom.

Thus the French Government and M. Bidault agreed with what the President had said. The solution was not easy nor was it intellectually simple nor politically easy but there was no other solution. The loss of this difficult battle would be a cataclysm in both hemispheres. To win they would need good cards. The President and Prime Minister have told us to do all we could and to do it quickly. This we will do. There is a saying that “impossible” is not a French word. The first phase of the battle has been hard and help is needed for the second phase. The calm courage of M. Laniel helped win the first phase. The second phase could likewise be won. M. Bidault would like on the following day after talking again to M. Laniel and the other members of the delegation to tell his friends that which was needed to win. It was a matter which should be studied with understanding and friendship.

President Eisenhower then said that, if he might have the privilege of the last word, he would like to ask all those present to speak to no one concerning what had happened at the meeting. It was understood that this did not limit the action of the representatives appointed by the Foreign Ministers to prepare a statement to the press.

It was then agreed that the Foreign Ministers would meet on Sunday at 11 o’clock and the plenary meeting with the Chiefs of Delegation would take place at 5 p.m.

President Eisenhower then adjourned the meeting.

1. The U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a summary of this meeting in Secto 11 from Bermuda, Dec. 6 (396.1/12–653). This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. For a report on the Foreign Ministers meeting at 11 a.m., see FM MIN 2, p. 1763.
3. For the list of topics for the Bermuda Conference, see the attachment to FM MIN 1, p. 1749.
4. For a record of the conversation under reference here, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 1769.
5. For President Eisenhower’s account of this part of the meeting, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 245–246.
6. For documentation on the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty at Paris, May 27, 1952, see pp. 571 ff.; documentation on the conventions signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, United Kingdom, and France is presented in volume vii .